# Hegemony Good

# Impacts---T/L

### 2AC---Laundry List---T/L

#### US heg promotes nonproliferation of nukes, biosecurity, democracy, human rights, responsible AI norms, and alternatives to combat climate change

Denise Jenkins 22, Ambassador, Ph.D. in International Relations from UVA, MPA from State University of New York at Albany, JD from Albany Law School, BA from Amherst, graduate from The Hague Academy for International Law, retired US Naval Reserve Office, member of the New York State Bar, adjunct professor at adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law School, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and George Washington Elliott School of International Affairs, special envoy and coordinator for threat reduction programs under Obama, 5/26/2022, "Priorities Regarding the New and Emerging Challenges to International Security," United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/priorities-regarding-the-new-and-emerging-challenges-to-international-security/>, kav

Welcome and good afternoon.

I want to thank all of you for joining me here today when I know how very busy all of you are.

Last Spring, Secretary Blinken set out the Biden-Harris Administration’s vision of a foreign policy that leads with diplomacy, revitalizes our global network of alliances to meet emerging global challenges, and delivers for the American people. It is a vison, as the Secretary noted, that springs from two fundamental principles: that American leadership and engagement matters, and those countries need to engage and cooperate, now more than ever. It is the role of the State Department – and America’s diplomats and development workers – to engage around the world and build that cooperation.

Today, I am happy to be here to present my priorities as Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security; known inside of the State Department as ‘T.’

The ideas I list today are in light of the many changes that we see in the international security landscape. I chose today to present my priorities, just as we mark the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972. To me, it is a humbling reminder that even as we face monumental international security challenges today, our predecessors prevailed through the power of diplomacy. In everything we do, we will look not only to make progress on short-term problems, but also to address their root causes and lay the groundwork for our long-term strength.

I should note that while I am presenting these ideas, adjustments will be made as we continue to better understand the changes that are taking place and the security environment around us settles. Little did we know last year at the beginning of the Biden Administration that Putin would invade Ukraine. Things are continuing to change on a large scale.

Some of today’s arms control and international security landscape remains the same, such as the DPRK’s insistence on advancing its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and refusing to engage in diplomacy. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), still the most viable option to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, remains unclear. We remain strongly committed to our efforts regarding both the DPRK and the JCPOA. In the meantime, there are other changes – like Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war in Ukraine and the growing challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that present us with many more questions than answers.

Now is the time to consider a new way to address what are new challenges. Russia’s unprovoked invasion has led us to consider what gaps now exist. What does the new landscape mean for us and the issues within T such as arms control, deterrence, nonproliferation, security assistance, and emerging technologies? The People’s Republic of China is also posing new challenges in many areas of our responsibility. How do we address those challenges? Technology is advancing, as are the opportunities and challenges posed by an increased interest in space, while at the same time, climate change and resource limitations can lead to conflict if not addressed. We need to focus on the headlines of today, while keeping an eye on the trendlines for the challenges to come.

The T Family is comprised of three Bureaus: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. It is my honor to lead these Bureaus and work closely with their leadership to use our diplomatic engagements and programs and when needed, sanctions and other pressure, working with the interagency, to implement these priorities of mine.

Let me give you a preview. I have nine priorities. They are as follows:

Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities

Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance

Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective

Protect and promote the U.S. and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages

Promote, protect, and advance the U.S. Civil – Nuclear Industry

Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships

Building the “T Family Brain Trust” to Address New and Emerging Challenges to International Security

Examine “New” Areas of Conflict in International Security

Strengthen and Amplify the T Bureaus

The three T Bureaus are developing or will develop a way forward on these priorities, including new priorities I have asked them to incorporate. While these are my priorities, I note that all of the work of the Bureaus are important to the U.S. and to international security.

Priority One: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities

The T Family will continue to engage the international community in strengthening existing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes, and related activities, including in light of recent challenges to those regimes. This includes, where possible, meaningful engagements and dialogues with Russia and the People’s Republic of China.

I have worked in the areas of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament for 30 years and I can say that arms control remains as important today as it ever was. While there have certainly been challenges to and violations of international arms control agreements by a handful of countries, arms control is not dead as some would like you to believe. Arms control remains an important means to increase allied and global security by reducing risk and enhancing stability. The importance of arms control will also grow as we face competitors pursuing reckless and destabilizing buildups of their nuclear forces combined with opaque, nontransparent nuclear use doctrines. However, progress can only be made in a situation of de-escalation, not escalation. In all cases, we need willing partners sitting across and around the table.

We remain committed to the implementation of New START and eventually getting back to the table to continue the dialogue on laying the groundwork for future arms control and to the pursuit of follow-on measures to the New START treaty. As you know, following Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, we have suspended our Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD). That said, the issues that have been laid out prior to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine are even more important now. In that respect, we want to sustain limits on the Russian systems covered under New START beyond 2026, limit the new kinds of nuclear weapons Russia has fielded or is developing, and address all nuclear weapons including Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.

We must also be flexible as we consider the ways in which we pursue risk reduction and future arms control measures. We will be looking at the different types of forms these efforts can take, including but not be limited to a traditional approach of focusing on negotiating treaties. The way forward in this new international security landscape may be in the form of initiatives like the U.S. voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing recently announced by Vice President Harris, or codes of conduct, or best practices. We can see from the current crisis that the security environment remains complex and is becoming more complex. There is no single, elegant solution to managing nuclear or other 21st century risks. The U.S. is prepared to be creative in finding ways forward and partnering with others to make the world safer. That is what being a leader in arms control is about.

On nuclear disarmament, we remain committed to a world without nuclear weapons in the context of enhancing international security overall. While our concerns about the ability of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to achieve its goals have not changed, we remain committed to engaging in pragmatic efforts to pursue effective measures related to nuclear disarmament. This includes work conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), with whom we work closely.

We support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will work to achieve its entry force while maintaining our moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to seek negotiations on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and call on all relevant countries to join us in declaring and maintaining a moratorium on such production. We will also continue to work with our P5 colleagues, circumstances permitting, to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its three pillars. The U.S. assumes coordination of the P5 Process in June, and we hope to build on previous efforts. The recent P5 statement on the prevention of nuclear war is a good example of the important work we can do together; we must hold each other to those commitments.

We will put renewed focus on these efforts and now that travel restrictions have lifted, we are looking at when we can meet face to face with partners in these forums and discuss ways to move ahead, especially taking into account how the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine has impacted the landscape of that work. Indeed, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling only underscores the importance of preserving the record of non-use of nuclear weapons.

Our Bureaus will also continue to lead efforts to maximize support for enhanced verification capabilities throughout the U.S. government by partnering with the interagency, academia, the scientific community, non-Governmental Organizations, private industry, and others.

There are other new challenges that require continued attention. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly building up a larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal. The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable it to have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the estimated size that the United States projected just two years ago in 2020.

As I noted in my speech last year at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Conference, and it remains true to this day, the U.S. continues to request that the PRC be more transparent about the purpose and direction of its nuclear strategy. There is currently no formal dialogue between our governments on this subject, and limited tools are available to mitigate risk and prevent crisis escalation with the PRC. We will continue to seek engagement with appropriate PRC officials on risk reduction.

As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, or NPT RevCon, will at long last take place in August in New York. With the Russian government’s reckless and destabilizing rhetoric, it is more important now than ever for all States Parties to reaffirm the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and recommit to its goals. The August NPT RevCon provides an opportunity to do that. While the U.S. recognizes the challenges that Russia’s actions pose to the NPT, we will emphasize practical actions responsible nuclear powers can take to reduce nuclear risks and pursue a realistic path on arms control and disarmament, and to ensure that all NPT Parties can realize its full benefits. The RevCon presents an opportunity to reflect both on how much has been accomplished and on what can and must be done to preserve and extend that progress. The NPT remains instrumental in limiting the risk of nuclear war by avoiding a cascade of nuclear proliferation and laying the groundwork for progress on disarmament.

The U.S. will use the Review Conference to promote its objectives in all three of the NPT’s pillars – the areas of nonproliferation and strengthened safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. We plan to find areas of common ground on measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war and a positive dialogue among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).

The U.S. is also committed to the third pillar of the NPT – the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. In that respect, the U.S. and the UK have co-led an effort to build a multilateral deliverable, called the “Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses,” to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. The Sustained Dialogue aims to integrate non-traditional stakeholders in the NPT process to promote broader acceptance of peaceful uses as a solution to development challenges and to create a lasting framework that better captures peaceful use assistance as a dividend of the NPT. It provides a benefit of the NPT that often gets overshadowed by political debates on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

Here, I want to thank my colleagues, Ambassador Adam Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, for his leadership as we prepare for the NPT Review Conference, and for the work that former Assistant Secretary Tom Countryman has accomplished since he agreed to return to us and assist in this process.

We also see the Review Conference as an opportunity to recognize the continued need for a strong International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its work on safeguards, safety, and security. The IAEA has been doing significant work in the area of peaceful uses as well as in other areas of concern, including convening the recent first Review Conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, its work on cybersecurity, on nuclear law, and in other areas. Strong U.S. leadership on nonproliferation will also involve continuing to promote the combination of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) as the de facto international standard for verifying that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. This year marks the 25th anniversary of the AP, and so now is the time to reinvigorate our efforts in support of its universal adoption. We will also reiterate our support for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and for all states to halt production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

Moving on to the other important areas in priority one, there is a renewed focus on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As I noted at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva last year, for the past two decades, efforts to strengthen the Convention have been treading water. States Parties have been unable to agree to significant action. We face a biological weapons threat that is real and, in many respects, growing. Some states continue to possess sophisticated, well-established biological weapons programs, while non-state actors have shown continuing interest in acquiring biological weapons capabilities. Additionally, the widespread availability of sophisticated scientific and technological tools and methods is gradually eroding barriers to the development of biological weapons.

COVID-19 is a wake-up call for all of us. The astonishing human toll of the pandemic has illustrated our shared vulnerability to novel pathogens.

In Geneva, I noted a two-pronged approach. The Review Conference should take near-term, concrete action to strengthen the Convention and benefit States Parties. These actions include further operationalizing assistance under Article VII; establishing a voluntary fund for technical cooperation; creating a mechanism to review advances in science and technology; deepening collaborations on biosafety and biosecurity; staffing the Implementation Support Unit to carry out these roles; and enabling more agile decision making. The second way forward is for the Review Conference to take steps to address the harder issues. It should establish a new expert working group to examine possible measures to strengthen implementation of the Convention, increase transparency, and enhance assurance of compliance.

I was very happy this year to appoint a new BWC Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative to lead the government’s engagements on the BWC. I am pleased that the States Parties reached consensus to delay the Review Conference until November, which allows time for the newly nominated RevCon President to prepare for the meeting. Our Special Representative Ken Ward will spend the next few months working closely with allies and like-minded countries as we turn our broad concepts into specific proposals.

Along with this effort is work by my team to enhance[s] biosafety and biosecurity norms, practices, tools, and resources to bolster cooperation in forums such as the BWC, Global Partnership, and the Global Health Security Agenda. We will work to ensure the tools needed to address these challenges have the attention and resources needed to confront biological challenges. We will work to build national capacity to mitigate biological threats.

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC, the United States is on track to complete destruction of its chemical weapons by September 2023, and we have destroyed over 97 percent of our fully declared stockpile. Given the potential chemical weapons threat to Ukraine, the United States is again leading and working closely with allies and partners. I am proud of the bilateral security assistance that the United States has provided to Ukraine, including over $100 million in life-saving protective and detection equipment and related medical countermeasures, in addition to funds provided to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that will be used to assist Ukraine to protect against the threat of chemical weapons.

The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance is also continuing to work with the OPCW to hold Russia and Syria accountable for their past chemical weapons use and to deter further use. We look forward to additional OPCW reports this summer from its Investigation and Identification Team that will identify those responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The Bureau will continue to make advances in chemical forensics to improve the ability of the United States, allies, partners, and the OPCW to attribute the use of chemical weapons. The CWC States Parties Review Conference in 2023 is another opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their commitment to the CWC and its implementation. We are now considering our goals for the Review Conference to advance its work.

In all our work, we will continue to combat disinformation against U.S. activities and engagements.

The U.S. has been a leader in the development of conventional arms control instruments, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, we continue to see a role for conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. This kind of arms control can enhance mutual confidence and transparency among states and reduce the risk of conflict. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance continues to support full compliance with existing conventional arms control agreements and the development of new ideas for future confidence- and security-building mechanisms, including the modernization of the Vienna Document to reflect the new political-military realities in Europe. It is important to have a base of existing conventional arms control instruments that we can build on to restore a more enduring peace.

Moving on to fortifying related activities as I also noted in this priority, we will enhance the role of export controls and counter proliferation measures in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, and related technologies. The multilateral export control regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group – remain important bodies through which we work with our allies and partners to address proliferation challenges. The regimes protect nonproliferation imperatives while providing predictability for exporters and are the basis for preventing advanced technologies from falling into adversarial competitors. These regimes and institutions must adjust to the challenges in the international security landscape. We will enhance U.S. leadership in these regimes and institutions and advance novel approaches to the challenges each regime face. We will also support the important work of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s programmatic offices that promote adherence to the regimes’ guidance and updates to the control lists among non-member countries, thereby expanding the reach of nonproliferation norms. In that respect, I commend you to go online and learn more about the extensive programmatic work of the T Bureaus.

Priority Two: Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance

The T Family will continue to promote democracy, transparency, and accountability among our allies and partners as we lead the Department’s Security Sector Governance (SSG) efforts. This includes ensuring SSG is accounted for in a methodical, transparent way in our arms transfer and security assistance decision-making, supported by holistic diplomatic engagement, and protecting human rights and civilian security. SSG is about encouraging the leadership and security institutions we partner with to provide security to their people as a public good, rather than leveraging their power to further the narrow interests of the elite. The T Family will reassert the imperative of democratic principles and human rights at the center of our nation’s security assistance programs.

A fundamental aspect of this future work is to ensure that we integrate SSG into larger issues of foreign policy. Assistance should be an integral part of a longer, holistic, diplomatic strategy for our foreign policy goals and approach with countries rather than be transactional. We seek SSG integrated in a methodical, transparent way in our arms transfer and security assistance decision-making with diplomatic engagement.

For example, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will continue providing advisory assistance through the Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), which seeks to improve security sector governance and institutional capacity of select partners at the service, ministerial, and national levels. By focusing on systems and processes, GDRP projects aim to build the resilience of U.S. partners and their security institutions, enhance effectiveness and accountability, and better align the security sector to the needs and challenges of the partner nation and its citizens.

SSG is shaped by hard lessons learned. Americans are rightly wary of prolonged U.S. military interventions abroad. We have seen how they have often come at far too high a cost, both to us and to others. When we look back at the past decades of our military involvement in the world, we must remember what we have learned about the limits of force alone to build a durable peace; that the day after a major military intervention is always harder than we imagine; and how critical it is to pursue every possible avenue to a diplomatic solution. Security sector assistance cannot overcome or ‘fix’ underlying structural or political challenges. Rather, it must be part of a broader effort alongside lines of effort in the areas of justice, democratization, economic growth, countering corruption, and addressing stakeholder equities and concerns across the political spectrum. It is not enough to build defense institutions in tandem with “train and equip” missions; security sector governance must be the pacesetter.

Priority Three: Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective

As part of the Secretary’s modernization efforts to address 21st Century threats, the T Family is important to the Department’s efforts to address emerging technologies from a national security perspective. That includes leading efforts to prevent the proliferation of these technologies for purposes related to weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, to enhance alliance military cooperation on these technologies, and to develop appropriate norms of responsible behavior regarding their use. T Bureaus will enhance their work on emerging technology with new offices and expertise.

Our Bureaus are also engaged in discussions on other threats posed by emerging national security challenges presented by new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information sciences, and biotechnology, among others. We are looking at ways in which these challenges can be addressed considering the changing nature of the technology and threats posed by adversarial uses. The PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which blurs the lines between civil and military development, further compounds these challenges. The risk that sensitive technologies can be transferred via intangible means make it critical to conduct outreach to academia and industry and ensure proper vetting of foreign visitors and students, so they do not contribute to programs of concern.

We will work to implement related national security-focused strategies developed by the T Bureaus and including by supporting related Department efforts in the United Nations. This work will focus on how new technologies could present opportunities and risks to the security of U.S. allies and partners.

The T Bureaus and I will also promote the use of norms of responsible behavior or codes of conduct when promoting risk reduction in areas of emerging technologies such as space. AVC’s Office of Emerging Security Challenges has been consulting with allies and partners at multilateral forums and there is broad support for this approach. Other areas where we will seek to advance efforts to develop norms of responsible behavior include artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing.

The U.S. is also part of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). In March 2022, the U.S. Delegation submitted a proposal for consideration by the GGE titled “Principles and Good Practices on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” cosponsored by delegations from a number of other countries. This document builds on how International Humanitarian Law applies to LAWS and proposes additional measures that will be discussed by the GGE in July 2022. I will continue to support this effort.

Priority Four: Protect and promote the US and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages

American and allied technological advancements are core elements of the U.S. industrial strategy and President Biden’s key priorities, and the T Family will continue efforts to keep such technology and advancements from illegal acquisition. As noted, we are particularly concerned with threats posed by the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy that will fuse together its civilian economy and defense establishment so that advanced and emerging technologies drive economic and military modernization simultaneously.

The T Family has led U.S. participation in the four nonproliferation export control regimes for over 30 years and is partnering with allies and partners in other regional and bilateral efforts as we further build on these coalitions to protect sensitive technologies from adversarial acquisition and exploitation.

The T Family will also continue its updates to the U.S. Munitions List, engaging foreign governments as well as industry and university partners at home and at abroad to bolster their understanding on how to comply with applicable U.S. export control regulations, and strengthen allies and partners’ end-use monitoring programs for U.S. defense articles and services.

Priority Five: Promote, protect, and advance the US Civil – Nuclear Industry

The T Family [The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs] supports the Department’s efforts to promote U.S. nuclear power alternatives that support global norms of nonproliferation, safety, and security, including traditional large nuclear power plants and new, innovative small modular reactors, as part of the solution to global climate change. The U.S. will also continue to promote and support global norms of nonproliferation, safety, and security, and help to protect allies and partners’ critical energy infrastructure.

The Foundational Infrastructure for the Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) is one such endeavor.

The FIRST program provides capacity-building support consistent with the IAEA’s Milestones Approach to enable partner countries to benefit from advanced nuclear technologies and meet their clean energy goals under the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.

We will continue to seek engagements with countries through FIRST and other efforts that build capacity under the highest international standards and meet their energy needs.

FIRST was one of the Presidential deliverables for the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit on Climate and at the COP26 Climate Change Conference. We spearheaded an announcement by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis on cooperation to build a first of a kind small modular reactor in Romania. We have begun engagements under FIRST in recent months with the Philippines and Ghana, and we continue to seek engagement with other countries considering nuclear power for their clean energy needs. We have also recently signed two Memorandum Of Understandings on nuclear cooperation with the Philippines and Armenia.

We will also continue to engage all who are looking to take advantage of nuclear energy’s benefits to carefully consider the larger political, economic, and strategic consequences of their choices for peaceful nuclear energy cooperation partners, and—as countries are reminded of the urgent security risks posed by Russia and others’ energy diplomacy—we will aim to greatly deepen cooperation and coordination among like-minded allied and partner nuclear suppliers.

Priority Six: Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships

This goal connects all the other priorities. While it remains important to strengthen our relationship with traditional allies and partners, it is also important that we build new relationships with other countries who also are within our national security interests. In that respect, the T Family will enhance consultations with allies and partners and establish dialogues with new partners to develop and deepen a shared understanding of the changing international security environment and thereby further national goals and objectives. We will also negotiate security agreements to support closer cooperation.

For example, where appropriate, arms transfers and defense trade offer a key tool to strengthening alliances and establishing new partnerships. In the wake of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, many of Russia’s traditional security partners express concern on their own dependance on Moscow in terms of the demonstrated performance of Russian systems in their inventories as well as potential future difficulties obtaining future support and sustainment. We will work with industry to encourage countries to diversify away from Russian dependance.

#### U.S. heg is a prerequisite to solve existential risks, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and climate change

**Betz 21** [11/3/2021, Betz, Hans-Georg, Hans-Georg Betz is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Zurich. Before coming to Zurich, he taught at various universities in North America, including Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC, and York University in Toronto. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book chapters on radical right-wing populism. He holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT., “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony”, Fair Observer, <https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/hans-georg-betz-international-order-great-powers-american-hegemony-china-news-12512/>]//AA

**The international order is in deep trouble**, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, **the world is in disarray.** The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quicklythe beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to ascreechinghalt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that **America’s hegemonic position**, which it assumed after World War II, **is on the wane and**, with it, **the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.”** Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from **hegemonic stability theory**, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory **posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power** capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. **Order and stability require**, among other things, **that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern** the **interactions** between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain. This was anything but a natural transition. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the United States had refused to get entangled in international affairs. America’s retreat from internationalism after World War I was epitomized by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations — and that despite the fact that the league had been the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson. Isolationism went hand in hand with protectionism. Throughout the 19th century and way into the beginning of the 20th, the United States boasted some of the highest tariffs in the world. The culmination was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a devastating impact on international trade and contributed to the Great Depression. It was not until the United States entered the war against Nazi Germany that it assumed the role commensurate to its position as the economically and militarily by far strongest power in the world. Alternative Options The failure of the most recent G20 meeting in Rome to arrive at a meaningful common position on global warming and climate change ahead of the COP26 in Glasgow is further proof that the United States is no longer in a position to fill this role. Instead of leading, President Joe Biden blamed China and Russia “for any disappointment over the level of commitment by G20 leaders to fight climate change.” This is not to deny that Biden has a point. But given the enormity of the impact climate change is bound to have on the natural environment and life on this planet, it is little more than an exercise in passing responsibility. Biden’s remark, however, does address a serious issue, namely the role of China in a rapidly changing world. A few weeks ago, Chinese coal production reached new historic highs, amounting to an estimated 4 billion tons for this year. Accelerated coal production is supposed to alleviate energy shortages that have threatened to slow down the country’s growth. Unfortunately, emissions-wise, coal happens to be one of the worst sources of energy. **A new study on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions** on coastal areas **predicts catastrophic devastation** as a result of rising sea levels for some of the world’s megacities, particularly in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China — all major coal consumers. Given the concentration of China’s population in a string of coastal cities, one might assume that it has a particular interest in **combating climate change**. In theory, this **would entail** an **active involvement** in global governance, a proposition that China has been more than reluctant to embrace, presumably because it would entail directly challenging the United States. At the same time, however, China has launched major initiatives, such as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and particularly the One Belt, One Road initiative. Together with China’s massive engagement in Africa, these projects leave the impression that they are part of a comprehensive drive designed to establish China as an alternative to the United States. This might herald the emergence of a new system, no longer dominated by one power but multipolar, and certainly very different from the one established after World War II. For, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry has noted a few years ago, **“there is no liberal internationalism without American and western hegemony — and that age is ending.”** With the decline of the United States and the parallel rise of China, countries have the option to “seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support.” **The end result might very well be a bifurcated world order, on the heels of a period of instability and turmoil**, or what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini have called a “G-Zero” world, **one without clear leadership and global cooperation.** Bifurcation means the coexistence of competing systems that follow fundamentally different rules. This can already be observed in the realm of economic governance. Olga Petricevic and David Teece have recently warned of a “noticeable defiance of the principles of classical economic liberalism and the rule-of-law” by Russia and China. The Chinese “alternative model of governance,” they note, “is deploying coordinated protectionist trade and investment policies and government intervention aimed at accessing and acquiring foreign intellectual property, thereby influencing the global economic and innovation system.” Its success is likely to inspire imitation and attempts to jump on the bandwagon, resulting not only in bifurcation but in polarization reminiscent of the Cold War period.

#### US heg boosts transatlantic unity, keeps Russia and China in check, spreads democracy, and leads world peace

Ville Sinkkonen 22, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Center on US Politics and Power, 6/7/2022, "A Fleeting Glimpse of Hegemony? The War in Ukraine and The Future of The International Leadership of The United States ," Transatlantic Policy Quarterly, <http://transatlanticpolicy.com/article/1126/a-fleeting-glimpse-of-hegemony-the-war-in-ukraine-and-the-future-of-the-international-leadership-of-the-united-states>

The war in Ukraine is a world-historical moment – a pivotal event that comes around maybe once every decade. Already the Russian invasion has upended the post-Cold War European security order. However, beyond shattering established structures, crises tend to create opportunities. In this regard, the war in Ukraine is no different. From the standpoint of the United States, Moscow’s blatant aggression has creating an opening to reassert its leadership of the Western alliance and even recapture some of its post-Cold War hegemonic position, which has been challenged by revisionist powers China and Russia and domestic travails.[1] A little over six months after a chaotic exit from Afghanistan, President Biden and his administration are being hailed for the successful coordination of a joint transatlantic response in sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine. Joe Biden’s triumphant inaugural declaration looks prescient: “America is back”.

However, in the midst of such triumphalism, it is vital to pause and consider pathways forward. As the old international order receded, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s international engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world.[2] After briefly outlining how the Biden administration arrived at its pivotal date with history, this article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with to sustain the current “hegemonic moment.” Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.

From Relief to Trepidation and Back Again

In Europe and within the U.S. alliance network more broadly, the Biden presidency was greeted by and large with a sense of relief. After four years on Donald Trump’s America First rollercoaster, transatlantic relations would – so the logic went – give way to a smoother ride. For America’s friends and allies, Joe Biden was a known quantity, an experienced foreign policy leader with transatlanticism and alliance solidarity near his heart; a stark contrast to Trump’s unilateralist and transactionalist tendencies.[3] Biden’s team articulated a willingness to reassume America’s place at the relevant tables of international politics to “earn back [… its] leadership position”.[4]

Relatedly, the leadership role the U.S. has presently assumed remains in stark contrast to how the Trump administration dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic, shutting borders, hoarding medical supplies, and engaging in vaccine nationalism.

In the context of these high expectations, the first year of the Biden administration was a disappointment for many on the old continent. There were, of course, early successes. The U.S. decision to re-enter the Paris Climate Agreement and return to the fold at the World Health Organization (WHO) were greeted with applause by many in Europe. The President’s “feel-good tour” of the old continent in June produced pledges of support for the EU and NATO as well as headline-grabbing developments like the B3W (Build Back Better World) infrastructure initiative and a deal on the 17-year-old EU-U.S. dispute over airline subsidies.[5]

However, dark clouds were brewing on the horizon. The U.S. had already failed in consulting its European allies on the decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, ultimately taken in mid-April. The chaotic exit from the country in August, on the heels of a surprising Taliban takeover, led observers to question U.S. reliability and credibility and the Biden administration’s policy competence.[6]

The Afghanistan debacle was followed in short order by an announcement of a security pact by the U.S., UK, and Australia, dubbed AUKUS. The arrangement would grant Australia access to nuclear propulsion technology for its submarines. In the process, the French – the one EU member with ambitions of a sustained security footprint in the Indo-Pacific – lost out on a lucrative $66 billion deal to build diesel-powered submarines for Australia. In the ensuing dust-up between the U.S. and France, Paris even called home its ambassador to the United States.[7]

After these debacles, Russia’s maximalist calls to renegotiate the European security architecture and build-up of forces around Ukraine provided the Biden administration with an opportunity for a transatlantic reset after a challenging year. By airing intelligence findings about Russian troop movements and intelligence regarding the Kremlin’s plans, the U.S. eroded Moscow’s ability to rely on the element of surprise. Just as importantly, the U.S. took the lead in diplomacy before Russia shut the door on such endeavors with its invasion on 24 February 2022.[8]

Because of astute diplomacy and coordination in the weeks leading up to the invasion, the U.S. and the EU were swift in responding with punitive sanctions and have been able to up the ante as the Russian attack has continued. The provision of Western military aid to Ukraine has also been a joint transatlantic undertaking, and despite some public spats, such as over the fate of Polish MiG-29 fighter jets, the effort has allowed Ukraine to inflict considerable damage upon the invading forces. Meanwhile, NATO is bolstering its defenses on the Eastern flank and has regained a sense of purpose. In the span of less than three months, doubts over U.S. credibility have been traded in for celebrations of transatlantic unity.[9] Yet the war in Ukraine still raises several open questions about the future role of the United States in the world writ large and the shape of the transatlantic relationship in the coming years. Five sets of challenges appear particularly pertinent, namely, making most of the transatlantic unity, selling the U.S. and Western approach globally, engaging in two-theatre great-power competition, finding a balance between safeguarding democracy, and dealing with autocracies, and, last but not least, finding domestic backing for a sustainable foreign policy line.

Cashing in on Transatlantic Unity

The pronounced unity on sanctions against Russia and the steady stream of weapons deliveries and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine speak volumes for the reinvigorated strength of the transatlantic bond. Even Germany has gone against the grain of its strategic culture, pledging a €100 billion increase in defense spending and endeavoring to meet NATO’s 2-percent-of-GDP military spending target.[10] Declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019,[11] NATO has found a new sense of purpose, and is now debating the entry of two new members: Finland and Sweden. Both countries possess a long history of military non-alignment, robust democratic credentials and relatively strong militaries.[12] In fact, the entry of these two Nordic countries to NATO enjoys broad support within the alliance, and bipartisan support in Congress.[13] Such seismic shifts would have been unimaginable at the beginning of the year, let alone in the Trump era.

Yet, barring a leadership change in the Kremlin or a drastic Russian policy shift, a long era of “neo-containment” beckons on the continent.[14] After years of uncertainty over the future direction of the Western alliance, the U.S. commitment to the transatlantic relationship seems secure, at least for the time being. The U.S. has, for instance, increased its troop presence in Europe from 60 000 to 100 000 after the Russian invasion, alongside its material support for Ukraine.[15] In the long run, however, the future American military presence and shape of NATO’s deterrence posture on the old continent will depend on how the war in Ukraine ultimately plays out. The extent to which Russia’s military capabilities can be further degraded in Ukraine and the ability of either the Ukrainians or Russians to achieve successes on the battlefield before a negotiated solution or a stalemate are just two vital vectors that will impact contingency planning.

Whether the U.S. can cash in on its allies’ manifest willingness to invest more in defense is an even broader question. Europeans are finally answering a call for more equitable burden-sharing that U.S. administrations have been making for decades. At the same time, however, the transatlantic relationship has always presented Washington D.C. with a dilemma. The ability of the U.S. to influence its allies has depended on an asymmetry of power between the two sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, a more capable and autonomous Europe would likely be less willing to follow Washington’s lead.[16] This mode of thought has historically been at the core of D.C. insiders’ gripes regarding European strategic autonomy. Going forward, U.S. policymakers would need to drop such antiquated views in favor of a more approach to transatlantic security, one where the U.S. views European capacity building as positive progress regardless of the framework wherein such developments take place.[17] A more capable Europe would not only assume more responsibility for the continent’s security, but free up U.S. resources for use elsewhere around the globe. A stronger Europe thus makes for a better – even if at times more independent-minded – partner. Here the Europeans’ manifest demand for sustained U.S. hegemony and calls for strategic autonomy need not be irreconcilable.

A Worrying Global Context

While European solidarity has been on display in media headlines, and the U.S.’ traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific have been supportive, a prominent chunk of the world does not share the American and European understanding of the war.[18] Nor are they willing to take measures to sanction Russia either symbolically or materially. When the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council on 7 April 2022, 93 members voted for the resolution, but 24 voted against and 58 abstained. Notable abstainers included India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Vietnam, which the U.S. has sought to woo in recent years, voted against.[19] In the Middle East, the U.S.’ traditional partners have refused to pump more oil into the market amidst soaring energy prices.[20] Meanwhile, despite U.S. courtship of India in the Quad framework, New Delhi continues to balance American demands and its historical relationship with Moscow.[21] Testament to the difficulty of selling the West’s message in the global south, South African President Cyril Ramophosa has blamed NATO enlargement for the outbreak of the war.[22]

The world remains a messy place, and the ability of the U.S. to counter Chinese or Russian influence globally hinges on the U.S.’ ability to work pragmatically with regimes that possess few democratic credentials.

From the U.S. and Europe standpoint, this lack of support from outside the traditional West is a problem. Although the hegemony of the U.S. dollar makes going against its sanctions difficult,[23] how the U.S., EU, and their allies have managed to shut Russia out of the global economy is a warning sign to other potential targets of sanctions. Therefore, the war could hasten movement away from the dollar and euro as reserve currencies, eroding the future efficacy of sanctions.[24] Relatedly, the leadership role the U.S. has presently assumed remains in stark contrast to how the Trump administration dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic, shutting borders, hoarding medical supplies, and engaging in vaccine nationalism.[25] While Covid vaccinations have progressed with vigor in the West, vaccination rates are lagging in the global south. There is a stark contrast between the U.S. Congress approving a $40 billion package to support Ukraine, and its inability to agree on sufficient funding for the global vaccination drive.[26] In this vein, what might appear as newfound U.S. leadership in the West, can easily be construed as yet another manifestation of American and Western hypocrisy elsewhere.[27]

Competing on Two Fronts

In the process of upending the European security architecture, the Ukraine crisis has thrown the U.S. into the center of a “two-front great-power competition”.[28] At the start of the Biden presidency, there were few areas of bipartisan consensus in Washington D.C., but the imperative of engaging China in great-power competition came close. The incoming administration recognized China as a priority over other security challenges, including Russia. In fact, there was little discernible change beyond rhetorical nuance from the Trump administration when it came to China policy. The Biden team kept Trump-era tariffs in place, and despite a joint U.S.-China pledge made at the COP26 summit, competition has been the order of the day. Joe Biden’s recent statements indicating U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack – which would be a departure from decades of “strategic ambiguity” – underline how the U.S.’ China policy’s tides have shifted in the span of two presidential administrations.[29]

When it came to Russia, the initial intention of the administration was to manage the relationship so that the U.S. could finally reorient towards the Indo-Pacific – although there was no expectation of an actual “reset” with Moscow. Although the June meeting between Biden and Putin in Geneva appeared to pave the way for more predictable relations initially, Russia’s decision to pursue regional revanchism in Ukraine has laid any such plans to rest. The success of Ukraine in withstanding the Russian onslaught, with the help of Western weapons deliveries, has also enabled the U.S. to reframe its approach towards the Kremlin. In the words of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the U.S. “want[s] to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things it has done in invading Ukraine”.[30] This shift towards degrading Russia’s capacity is reflected in the investments the U.S. is willing to make to support Ukraine’s cause. These assets have broad bipartisan support, as manifested in the recent $40 billion bill that passed with comprehensive bipartisan support in both houses. [31]

To further complicate matters, just weeks before Russia embarked on its military adventure, Xi Jinping met Vladimir Putin at the Beijing Winter Olympics, and the two states released a statement asserting their friendship had “no limits”. While China has refrained from directly supporting Russia with military equipment, it has not condemned the invasion or gone along with Western sanctions, instead looking to benefit from cheaper Russian energy. While the Russia-China relationship is hardly a happy marriage, Beijing’s reaction proves it does not want to lose a partner who shares its distaste for American hegemony.[32] China is therefore unlikely to forsake Moscow, at least for the foreseeable future.[33]

The key question going forward is how the United States intends to maintain such a two-theatre posture in the great game of the 21st century. Obviously, this is a question of attaining and allocating the necessary resources to sustain such an approach, whether in terms of troops or materiel. Critics of the U.S. approach to Ukraine have already pointed out that the rejuvenated focus on the European theatre is a distraction, and the “U.S. Should […] husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia”.[34] Regardless of the constellation of capabilities the U.S. can muster for each theatre, the role of allies will be magnified, requiring astute relationship management from the United States in marrying the concerns and capabilities of its European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners.[35] This will be no mean feat, given the different threat perceptions and security concerns of U.S. friends across the globe.

Dilemmas of Democracy and Autocracy

President Biden has linked strategic competition to a broader contest between democracy and autocracy. For him safeguarding democracy is “the defining challenge of our time.”[36] To underline U.S. commitment to bolster democracy worldwide, the President fulfilled a campaign pledge by hosting the first ever Summit for Democracy in December 2021, albeit to little fanfare. While this narrative of the competition as a struggle between systems of governance plays to audiences at home and in the West writ large, it may actually operate in the converse direction in the rest of the world. Branding states as laggards is not ideal for enticing them into cooperation.[37] The world remains a messy place, and the ability of the U.S. to counter Chinese or Russian influence globally hinges on the U.S.’ ability to work pragmatically with regimes that possess few democratic credentials.

This dilemma has been on full display in the aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In its search for softening the spike in energy prices, the Biden administration has reached out to Saudi Arabia and its controversial crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and oil-rich Venezuela, a state under severe U.S. economic sanctions.[38] The current crisis has also opened up opportunities for authoritarian states to haggle with the hegemon. The opposition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, for instance, can be seen as a not-so-subtle ploy to obtain concessions from the U.S.[39] Of course, making deals and cultivating strategic relationships with unsavory regimes were part of the American toolbox in the bipolar competition of the Cold War and during the global “War on Terror.” The difficult task of balancing between the desire for bolstering democracy and the imperative of safeguarding U.S. interests will certainly remain at the heart of U.S. international engagement for decades to come.[40]

Domestic Concerns and Presidential Wildcards

The Trump era illustrated that the ability of the U.S. to sustain a globally engaged foreign policy is intimately tied to domestic politics. Trump consistently questioned the value of U.S. alliances and partnerships, was suspicious of multilateral institutions and opposed to free trade, and showed blatant disregard for democratic norms at home and abroad.[41] This “America First” foreign policy approach undercut U.S. influence globally as it pulled out of critical institutions and eroded allies’ and partners’ trust in U.S. security guarantees and America’s willingness to provide global public goods.[42] Doubts about the U.S. persisted throughout the Trump presidency, even though day-to-day U.S. diplomatic engagement and military cooperation with allies and partners remained intact, and the administration made substantial investments in its alliances, for instance in the auspices of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).[43] Trump’s rise to the presidency would not have been possible without the extreme polarization and hyperpartisanship that plagues American politics and the wariness of American voters regarding an active foreign policy. Despite Joe Biden’s pledges to unify the American people,[44] there are few signs of these phenomena abating. The world is thus justifiably holding its breath in anticipation of the 2024 presidential election.

It is unclear whether the war in Ukraine has created the conditions that will forestall a drastic foreign policy shift if a Republican candidate takes the White House in 2024. Admittedly, on Capitol Hill, the Republican party has, by and large, sought to portray itself as tough on Russia, creating an air of bipartisanship on the issue. The same goes for supporting building up NATO defenses on the Eastern flank or for the alliance’s open-door policy, particularly Finnish and Swedish NATO accession. At the same time, however, some Trumpian politicians and pundits have questioned the rationale of supporting Ukraine. Trump himself made headlines in the lead-up to the Russian invasion by praising Putin.[45]

Of course, beyond questions related to European security, Trump or a Trump-like President would likely retain the core parameters of the “America First” foreign policy approach. This would entail wariness regarding international institutions, a dogged focus on competition with China and resistance towards multilateralism and free trade. Even in the event of Democrats holding the White House, these tropes will continue to impact foreign policy. This is clear in the remarkable continuity between the China policies of the Trump and Biden administrations and Biden’s “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class”.[46] This entailed a pronounced focus on domestic initiatives during Biden's first year, including the $ 1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill and the initially $3.5 trillion Build Back Better framework, which never made it through Congress. In addition, the Biden administration has made little substantial progress on trade agreements, which has left it engaging China in great-power competition “with one hand tied behind its back” – much to the chagrin of its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.[47]

### 2AC---European Stability

#### Loss of US power now risks Russian conquest of Europe and global instability.

Brands 6/1 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 6-1-2022; "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America”; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-01/the-world-doesn-t-need-a-more-restrained-america#xj4y7vzkg>; Bloomberg; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply **reduced US role** in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though **not persuasive**. Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else. Some restrainers seek wholesale global retrenchment; others mainly decry ongoing US involvement in Europe and the Middle East. What unites them is a conviction that the overuse of US power has been catastrophic for America and the world. This coalition seemed ascendant a year ago, when President Joe Biden denounced the “forever wars” while pulling out of Afghanistan. That decision, two analysts argued, marked Biden as a hard-nosed realist — and perhaps an ally in the struggle to reshape American diplomacy. Yet the moment **didn’t last**. The collapse of the Afghan state even before the US finished withdrawing showed that, while waging wars is expensive, losing them can impose a **serious cost**. Then came Russia’s assault on Ukraine. As Vladimir Putin’s forces sought to restore the Soviet empire and murdered Ukrainian citizens, they revealed just **how awful** a world shaped by great powers other than Washington might be. Indeed, Biden isn’t getting much praise from self-proclaimed realists today. While refusing to intervene militarily, Biden has otherwise backed Ukraine with money, weapons and other support. NATO — whose peaceful expansion allegedly forced Putin to order a campaign of aggression and murder — now appears likely to add two new members, Finland and Sweden. Biden has even invoked the rhetorical legacy of his cold war predecessors, declaring that Ukraine is a vital front in the struggle to save the free world. In response, the restraint coalition has itself opened a new front, finding multiple reasons to attack Biden’s Ukraine policy. First is cost. Sustaining a medium-sized country under a ferocious military assault is fantastically expensive. The latest US support package for Ukraine totals some $40 billion — money, Hawley complained, that could be better spent on giving US military personnel a generous raise. Some Republicans in Congress seem to agree — 57 representatives and 11 senators voted, unsuccessfully, against the aid package. Second is risk. No one knows how the war in Ukraine will end. If the US helps Ukraine defend itself too successfully, the thinking goes, then perhaps a humiliated Russia will escalate wildly rather than accept defeat. Finally, there is politics. With Biden having gone all-in on Ukraine, there’s little space for the restraint contingent on the left. But Hawley and other Republicans seeking to inherit Donald Trump’s political base clearly believe that there is a constituency for claims that supporting a vulnerable democracy equates to putting “America last.” It is uncharitable to label such arguments “pro-Putin.” Forty billion dollars is real money, given that the Pentagon is struggling to find a 10th of that for urgent near-term improvements to America’s military posture in the Pacific. There is, undoubtedly, danger in a scenario where Putin worries that he is losing the war — and in consequence loses his head. But the perpetual problem with restraint is the corresponding unwillingness to consider what happens after America pulls back. Suppose Washington does slash support to Ukraine and leave European security to the Europeans. What does that bring? Judging by the past century — or even the past six months — the answer is **not a stable Europe** and a more solvent America. Rather, the result is likely to be a partially **successful Russian war of conquest** that creates **pervasive insecurity** in Europe; a continent that, lacking **American leadership**, is less united and confident in opposing Putin; and greater **global instability** that ultimately makes it harder to contain **China**, as well.

# Uniqueness

## Sustainability

### 2AC---UQ---No Heg Decline

#### U.S. hegemony resists collapse

**Kovac 2/19** (Igor Kovac, PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and Foreign Policy Advisor for the Slovenian Prime Minister, 2/12/22, “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, pg ii-iii, accessed 6/18/22)//sfs

Most International Relations literature suggests that when power becomes imbalanced, such a situation will be corrected – hegemony cannot persist over time. However, history offers us several examples of hegemonies lasting over a century, e.g., Ancient Rome, Ming China. So far scholars have offered four explanations for such enduring hegemony (Coercive Hegemony, Cooperative Hegemony, Cultural Hegemony, and Opportunist Hegemony), with a common mechanism: ineffective balancing. Namely, the hegemon has the capacity to put balancing at bay using different strategies flowing from the nature and fundamental principles of its hegemony. Hence, the hegemon uses coercion, institutional leverage, ideological indoctrination, or buyout, in order to assure its hegemony can endure. Yet, through time and through crisis the capacities of the hegemon to make the balancing ineffective diminishes. As such, these theories all share a similar assumption – imbalance is transitory and thus hegemony will breakdown. But what if that common assumption is incorrect. What if under certain conditions, imbalance is not resisted, but rather serves interests of non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon? Twentieth and twenty-first century US hegemony suggests such conditions may exist. This American imbalance displays a different nature and fundamental mechanism behind its functioning. Although US relative power is declining, its global monetary network centrality is not. Moreover, even in times of severe crisis, such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, or the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, we have not witnessed US monetary centrality decline. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The dynamics associated with an imbalance of power in favor of the United States runs against the expectations of existing theories. Therefore, we need a different theory to make sense of these particularities and make better policy recommendations. Thus, I have developed a Pervasive Hegemony Theory, which is based on a ‘buy-in’ behavior, that better explains US hegemony compared to existing alternatives. The ‘buy-in’ behavior relates to non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon, in which all countries continue to use hegemon’s monetary unit in their monetary relations, even in times of severe economic crisis. This reinforces the hegemony. Even though non-hegemonic states may not prefer the imbalance of power, they prefer conducting their economic relations within the hegemon’s monetary unit and thus perpetuate the imbalance. Subsequently, they can only maximize their selfish interests and autonomy by buying-in to the hegemony and reproducing the imbalance of power. Conversely, the hegemon may not like the current rules and norms of the international system, but it can change those and obtain the support of the non-hegemonic states if it accepts to provide its monetary unit as the central currency of the system. In pursuing this argument, I use both quantitative (Network Analysis and Time Series) and qualitative methods (Process Tracing). I use the former on available economic data to establish the claim of US economic centrality, and that it is something different than what we have seen in the past. Second, I process trace the mechanisms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic state behavior in two international monetary systems (Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods) in order to isolate and identify the buy-in mechanism and provide an explanation of enduring imbalance – ownership over the central monetary unit in global economy. The dissertation, thus, assesses existing theories and indicates their inadequacies in explaining an important international phenomenon and provides a more robust explanation of enduring hegemony with the economic centrality, namely the ownership of the central monetary unit.

#### **U.S. unipolarity is inevitable---no rivals are strong enough to challenge it**

Beckley 18 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense. Unrivaled : Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower., pg. 135-154, Cornell University Press, 2018. EBSCOhost]//AA

CHAPTER 6 The Unipolar Era “If Sparta and Rome perished,” the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked, “what State can hope to endure forever?”1 The resounding answer given by history is “no state.” In time, perhaps in another century or so, the American empire will crumble and new powers will rise. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for many decades. We are living in the unipolar era, and it will probably outlive us. So what? The United States might be the most powerful country in his- tory, but it has a limited presence in many corners of the globe, and weaker nations routinely trample on U.S. interests.2 The United States failed to pre- vent the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rise of the Islamic State, the Russian inva- sion of Crimea, Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, North Korean nuclear proliferation, and Chinese island-building in the South China Sea. Unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity: What difference does it make? In this final chapter, I explain why this view is wrong by highlighting several ways that unipolarity transforms world politics. The good news is that unipolarity dramatically reduces the likelihood of great power war. The bad news is that it may increase the likelihood of asymmetric conflict and undermine American national unity and the liberal world order. No Hegemonic Rivalry The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past five hundred years when a rising power challenged a rul- ing power.3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium. The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conflict more likely—but none of these con- flicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry. To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identified by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-five years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths world- wide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars.4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent.5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined.6 What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life.7 Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans sud- denly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dra- matic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology.8 The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy fighting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conflict.9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than fight to overturn it.10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challeng- ers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions.11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

#### Renewed US leadership counters Russia and reinvigorates US hegemony

**Brands and Beckley, 22** (made the, 3-14-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, "The Return of Pax Americana? | AEI", https://www.aei.org/articles/the-return-of-pax-americana/)

The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse.

This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today.

### 2AC---UQ---U.S. Heg High Now

#### Heg is strong now. Prefer empirically backed models of testing.

Feirut Murat Ozkaleli and Gunes 21, Professor at School of Public International Affairs in international relations and comparative politics, Ph.D. from University of Colorado, MA from University of Denver, form chair of international relations department at Harran University, former associate director of graduate school at Lefke, former director of the Middle East Research Center at Zirve; Ali Gunes, ADA University, School of Public and International Affairs, Teaching Fellow CERGE-EI Foundation, December 2021, "Allied but Deviating NATO in the Multipolar World: Exploring Time Profiles of Western Alliance Cohesion Using Ideal Point Estimations," Global Governance 27(4) p. 561-586, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/glogo27&div=32&id=&page=>, kav

Utilizing ideal points, we proposed cohesion, deviation, and adhesion measures to empirically explore security alliance cohesion, Member State deviations, and third state adhesions. Our findings suggest that security alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact had higher cohesion than other UN members, that external threat increased security alliance cohesion, and that the United States turned out to be the most significant deviating member in NATO since 1980, while third countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan were more aligned with the NATO alliance whereas Israel was more aligned with the United States. By using our measures, one can study any alignment pattern among any state groups in the UN, even without a priori identifications of state groupings. Measures developed and tested in this study can provide researchers with strong diagnostic tools. The study contributes to the overall UNGA voting literature by providing statistical inferences about the validity of the data.

We believe that the approach and new measures presented here could be useful to investigate cohesion levels in other intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as economic communities like BRICS, while pinpointing each state’s political distance vis-à-vis each other or to a defined group of states. Furthermore, using this approach and these new measures could help researchers to concentrate on specific questions (e.g., whether the foundation of BRICS really brought Member States together on the issues of high politics, or whether Brexit could have been predicted). In other words, while the approach offered here was utilized more for descriptive purposes, it presents a superior alternative to measure variance across time, increasing our predictive power for actual or potential dramatic policy shifts at Member State and at (any) group level by using the UNGA voting data.

As the Trump administration threatened to abandon NATO, and as Russia revives and China rises, “How long can NATO last in a post-US hegemonic, multipolar world?” became one of the most important questions in contemporary world politics. Contrary to Trump’s withdrawal rhetoric, we found that the height of the US ally deviation from NATO was during 2001–2008, coinciding with the presidential term of George W. Bush. In fact, our findings suggest that Trump’s NATO deviation scores came behind those of two Democrat presidents, Obama and Clinton, when they were put into an ordinal scale for heuristic purposes.

Throughout this article, we deliberately tried to avoid any discussion that might not be empirically verified, keeping the scope of the article rather descriptive. Still, we believe studying the past of the security alliances would give us considerable explanatory and even predictive power. We observed that threat perception, both for external and internal (i.e., intra-alliance) threats, played a significant role in political alignments for security alliances. The 9/11 attacks and activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty led to a turning point for the NATO allies, as free riding was replaced by joining costly global wars that were arguably triggered by US hegemony in the world. In the past, the United States provided deterrence against the Soviet Union as a public good for NATO members. Over the past two decades, however, an increasing number of NATO members have come to believe that they are being dragged into “American wars.” In this case, the problem would not be one of US abdication or abandonment but balancing the hegemon.59 NATO has survived US ally deviation for four decades. The height of US deviation was actually in the past, not in the present. While alliance cohesion was an important topic, especially after the end of the Cold War, discussions about NATO have happened largely at a theoretical level, revolving around realist, liberal and constructivist propositions about whether NATO would collapse or survive.60 The present research, in contrast, was conducted at an empirical level. By applying this approach to NATO, we were able to measure the flexibility of the arrangement and obtain evidence to show what was really happening with the United States and NATO, despite what might have been expected from the rhetoric of Trump. While our findings support some earlier proposals, such as the external threat hypothesis, they also contradict some others, including the literature on the decline of US hegemony and its policy implications. We therefore hope that the new approach developed here to measure foreign policy preferences by using a spatial model and UNGA voting data might reignite interest for more empirically driven future research on NATO and other alliances, as well as cohesion of states in other organizations, while also strengthening the overall validity and therefore confidence in using UNGA voting data with spatial models.61

#### The US is trying to expand hegemony now to compete with China

Bessner 22 - is an Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, 4/7/22 (Daniel, “Ending Primacy to End U.S. Wars”, Quincy Institute, <https://quincyinst.org/report/ending-primacy-to-end-u-s-wars/#china-and-primacy>, accessed 6/26/22)//jd

It is painfully obvious today that U.S. officials remain committed to primacy even though the strategy has led the United States into several expensive wars of questionable value to the nation’s fundamental security interests — Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria — all of which have diverted resources that could have been better spent on improvements at home. Moreover, polling suggests that younger generations are becoming increasingly skeptical of primacy and more interested in participating in international organizations, which indicates that now is an apt time to reconsider a grand strategy that decision-makers embraced more than 75 years ago.22 Biden’s August 31, 2021, speech announcing the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan makes Washington’s continued devotion to primacy very clear. The president declared that the United States remains committed to combating threats from “across the world,” from Somalia to Syria, from Iraq to Africa and Asia, and will use its “over-the-horizon capabilities” to launch attacks when and where it thinks it should.23 The entire globe, it appears, remains under the U.S. ambit. Thus the United States retains 750 military bases and other facilities abroad, and thus the nation devotes almost $800 billion per annum to its military budget.24 In his Afghanistan speech, Biden cast China as the central threat to U.S. interests.25 Indeed, in his first speech to Congress as president, on April 28, 2021, Biden affirmed that the United States is “in competition with China and other countries to win the 21st Century.”26 While competition does not necessarily imply military conflict, Biden’s speech was followed by an increased military budget as opposed to other sorts of investments — in science, technology, and education, for instance. In early April 2022, Biden approved an additional $29 billion increase in defense spending.27 This suggests that the Biden administration remains fundamentally committed to primacy — that is, armed global domination. The idea seems to be that either the United States militarily dominates China or China militarily dominates the United States. Among the policy planners, no third scenario can be imagined. It is painfully obvious today that U.S. officials remain committed to primacy even though the strategy has led the United States into several expensive wars of questionable value to the nation’s fundamental security interests. According to primacy’s advocates, the globe cannot peacefully encompass a plurality of powers and interests: It can accommodate only one power that rules through domination, or what is euphemistically termed “leadership” when the U.S. is the hegemon. This is why “primacists” are so worried about China: They view international relations as a zero-sum game. As Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue in The Empty Throne, “a world with no leader would leave the United States poorer and less secure than if it continued to lead globally.”28 Indeed, Daalder and Lindsay are quite worried about China, affirming in no uncertain terms that “[a] Chinese-dominated world would not be friendly to the United States.”29 When making arguments such as this, primacists fail fully to consider that a more multilateral world might be defined by cooperation instead of security competition. Rush Doshi, who is currently a member of Biden’s National Security Council, likewise frames international relations in zero-sum terms. In The Long Game, Doshi worries that China has developed “a grand strategy to displace American order” and become “the world’s leading state.”30 The only thing the United States can do, Doshi concludes, is “adopt an asymmetric approach that blunts Chinese advances at lower cost than China expends in generating them.”31 Cooperation is barely thinkable. Over the past several years, U.S.–China relations have soured markedly. The Trump administration, which was replete with China “hawks,” instituted several tariffs on Chinese imports that provoked retaliatory measures and resulted in a minor trade war between the two countries. Trump also undertook several other actions that indicated his administration’s hostility toward China. He launched a vigorous campaign to limit the reach of Huawei, the highly competitive telecommunications giant, eventually pressuring Canadian authorities to arrest Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial officer, on bank fraud charges (charges since dropped). In 2019, Trump’s Treasury Department officially labeled China a currency manipulator; that same year, the president signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which authorized sanctions against those who commit human rights abuses in Hong Kong. Trump’s insistence that Covid–19 was a “Chinese virus” was merely the crudest reflection of his administration’s view that China was the main threat to U.S. supremacy.32 The Biden administration has similarly pursued a number of policies intended to counter China’s rise. The Federal Communications Commission, the Commerce Department, and the Treasury have blacklisted numerous Chinese companies as the administration has sanctioned several individuals in connection with Beijing’s Hong Kong policy and its treatment of the Uighur population in Xinjiang Province. The administration has also prevailed upon NATO to declare China a security risk. Moreover, Biden has continued Trump’s ban on U.S. investment in Chinese defense-technology companies and, earlier this year, forbade U.S. officials from attending the Winter Olympics in Beijing.33 Finally, last June the Senate passed the U.S. Innovation and Strategic Competition Act, which is specifically intended to combat China (particularly in the technological sphere); the House approved a related America COMPETES Act in January 2022.34 What, exactly, is Biden willing to risk in his attempt to ensure the U.S. remains the prime power wherever and forever? Might he, or a future president, risk war?

### 2AC---UQ---Economic Sustainability

#### Heg is sustainable, especially economically – the US dollar persisting as the world’s leading currency proves

Kovac 2/19/22 [2/19/2022, Kovac, Igor, Igor Kovac, a visiting researcher at The Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), located at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He received my Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati, and he currently serves as the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister. He has held a pre-doctoral fellow position at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University, and has obtained a M.A. in International Studies from The Vienna School of International Studies, M.S. in Sport Science, and a B.Sc. in International Relations, both from University of Ljubljana respectively., “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, University of Cincinnati, <https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=ucin1649768025217516&disposition=inline>, AA]

As such, conditions for successful balancing against United States and breaking up its hegemony were perfect in 2008. Thus, if non-hegemonic balancing were to take place, one should expect it to be seen at that point. Such balancing should be reflected in diminishing global confidence in the US dollar and its shrinking role in the global economy. Yet, the story we have experienced since 2008 is very different. Figure 5 shows the contemporary dominant position of the US dollar in comparison to other currencies according to five criteria. Furthermore, looking at the US dollar position dynamically since 2008 brings us to the same conclusion. If anything, the global position, and dominance of the US dollar has actually increased after 2008. It has not stayed the same, nor has it declined. Figure 6 portrays the issuance of international credits and what is astonishing is that with the rise of the amount of credits issued, also the amount of them issued in US dollar increases, while those in Euro or Japanese Yen decrease. Therefore, the US dollar has also strengthened its relative credit issuance position after 2008.

### 2AC---UQ---Hegemonic Stability Theory

#### **The pervasive hegemony theory asserts the sustainability of U.S. heg**

Kovac 2/19/22 [2/19/2022, Kovac, Igor, Igor Kovac, a visiting researcher at The Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), located at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He received my Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati, and he currently serves as the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister. He has held a pre-doctoral fellow position at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University, and has obtained a M.A. in International Studies from The Vienna School of International Studies, M.S. in Sport Science, and a B.Sc. in International Relations, both from University of Ljubljana respectively., “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, University of Cincinnati, <https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=ucin1649768025217516&disposition=inline>]//AA

2. PERVASIVE HEGEMONY THEORY “In /a/ sense, **money and languages have similar characteristics, and the US dollar is the lingua franca for today’s international monetary system.**”58 The crux of the Pervasive Hegemony Theory is the ‘buy-in’ dynamic, by which **the hegemon and non-hegemonic states both reinforce the hegemony.** Since the latter is defined as a set of rules, norms, and principles of how the hegemon centers the world economy around it. This means that the hegemon and non-hegemonic states either display their commitment to existing economic rules or consensually embrace new ones. Hence, assuming that monetary relations are the most important aspect of economics, and that politics and economics are not independent, **the rules composing a monetary system is at the core of hegemony, and its change is my dependent variable.** Being interested in enduring hegemony, I want to observe how a hegemony endures even when it must change this quintessential dimension—the monetary system. I operationalize the International Monetary System (IMS) and its rules through the monetary trilemma59 and the manner of its functioning in terms of adjustment, liquidity, and confidence.60 Still, theoretically the more important question is **why do non-hegemonic states and the hegemon alike ‘buy-in’?** I argue that **it is due to the hegemonic ownership of the central monetary unit.** Thus, this is my independent variable, which is composed of two elements: first, the central position—referring to the most important node in a network;61 second, the ownership—meaning a control over the production of the monetary unit. Therefore, I operationalize this variable by measuring the network centrality of the hegemon’s monetary unit over time (e.g., reserves, transactions). As such, if the global centrality of the hegemon’s currency is stationary (mean and variance do not change through time)62 even in times of economic crises, and during a subsequent change in the IMS, we can talk about the presence of a ‘buy-in’ and this hegemony may be classified as a pervasive hegemony. Hence, the ownership of a central monetary unit creates a system where the non-hegemonic states can extract the benefits of using the hegemon’s currency only if they ‘buy- in’ first, i.e., reproduce the IMS. The latter sequence is necessary as the hegemon may not be willing to procure its currency, particularly in times of crisis. Moreover, the ownership of the central monetary unit plugs into the risk-aversion of non-hegemonic states, so they do not seek an alternative monetary unit, as existing monetary centrality sufficiently generates the framework for their fulfillment of autonomy and maximizing national interests. Instead of seeking alternatives, they reinforce the new rules of hegemony, i.e., of the monetary system. Subsequently, the hegemon does not roll back its currency, and the non-hegemonic states may continue to reap benefits from using the hegemon’s currency. The hegemon reaches the same conclusion through an opposite perspective. Namely, the hegemon realizes that it is through the provision of a central monetary currency that it can generate a new consensus on the rules, norms, and principles of the IMS that would reflect its own selfish interest better. Therefore, the hegemon is interested in securing such a new monetary system first, before making its currency available. Hence, **both sides reinforce the hegemony, while at the same time both sides follow their selfish and rational national interests.** US pervasive hegemony, is therefore, the story of US dollar centrality.63 Helleiner sums it up perfectly: “Washington has played little direct role in promoting dollarization abroad. Nevertheless, the United States has profited from this development.”64 For example, according to one estimate, the annual return on US investments overseas is 1.2% higher than its payments on overseas debt.65 However, the literature66 is divided along the fault line of US dollar persistence in its global dominance,67 and an evolution away from US dollar-based system towards multi- currency world.68 Furthermore, it is also skeptical about US benefits from its hegemony.69 Helleiner and Kirshner “argue that there are three distinct sets of /.../ assumptions that dominate the literature on the future of the dollar: those embodied in market-based, instrumental, and geopolitical approaches to the subject.”70 In all three of these approaches one finds scholars that support the decline of US hegemony and predict a bleak future for the US dollar, as well as those who predict the sustainable dominance of the US dollar and hence US hegemony.

**The US has created a stable international order, that can be easily undone by diminishing hegemony.**

**Kagan 17 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS** [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. Jan 24 “The twilight of the liberal world order” <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/> [Acc 6/21/22](https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread%20Acc%206/6/22) SM]

However, it is the two great powers, **China and Russia**, that pose the greatest **challenge to** the relatively **peace**ful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an **unprecedented global calamity.** It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been **held in check** and **great power conflicts have been avoided.** The **role of the U**nited **S**tates, however, has been **critical**. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost **insuperable obstacles** to achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “**situations of strength**” in their regions that have required them **to pursue their ambitions cautiously** and in most respects to **defer serious efforts** to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a **check on their ambitions** in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism have posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an **existential threat**—and **with reason**. The **continual threat** to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more **cautious approach** when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, **only when invited** to do so **by U.S. and Western passivity**. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world **have had to be careful.** The **greatest check** on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined **military power of the U**nited **S**tates and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a **daunting challenge** to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge.Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the **inherent stability** of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the **distant American superpower** to **contain their ambitions**.The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be **too great to be seriously challenged** by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

**The only way to preserve liberalism is through American hegemony.**

**Kagan 21** [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. March/April “A Superpower, Like It or Not: Why Americans Must Accept Their Global Role” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-16/superpower-it-or-not [Acc 6/21/22](https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread%20Acc%206/6/22) SM]

The messy truth is that in the real world, the **only hope** for preserving liberalism at home and abroad is the maintenance of a world order conducive to liberalism, and the **only power capable** of upholding such an order is the **U**nited **S**tates. This is not an expression of hubris but a reality rooted in international circumstances. And it is certainly a mixed blessing. In trying to preserve this order, the United States has wielded and will wield power, sometimes unwisely and ineffectively, with unpredictable costs and morally ambiguous consequences. That is what wielding power means. Americans have naturally sought to escape this burden. They have sought to divest themselves of responsibility, hiding sometimes behind dreamy internationalism, sometimes behind a determined resignation to accept the world "as it is," and always with the view that absent a clear and present danger, they can hang back in their imaginary fortress. The time has come to tell Americans that there is **no escape from global responsibility**, that they have to think beyond the protection of the homeland. They need to understand that the purpose of NATO and other alliances is to defend not against direct threats to U.S. interests but against a **breakdown of the order** that best serves those interests. They need to be told honestly that the task of maintaining a world order is unending and fraught with costs but **preferable to the alternative.** A failure to be square with the American people has led the country to its current predicament, with a confused and angry public convinced that its leaders are betraying American interests for their own nefarious, "globalist" purposes. The antidote to this is not scaring the hell out of them about China and other threats but trying to explain, again, why the world order they created still matters. This is a job for Joe Biden and his new administration.

**American Isolationism breeds instability and a rise in revisionist powers.**

**Kagan 17 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS** [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. Jan 24 “The twilight of the liberal world order” <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/> [Acc 6/21/22](https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread%20Acc%206/6/22) SM]

With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have signaled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to **uphold liberal norms** in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interestof preserving an **open economic order**. Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the **instability and clashes** of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more **aggressive revisionism** by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests. History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of **global responsibility**, to **reject strategic involvement** to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially **selfish policies p**ursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the **calamities** of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of **global conflict.** One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of **complete capitulation**. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

### 2AC---UQ---Decline = Fake News

#### US Hegemonic decline is a product of fake news and sensationalist reporting – sustainability is different from perfection

**Jackson, 22** (Lauren Jackson, 1-7-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, The New York Times, "The Idea of American Decay", https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/07/podcasts/america-decline-capitol-riot.html)

The idea that America is in decline isn’t new. For decades, academics have warned that partisan gridlock, politicized courts and unfettered lobbying were like dangerous substances — if taken in excess, America’s democratic systems were at risk of collapse. But what happens when the idea itself gets mainlined? When words like “died,” “decline” and “dagger” sit near “America” on front pages across the country? When a majority of the American public rewrites the story they tell themselves about their country’s standing in the world? That’s what some experts say is happening now — that the Capitol riot and its aftermath have normalized a sense among Americans that the country, its economic system and its standing in the world are in decline. New data supports this claim: 70 percent of Americans believe the U.S. is “in crisis and at risk of failing,” according to a recent poll. Fortifying America’s democracy is not just about ensuring the trustworthiness of elections, but also about safeguarding Americans’ belief in the possibility of change. So what happens when that self-conception falters — when Americans begin to believe their country isn’t winning, but instead is losing a long battle? A fractured collective narrative at home “Jan. 6 and then the Republican reaction is a really important turning point in the perception of American decline,” said Francis Fukuyama, a political scientist and author. Mr. Fukuyama noted that while he had been writing about American political decay for years, the concept had assumed more systemic import after the Capitol riots — and wider acceptance. Just a few years ago, a majority of Americans believed the U.S. was one of the greatest nations in the world. In a Pew Research survey from 2017, 85 percent of respondents said either that the U.S. “stands above all other countries in the world” or that it is “one of the greatest countries, along with some others.” Additionally, 58 percent of those surveyed said the American democracy was working “somewhat” or “very well.” “Prior to the rise of all this populism,” Mr. Fukuyama said, “there was a basic progressive narrative to American history. And that was based on a Declaration of Independence and a Constitution that were flexible enough to be modified over time to be made more inclusive.” “This American narrative that has held us together, it doesn’t hold anymore,” he said, adding that the riot, “more than anything that happened during the Trump presidency, I think does underline that.” Now, nearly two-thirds of respondents in the NPR/Ipsos poll agreed that U.S. democracy is “more at risk” now than it was a year ago. Among Republicans, that number climbs to four in five. This narrative persists on both sides of the political spectrum — with each side pointing the finger at the other as a threat to the nation’s well-being. It’s also a narrative that has direct effects on American democracy — polarizing partisanship on national and local levels, affecting critical legislative functions like passing budgets and limiting social consensus-building in response to crises like Covid. The Themes of the Jan. 6 House Committee Hearings In light of these varied crises, “what is most striking is not what has changed but what has not,” Peter Baker, The Times’s chief White House correspondent, wrote on the anniversary of the Capitol Riots. “America has not come together to defend its democracy; it has only split further apart.” It is this growing chasm that some political theorists say will be most difficult to reconcile in the interest of shoring up America’s democratic institutions. “We have two Americas,” James Morone, a professor of political science at Brown University, said, with Americans in urban centers experiencing the benefits of globalization while many in rural areas feel left behind as the American middle class shrinks. These two Americas also often inhabit opposing factual realities, allowing misinformation to persist and even fuel violence. “And here’s the thing: Each is represented by a different party. That’s one reason the two-party system is breaking down.” Rippling effects abroad This national self-doubt also has implications for the perception of American strength and supremacy globally, a challenge for President Biden’s foreign policy as his administration struggles to win back the global repute thrown into question by four years of “America First.” In his address at the Capitol on Jan. 6, Mr. Biden said, “Both at home and abroad, we’re engaged anew in a struggle between democracy and autocracy.” Donald J. Trump and his allies continue to push a false retelling of the 2020 election, in which Democrats stole the vote and the Jan. 6 riot to disrupt President Biden’s certification was largely peaceful or was staged by Mr. Trump’s opponents. This approach is part of a broader transformation of authoritarian tactics globally, as Max Fisher, the Interpreter columnist at The Times, points out. “Dictators have shifted emphasis from blunt-force repression (although this still happens, too) to subtler methods like manipulating information or sowing division, aimed at preventing dissent over suppressing it,” he wrote. Now, history is being rewritten in Russia, Hungary and China, where governments are repressing and sanitizing elements of national history in favor of contemporary politics — as is also happening in the United States. This tactical similarity with foreign autocrats, some experts argue, throws American ideals into question internationally. “If crucial facts can be denied by a major American party and millions of American citizens, aren’t all American claims to truth and rationality suspect?” said Robert Daly, director of the Kissinger Institute on China. “For as long as I can remember, U.S. democracy, even with its flaws, was held up as the gold standard of democracy worldwide,” said Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America program at the Wilson Center. Now, according to a Pew Research survey, a median of just 17 percent of respondents said democracy in the U.S. is a good example for others to follow. America still benefits from some positive reputational assessments around the world, with a majority of respondents to the Pew survey expressing favorable opinions on America’s technology, its military and its entertainment output. But some experts argue those sources of soft power are also under threat in conjunction with democratic backsliding. “One of the side effects of losing the democracy is losing control over the markets,” Rebecca Henderson, a professor at Harvard Business School, said, adding, “I think it’s an incredibly dangerous moment. I think we absolutely could lose the democracy.”

### 2AC---UQ---AT: Multipolarity Inevitable

#### No multipolarity – the US is still the world’s only superpower

Farrell and Newman 3/7 [Henry J. Farrell, Abraham L. Newman; Henry Farrell is the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Agora Institute Professor of International Affairs at SAIS, 2019 winner of the Friedrich Schiedel Prize for Politics and Technology, and Editor in Chief of the Monkey Cage blog at the Washington Post. Abraham L. Newman is an American political scientist and professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University and Director of the Mortara Center for International Studies.; 3-17-22; "US is the **only** sanctions **superpower**. It must use that power wisely”; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/us-is-the-only-sanctions-superpower-it-must-use-that-power-wisely/articleshow/90285787.cms?from=mdr; The Economic Times; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

For years, many believed that a world of global economic networks and interdependence — countries intimately connected via supply chains and finances — made war obsolete. That is part of the reason Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was so shocking. But the international economy itself has turned into a battlefield. The conventional war in Ukraine has unleashed a swift and staggering economic conflict, led by the United States and its allies against Russia. And that war is being waged with new weapons, forged in the post-Cold War age of global networks. As much as we talk about **multipolar politics**, when it comes to global networks, **there is just one superpower: the United States**. Many global networks have centralized economic chokepoints, and the United States is able to seize these, turning them into tools of coercion. **No other country can match this ability**. America can now redeploy global networks to entangle and suffocate oligarchs, banks and even entire countries, as Russia has painfully discovered. It is now up to the United States to determine how to steward this enormous power. If it overreaches, it might provoke a military response or create the incentive for its adversaries to create and foster their own alternative networks. The Ukraine war may be a turning point. Will we end up with a fragmented world economy where military and economic conflict become two sides of the same coin? Or will we figure out ways to contain economic conflicts and stop them from spiraling into further military confrontations?

#### Unipolarity and multipolarity are in a constant cycle.

Saksena ND, leads Defence Businesses and Pre-Sales for Innefu Labs (an information security R&D startup), previously a Product Manager for Reliance Jio’s Security & Loss Prevention vertical; worked with think-tanks, policy advocacy groups, and international affairs journals in the past, (Amit, "Is Multipolarity Inevitable in International Politics?," International Affairs Forum, <https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&amp;ContentID=8315>, kav)

As history will show, realists will argue, and the liberals will nibble on their thumbs, unipolarity often exhibits symptoms of the wave function collapse, a quantum mechanics term which essentially means the return of an object to an initial level, after elevating due to external build-up (factors indirectly affected by the object). Metaphorically applying this definition to the context of sovereign states, gives us the root cause of all the major events which have molded our global politics into its present state. Be it the World Wars, atomic bomb, democratization or the Cold War, history is abounding with examples of unipolarity being only a passing stage in a vicious circle of this global game.

At its climax, the Cold War saw the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., and the United States left as the only superpower in the world. The world order was reset, and amidst extreme chaos and failing governments, the United States emerged as a beacon of hope. Freshly independent states wanted to rebuild themselves in America’s image. Nations worldwide went into a frenzied state of enhancing their economic and politico-social conditions. The underlying principle was simple. The United States was perceived as an individual hegemon. And states, dubious of the hegemon’s intentions, vied to enhance their own influence and security. As neoliberalism dictates, the singular rise of a nation state forces the others to balance its influence, which in turn can only be achieved by individually augmenting their own influence.

Such is also the case of smaller nations, which experience extremely high growth rates due to the catch-up effect, and in the process, get aspirations for their own national interests. Smaller powers need not spend as much as the big powers on defense, or global initiatives, and can use that to budget for economic and societal development (Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, S. Africa, etc.). In case of R&D, the smaller states can merely acquire the latest technology, or in the least, receive assistance from allied states to procure it, thus saving the time and money initially spent on developing it (Russia-India/U.S-S.Korea, etc.). With a number of such nations functioning in close proximity to one another, a race to impose dominance in a region initiates, often leading to political and/or military clashes (see the Indo-Pak nuclear tests, 1998). The solo hegemon, apprehensive of such development as a threat to itself, would then try to counter these rising states by forming alliances either with them (China-Pak), or against them (China-India). In either case, unipolarity has transitioned into multipolarity. This new alliance will now be a hegemon, and have a catalytic effect on a third state, or a group of states, which would again begin the process of balancing the alliance’s power and influence, thus starting a Domino Effect in the region specifically, and in the world as a whole.

Also, the initial big power, in the wake of these developments, may try to coerce the rising powers into agreeing to international frameworks which can be puppeteered by it (the League of Nations, United Nations). This persuasive tendency may make the smaller powers even more vary of the hegemon, and boycott the frameworks altogether, weakening the hegemon’s influence even further (N. Korea, India and Pakistan against the NPT).

Unipolarity is, thus, only a repetitive stage in world politics. Undeniably, it will always be followed by multipolarity, which is more of a defensive mechanism to unipolarity, as opposed to a different world order. The World Wars were a result of many great nations vying for influence and power in a multipolar world. So it can be said that unipolarity is an unfortunate outcome of multipolarity. This balance between the two is the fundamental clockwork of world politics.

#### No multipolarity - American “renaissance” and decline of revisionist powers ensures that the US will retain global influence

Klein ’21 [Brian P.; Brian P. Klein is a geopolitical and economic strategist. He previously served as a U.S. diplomat and trade official.; 12-30-21; " The Many Signs of American Renaissance”; https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-many-signs-of-american-renaissance-51640801897; Barrons; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

The end of 2021 couldn’t come fast enough. A year that started with January’s insurrectionist storming of the Capitol is ending with Omicron’s December surge, threatening a tentative economic recovery. And plenty of bad news happened in-between. Social strife, rising inflation, a disastrous U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, and political gridlock in Washington makes it seem like America is an empire in decline. Except that the data doesn’t back up this catchy political punchline. Rather than another year highlighting the **inevitable end of U.S.** economic and political **influence** as authoritarian governments rise around the world, 2021 showed an **American renaissance** in the offing. The U.S. economy is poised for a strong 2022. That’s making the world’s authoritarian leaders nervous. Driven by the recovery, U.S. international influence is growing again after years of retrenchment. From Moscow to Beijing to Istanbul, excessive state control is causing economic pain for the people in the grip of authoritarianism. Their **international political isolation** is growing. It’s **easy to take a negative view** on U.S. prospects. At first glance, perceptions of U.S. democracy around the world are strikingly low among other advanced democracies, such stalwart proponents as the UK, Germany, and Japan. According to an early 2021 Pew research poll, 57% agreed that the U.S. political system “used to be a good example” for others, but only 17% felt that it still is. That seems ominous, but look closer. Another Pew survey of these same countries, also in early 2021, found 61% had an overall positive view of the U.S., compared to the 27% who viewed China favorably. This preference extended to economic relations as well. When asked which country was more important for “strong economic ties,” 64% preferred the U.S. versus 21% choosing China, despite many viewing China as the dominant global economic power. Part of these favorable views may have to do with the **U.S. re-engaging with allies**. As Russia cuts back on natural gas sales to Europe just as winter bites, the U.S. is increasing exports of liquified natural gas to these countries. Russian troops are on Ukraine’s borders, and Putin is attempting to wring security guarantees out of Washington. But the White House is refusing to be split off from NATO in a joint approach to Moscow. China has amped up military threats to Taiwan. Record numbers of military fly-bys near Taiwan prompted Washington and Tokyo to state their support for the island. Chinese flights dropped dramatically shortly after. China has also sustained its militarization of the South China Sea, despite losing its case under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In response, the U**.S. has strengthened military ties** with Australia and India in an actual pivot to an Indo-Pacific strategy. These are not the moves of a country in decline, but rather one that puts alliances first in lieu of unilateral action. As the U.S. economy begins to **thrive again**, it is helping consolidate global influence chipped away by a more insular approach. The domestic economy has remained remarkably robust, even with the trifecta of supply chain bottlenecks, rising prices, and a Covid slowdown that for several months earlier this year devastated the services industries (restaurants, movie theaters, hotels). Consumer spending rose a solid 8.5% from the beginning of November through late December over the same period a year ago. Holiday-specific sales rose 10.7% over prepandemic 2019 spending levels. This can be partly attributed to forced Covid-induced savings and the Federal Reserve’s seemingly insatiable desire to print money. People have been feeling so flush with cash that they’ve been quitting their jobs in droves. Economic resilience is behind yet another positive trend: Countries around the world are making longer-term bets on U.S. growth with increased foreign direct investment. After several years of declines, inbound FDI soared. For the third quarter of 2021, $74.5 billion flowed into the country, a 68% increase over the same period a year ago. Second quarter figures were 144% higher than the year ago period. And both were significantly higher even compared with 2019 prepandemic levels. How are the leading authoritarian countries faring? According to the OECD, while the U.S. economy expanded by 0.6% in the third quarter over the second, China grew only 0.2%, and Russia declined by 0.8%. The challenges of continued U.S. growth and sustained global influence are hardly insignificant. Threats to a free and fair 2022 midterm election cannot be taken lightly. Failure to pass legislation to stem climate change, bridge the enormous wealth gap, and improve education would certainly degrade U.S. competitiveness. But these would be entirely self-inflicted wounds. And they are largely within **Washington’s power to overcome**. For countries like China and Russia, their **problems are systemic** and unlikely to improve because the efforts needed to reverse these trends threaten the authoritarian systems that caused them in the first place—namely, centralized economic control and a rogue’s list of political-military relationships with countries like North Korea, Syria, and Iran. Every new year brings with it hopes for change. As 2022 dawns, signs are good that the U.S. will muster the will to keep this political and economic revival going. That in turn will help **reassert** a positive **influence** around the globe when the world needs it the most.

# LIO

### 2AC---LIO Sustainable

#### The liberal international order is sustainable – innovation and competition makes it stronger

Deudney and Ikenberry 18 - Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, July/August 2018 (Daniel and John, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order", Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world>, accessed 6/22/22)//jd

THE RESILIENT ORDER After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order’s institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism. Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith’s case for free trade, for example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers. This dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only accelerating. Human progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange, thus making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and trade. In the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist. The international order is also likely to persist because its survival does not depend on all of its members being liberal democracies. The return of isolationism, the rise of illiberal regimes such as China and Russia, and the general recession of liberal democracy in many parts of the world appear to bode ill for the liberal international order. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, many of its institutions are not uniquely liberal in character. Rather, they are Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states, whether they be democratic or authoritarian. And many of the key participants in these institutions are anything but liberal or democratic. Consider the Soviet Union’s cooperative efforts during the Cold War. Back then, the liberal world order was primarily an arrangement among liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Even so, the Soviet Union often worked with the democracies to help build international institutions. Moscow’s committed antiliberal stance did not stop it from partnering with Washington to create a raft of arms control agreements. Nor did it stop it from cooperating with Washington through the World Health Organization to spearhead a global campaign to eradicate smallpox, which succeeded in completely eliminating the disease by 1979. More recently, countries of all stripes have crafted global rules to guard against environmental destruction. The signatories to the Paris climate agreement, for example, include such autocracies as China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian approaches have also thrived when it comes to governing the commons, such as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica. To name just one example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which has thwarted the destruction of the ozone layer, has been actively supported by democracies and dictatorships alike. Such agreements are not challenges to the sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to solve problems they cannot address on their own. Most institutions in the liberal order do not demand that their backers be liberal democracies; they only require that they be status quo powers and capable of fulfilling their commitments. They do not challenge the Westphalian system; they codify it. The un, for example, enshrines the principle of state sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security Council, the notion of great-power decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable. Because much of international cooperation has nothing at all to do with liberalism or democracy, when politicians who are hostile to all things liberal are in power, they can still retain their international agendas and keep the order alive. The persistence of Westphalian institutions provides a lasting foundation on which distinctively liberal and democratic institutions can be erected in the future. Another reason to believe that the liberal order will endure involves the return of ideological rivalry. The last two and a half decades have been profoundly anomalous in that liberalism has had no credible competitor. During the rest of its existence, it faced competition that made it stronger. Throughout the nineteenth century, liberal democracies sought to outperform monarchical, hereditary, and aristocratic regimes. During the first half of the twentieth century, autocratic and fascist competitors created strong incentives for the liberal democracies to get their own houses in order and band together. And after World War II, they built the liberal order in part to contain the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism. The Chinese Communist Party appears increasingly likely to seek to offer an alternative to the components of the existing order that have to do with economic liberalism and human rights. If it ends up competing with the liberal democracies, they will again face pressure to champion their values. As during the Cold War, they will have incentives to undertake domestic reforms and strengthen their international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union, although a great milestone in the annals of the advance of liberal democracy, had the ironic effect of eliminating one of its main drivers of solidarity. The bad news of renewed ideological rivalry could be good news for the liberal international order.

#### US-led international liberal order is sustainable – economics and democracy

**Deudney and Ikenberry 21** – Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 11/26/21 (Daniel and John, “Getting Restraint Right: Liberal Internationalism and American Foreign Policy”, Survival, Volume 63 Issue 6, accessed 6/22/2022)//jd

Since the middle of the twentieth century, as American power and influence has expanded, so have its liberal accomplishments. Over seven decades under American auspices, the post-war liberal international order has lifted more boats in terms of economic growth and rising incomes than any other order in world history. It provided a framework for struggling industrial societies in Europe and elsewhere to transform themselves into modern social democracies. Japan and West Germany were integrated into a security community and were able to fashion distinctive national identities as peaceful great powers. Western Europe subdued old hatreds and launched a grand project of union. With American prodding, European colonial rule in Africa and Asia largely came to an end. The G7 system of cooperation among Japan, Europe and North America fostered growth and managed a sequence of trade and financial crises.61 Beginning in the 1980s, countries across East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe opened up their political and economic systems and joined the broader order. As the United States experienced its greatest success as a world power with the peaceful end to the Cold War, countries around the globe wanted more, not less, US leadership. These monumental developments are rarely mentioned in indictments of American liberal internationalism.62 Modern liberal states are built around various values that are sometimes in tension with one another – liberty and equality, individualism and community, openness and social stability, hierarchy and sovereign equality. The Western system provided a framework within which liberal states could manage these trade-offs. The post-war system of ‘embedded liberalism’ provided mechanisms and capacities for these states to define the terms of economic openness. Governments were given tools to reconcile and balance the benefits of open trade with demands for economic stability and social protection. The alliance system facilitated sharing the costs of security protection. Alliances – along with the wider system of multilateral institutions – produced greater solidarity and community among Western and rising non-Western liberal democracies. The bargains and institutions behind the liberal-international order gave these states the ability to balance hierarchy and sovereign equality. The United States used its pre-eminent position to underwrite and lead the order, but its binding institutional ties with other liberal states produced a restraint on its power. The fostering of cooperation among the world’s democracies did not eliminate old-style power politics, which the United States and other liberal states continued to practise inside and outside the Western system. But the deep accomplishment of the post-war liberal order was the construction of a cooperative environment in which liberal democracies could provide tools and capacities to enable governments to navigate economic and security interdependence, balance their often conflicting values and principles, and secure rights and protections for their societies.63 This US-led order reflected liberal statecraft, rooted in republican and liberal theory. It was and remains a pragmatic and reform-oriented endeavour to strengthen the ability of liberal democracies to survive and flourish. In a world of rising interdependence and illiberal great-power challengers, liberal democracies will surely want to renew rather than abandon their distinctive, liberal-internationalist approach to order building.64

#### No war – Even if American hegemony is unsustainable, the liberal international order acts as a buffer and prevents crisis

Ikenberry 18 – is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 3/9/18 (John, "Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive", Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 32.1, accessed 6/22/22)//jd

This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of why the liberal world order will survive 19 continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.

### 2AC---LIO Good---Solves Hypocrisy

#### Support for LIO key to reduce backlash to US hypocrisy and use of force—LIO key to peace and economic growth

Mazarr, PhD, 18

(Michael J, SeniorPoliticalScientist@RAND, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-07/real-history-liberal-order>, 8-7)

With 70 years of hindsight, it is clear that some of the hopes of the architects of the postwar order have been at least partly fulfilled. The multilateral processes those architects created have helped stabilize the global economy and deter aggression. By aligning three-quarters of the world economy around a broad set of norms, they created a powerful gravitational pull toward stability at the center of world politics. Nations knew that to sustain their competitiveness, they could not oppose the prevailing order. By joining its own power to this multilateral project, moreover, the United States helped legitimize its role in the world—and earned forbearance for the times when it failed to live up to its own ideals. Allison argues that the order-busting hypocrisy of U.S. military action since 2001 “speaks for itself.” But few international behaviors speak for themselves. They are interpreted by other countries in the context of wider understandings of power and purpose. The association of U.S. power with a shared order has helped mitigate reactions to its misuse. The United States may well have reached the end of this tolerance, which is why Allison’s instinct for restraint hits the mark. But the answer is to reinvigorate, not forsake, the multilateralism that once assuaged antagonism toward U.S. power. The creators of the postwar order set out to do something both limited and revolutionary. They aimed to work within the constraints of national self-interest and international balances of power to build institutions and processes that could shape the character of world politics. The system they made has succeeded in important ways, even if only as one of several factors that have kept the peace and made the world rich. As the world enters an era of greater international competition, U.S. policymakers should take care not to underestimate the importance of the postwar system. The order is far from a myth; it is the United States’ most important competitive advantage.

### 2AC---LIO Good---Checks Russia/China Expansion

#### US hegemony is not imperial – it facilitates cooperation and international decision making – but China and Russia are revisionist and would expand without the US

**Deudney and Ikenberry 21** – Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 11/26/21 (Daniel and John, “Getting Restraint Right: Liberal Internationalism and American Foreign Policy”, Survival, Volume 63 Issue 6, accessed 6/22/2022)//jd

Within this balance-of-power alliance the United States may be dominant, but its writ stops far short of empire. It is a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics – a mixed and complex system built around institutions, bargains, partnerships, alliances and norms of diffuse reciprocity.41 What is distinctive about this type of order is that it is bargained, with the lead state providing services and frameworks for cooperation. In return, it invites participation and compliance by other states, starting with the subsystem of liberal democracies. In formal terms, there are three features of liberal hegemony that separate it from empire. Firstly, the leading state sponsors and operates in a system of negotiated rules and institutions. Power disparities still afford advantages to the hegemonic state, but the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power is reined in to the degree required to keep the order going. Secondly, the leading state provides an array of public goods – or club goods – in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Historically, these have included security and support for an open trade regime.42 Thirdly, the hegemonic order provides channels and networks for reciprocal communication and influence. These informal ‘voice opportunities’ arise from informal access to the policymaking process of the hegemonic state and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the system.43 Alliances and multilateral institutions provide mechanisms for communication and ‘pulling and hauling’ between states within the order.44 While formal decision-making is not shared, the system works more like a pluralist domestic regime than an empire.45 The United States’ hegemony does afford it asymmetrical power. While this leaves partners with less influence, it also facilitates collective decision-making.46 Those exhorting America to ‘come home’, motivated by a critique of America as empire, are arguing for a world order which will advance and not retard empire in the international system. The Quincy prescription of radically reducing the US global footprint is an invitation to other powers to extend their imperial reach. Other great powers, notably China and Russia, have been quite explicit in their ambition to extend their domination of neighbouring peoples and to create regional and world orders that reflect and support their anti-democratic, anti-liberal and kleptocratic qualities. The liberal order among democracies, led by the United States, remains the best middle path between anarchy and empire. For the United States to abandon it would mark a historic decline in the prospects for individual liberty, democratic accountability and social justice.

### AT: LIO Impact Turn

#### End of LIO makes every turn worse—robust empirics go aff

Fontaine, MA, 16

(Richard, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-11-30/how-trump-can-save-liberal-order>, 11-30)

Successive presidents have used U.S. power to bolster the international order’s rules and punish transgressors. In the seven decades since the world shifted away from a spheres-of-influence order ruled by might alone, the liberal order has helped to preserve peace among the great powers, foster economic prosperity, and facilitate the spread of freedom. That’s why Republican and Democratic presidents alike have emphasized the importance of world order, while differing in key ways about how best to shape and bolster it. Democratic U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2015 national security strategy document, for instance, devotes an entire section to international order, stressing the United States’ obligation to reinforce and create “the rules, norms, and institutions that are the foundation for peace, security, prosperity,” and human rights. For Republican President George W. Bush, the goal was “to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to build an atmosphere of international order and openness.” On the campaign trail, Trump articulated a very different view. Poorly negotiated trade pacts, he argued, have killed American jobs and sent them to lower-wage and currency-manipulating nations. U.S. taxpayers spend billions of dollars to uphold the country’s disproportionate responsibilities, while free riders grow prosperous off of the stability Washington provides. The United States takes on security responsibilities better left to locals, and the effort to fill vacuums and right wrongs on the world stage leads to misguided adventures such as the interventions in Iraq and Libya. Put this way, it’s clear why many Americans might reasonably conclude that the United States’ traditional role in global order is a raw deal and that a major course correction is needed—and soon. Indeed, a key lesson of the presidential election is that globalization and its current structures aren’t working for a major portion of the U.S. population. The traditional arguments used to defend globalization have fallen flat. If the global order, buttressed by U.S. power, purports to generate the blessings of security, prosperity, and freedom . . . well, a lot of Americans feel they’ve been missing out. They’re on to something. The international order so cherished by modern presidents has become increasingly frayed in recent years. Russia continues to challenge basic norms of sovereignty and self-determination in eastern Europe, and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has upended the notion of borders in the Middle East. China’s globally competitive state-owned enterprises have revealed gaps in global trade rules, and the United States has had little recourse to stopping its currency manipulation. Beijing’s claims over virtually the entire South China Sea and its attempts to limit freedom of navigation there pose a serious challenge to the traditional maritime order. North Korea and Iran have pursued nuclear programs in defiance of nonproliferation rules. Despite a formal embrace of universal human rights by the greater international community, freedom in the world continues a decade long decline. And just at the moment when the order needs bolstering, a number of the United States’ closest allies in Europe have embraced austerity and curtailed their spending on defense and foreign aid. In turn, they have looked, once again, to Washington to do the heavy lifting. It is clearly tempting for the United States to walk away. Yet to do so—or, more likely, to let the liberal order wither under neglect—would be profoundly dangerous. Its creation was a response to the destructive wars, economic depressions, and rise of dictatorships that marred the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, the world has seen the longest period of great-power peace in modern history, the largest number of people ever pulled up from poverty, and an unprecedented expansion of democracy. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the liberal order is the worst form of international organization—except for all the others.

### 2AC---LIO Good---Laundry List

#### Liberalism is both inevitable and good – its self-correcting mechanisms maintain global stability, facilitate international cooperation to resolve intractable problems, and raise global standards of living while constantly correcting for failure. Any other system risks global catastrophe and can’t be effectuated anyway given liberalism’s entrenched nature.

Deudney and Ikenberry, PhDs, 18

(Daniel, PoliSci@JohnsHopkins, G. John , InternationalAffairs@Princeton, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world>, 6-14)

In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake- all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues. Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences. Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.

# AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios

## AT: China

### No China Heg

#### China won’t overthrow the US.

Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303,%20kavm)

A Kindleberger Trap as a Strategic Challenge?

As China’s power grows, many observers worry the United States and China are destined for war, but few consider an opposite disruptive danger in hegemonic transitions. Rather than acting like a revolutionary power in the international order, China might decide to be a free rider like the United States was in the 1930s. I have called this a “Kindleberger Trap” after the renowned MIT economist who attributed the depths of the Great Depression and the instability of that decade to a rising America’s failure to contribute to global public goods at time when Great Britain could no longer do so alone.25 In this version of the failure of hegemonic power transition, China may act too weakly rather than too strongly and refuse to contribute to an international order that it did not create. Some Sinologists say that this fear overstates the “not invented here” problem and that China knows it benefited from the overall post-1945 international order. As Iain Johnston has shown, one can distinguish at least eight different orders related to eight areas of interdependence, and China’s support for the orders is medium to high in most.26

A Kindleberger Trap is a free rider, or failure by a rising power to contribute to global public goods.

To date, China has been quite active in supporting institutions that facilitate world order and interdependence. In the UN Security Council, China is one of five countries with a veto. China is now the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces, participating in UN programs related to Ebola and climate change. China has also benefited greatly from economic institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the other hand, China has started its own Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and a “Belt and Road” initiative (BRI) of international infrastructure projects that some see as an economic offensive against the existing order. China has not practiced full reciprocity as a market economy, and its rejection of a 2016 Hague tribunal ruling regarding the South China Sea raised questions about whether China would treat its legal obligations a la carte (as the United States has sometimes done). US and allied navies’ freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea remain essential to maintain this point. (It would also help if the US Senate would ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty.)

Thus far, China has not tried to overthrow the world order from which it benefits—rather, it has tried to increase its influence from within—but this could change as Chinese power grows. The Trump administration labeled China a revisionist power, but so far it is moderate revisionism, unlike extreme revisionist powers such as Hitler’s Germany. China is interested not in kicking over the card table but in tilting the table so it can claim a larger share of the winnings. At the same time, China’s growing economic power and its tilt will create problems for the United States and the international order. In other words, it may act as a free rider as the United States did in the 1930s.

As Chinese power grows, the American “liberal international order” will have to change. It was never all liberal, orderly, or global, and China has little interest in liberalism or American domination. Therefore, Americans would be wise to discard the terms “liberal” and “American” and think in terms of an “open and rules-based” world order to manage the various types of interdependence. This would mean framing an open international order in terms of institutional cooperation. Ideological differences will persist, and there will be sharp differences over values like human rights, but this does not prevent negotiations and institutions to manage interdependence.27 The US approach to an open international economy will need to be adjusted for greater oversight of Chinese trade and investments that threaten our technological and national security objectives, but there is still a basis for fruitful interdependence and negotiation of rules of the road to govern it.

#### **US and China decouple now, but China won’t catch up for decades.**

Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303,%20kavm)

Managing Interdependence

Some degree of decoupling is bound to increase, particularly in areas related to technology that directly affect national security. Both sides will wish to limit vulnerabilities that endanger critical infrastructure or have important implications for military postures. Some measures will be unilateral, such as those Beijing has been undertaking for more than a decade. As for US measures to restrict sensitive technology transfer via trade, investment, and scientific exchanges, “developing a control regime that reduces risk without imposing undue costs will not be easy.”28

Intricate supply chains are not easily undone. But bilateral and multilateral negotiations can help to prevent partial technological disengagement from degenerating into a stampede toward full protectionism. One example is provided by a group of American and Chinese economists who have suggested a framework for trade policy between divergent nations that distinguishes the areas subject to bilateral negotiations from those where countries are allowed to undertake well-calibrated domestic policy adjustments that minimize harm to its domestic economy or security. Other policies that involve damage spilling over to third countries could be handled by multilateral arrangements.29

Negotiations can help prevent partial technological disengagement from degenerating into a stampede.

As China, India, and other economies grow, the US share of the world economy will be less than it was at the beginning of this century, and the rise of other countries will make it more difficult to organize collective action to promote global public goods. But no other country—including China—is about to replace the United States in terms of overall power resources in the next few decades. The United States will continue to lead in production of global public goods, but it will need to increasingly share that role with China. Since the Nixon administration, China and the United States have cooperated despite ideological differences. Various forms of interdependence have grown, and efforts toward total decoupling would involve enormous costs. While interdependence has created new strategic vulnerabilities, it has also produced strategic opportunities.

Rapid Asian economic growth has encouraged a power shift to the region, but Asia has its own internal balance of power. Chinese power is balanced by Japan, India, and Australia, among others. None want to be dominated by China, though none wants to see a Cold War-style containment strategy that would force them into an economic divorce from China, either. The United States will remain crucial to that Asian balance of power. If the United States maintains those alliances, the prospects are slight that China can drive the United States from the Western Pacific, much less dominate the world. The United States has high cards for managing the traditional competitive parts of our cooperative rivalry with China and does not need to seek to sever the relationship entirely by completely decoupling in a fit of panic.

The more difficult question for an effective strategy will be whether the United States and China can develop attitudes that allow them to cooperate in producing global public goods and managing interdependence while competing in other areas. Worst case analyses may make such a balanced policy impossible. The US-China relationship is a cooperative rivalry where a successful strategy of “smart competition,” as advocated by Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, will require equal attention to both aspects of that description.30 But such a future will require good contextual intelligence and careful management of all dimensions of our interdependence, both negative and positive. Exaggerated fears will make such a balanced policy difficult, and hasty efforts to decouple will lead to a failed strategy that reduces US power.

#### Hegemonic power transition to China won’t happen - its neighbors check naval expansion

Beckley 17 [Beckley, Michael, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion”, <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/42/2/78/1843874/isec_a_00294.pdf>] AA

China’s neighbors can check Chinese maritime expansion and will remain ca¬pable of doing so for the foreseeable future. Given this regional balance of power, the United States should adopt an “active denial” strategy to preserve the territorial status quo in East Asia. The strategy would aim to raise the costs of military aggression for China, without backing it into a corner, and would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the A2/AD capabilities of China’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The goal would be to turn China’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying territory to China but not of taking and holding terri¬tory themselves.168 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. and Chinese forces by stationing most U.S. forces in hardened bases scattered around the East Asian periphery, where they could be called upon in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of most of China’s forces.169 Decreasing the number of U.S. forces near China’s borders would reduce the likelihood of air and naval clashes, help reassure China that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on the Chinese mainland at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balance of power in war-time, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coer-cion.170 The United States is uniquely empowered to impose financial sanc¬tions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international shipping and communications networks.171 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to ne¬gotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.172 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and, if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese mainland. These strikes could be conducted from submarines, stealth aircraft, or road-mobile shore-based missile batteries strung along the first island chain—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese A2/AD forces than surface ships and non-stealth aircraft. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could es-calate horizontally before doing so vertically—that is, by opening new geographic fronts (e.g., by blockading the Strait of Malacca) rather than pour-ing U.S. forces into the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for the sake of en-hancing crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over the PLA if it simply unloaded on China’s bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a conflict. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knock-out-punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition. Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China, however, a military posture primed for rapid escala¬tion could be a recipe for disaster. For starters, an offensive posture risks turning minor disputes into major wars. China might be tempted to shoot first during a crisis, in a desperate at-tempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out the PLA’s offensive forces.173 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and China’s interven-tion in the Korean War are just two examples of this “use it or lose it” logic in action. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and China; the two countries have long¬standing disputes over freedom of navigation, North Korea, Taiwan, and human rights, among other issues. A sensible U.S. security policy, therefore, must balance the need to deter China with the need to prevent disputes from escalating. Second, an offensive U.S. posture vis-à-vis China risks turning conventional wars into nuclear wars.174 Some of the systems that support China’s conven¬tional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support its nuclear arsenal, so Chinese leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemptive attack on China’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, some PLA officials have suggested that China would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on its homeland. Perhaps these declara- tions are bluffs, but is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential loss of its offensive forces, China might fire off a nu¬clear weapon in the hopes of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? If China were poised to overrun East Asia, then it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to check Chinese expansion. Better to address the problem than repeat the mistakes of the interwar period and appease ag¬gressors. China, however, is incapable of going on an Imperial Japan–style rampage across East Asia, so the stakes for the United States in a war between China and its neighbors would be moderate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little.175 Instead of rushing into a war with China, therefore, the United States should pick its battles selectively, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Some scholars argue that the United States should simply pull U.S. forces out of East Asia and hand over all responsibility for balancing China to local actors.176 Retrenchment, however, not only would reduce U.S. influence in the region, but also degrade crisis stability by undermining deterrence. China might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and ramp up coer¬cive pressure on its demoralized neighbors. As Thomas Christensen has shown, successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deter-rence.177 Retrenchment is skewed too heavily toward the former. An active denial strategy, therefore, remains the United States’ best defense policy toward China. The strategy maintains deterrence, by reducing China’s ability to achieve a quick military victory, while enhancing crisis stability, by reassuring China that it will not be cold-cocked on the first day of a war. Compared to slaying the forces of fascism and communism, stabilizing East Asia is an admittedly underwhelming call to greatness. It is not a mission that Americans are any more eager to undertake than the great geopolitical cam¬paigns of the twentieth century. But it is just as virtuous and just as vital.

### 2AC---No China War---Interdependence

#### Interdependence is key to Chinese deterrence.

Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303,%20kavm)

Understanding power and interdependence in the US-China relationship depends on understanding strategic objectives. If the US relationship with China is zero sum and China’s long-term objective is to destroy it, much like the aspirations of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, then the less interdependence the better—though, as we have seen, some will be unavoidable. If, on the other hand, the relationship is more a mixed game or a cooperative rivalry in which coexistence is built into the environment, then US strategic objectives must include stability as well as competition, and interdependence can be used for both cooperative and rivalrous goals.

Deterrence is one example of when interdependence can be beneficial to enhance cooperative goals. Entanglement, or the existence of various interdependences, can mean that an attack would cause serious costs to both the attacker and target; it can mean that there are benefits to continuing the status quo. In other words, entanglement is an important means of making an actor perceive that the costs of an action will exceed the benefits, thus contributing to deterrence.

Entanglement is an important means of contributing to deterrence.

In 2009, for example, the People’s Liberation Army urged the Chinese government to sell some of China’s massive holdings of dollars to punish the United States for selling arms to Taiwan. China’s Central Bank pointed out, however, that doing so would impose large costs on China. As a result, the government was deterred from selling the holdings and ultimately sided with the Central Bank. Similarly, in scenarios that envisage a Chinese cyberattack on the US power grid imposing great costs on the US economy, the two countries’ economic interdependence would mean costly damage to China as well. Precision targeting of minor economic targets might not produce much direct blowback in the absence of retaliation, but the rising importance of the internet to economic growth increases general incentives for self-restraint. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends heavily upon economic growth, and Chinese economic growth increasingly depends upon the internet.11

Critics of unsophisticated claims that economic interdependence causes peace point to World War I as evidence that economic ties did not prevent catastrophic war among major trading partners. Such criticisms go too far, however, in dismissing any possibility that states will take interdependence into account and thus reduce the probability of conflict. Norman Angell and others were wrong to argue before World War I that economic interdependence had made war impossible, but they were not wrong that it had greatly increased war’s cost.12 The preceding examples of China’s behavior reveal that policymakers do take interdependence into account. Of course, conflict is always possible because of human miscalculation. Most European leaders in 1914 incorrectly envisaged a short war with limited costs, and it is doubtful that the kaiser, the czar, and the Austro-Hungarian emperor would have made the decision to go to war if they had foreseen the loss of their thrones and dismemberment of their empires. Miscalculation and accident can undercut any type of deterrence. Trade between the United States and Japan did not prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Indeed, the attack was caused, in part, by the US embargo of exports to Japan. The embargo manipulated the asymmetrical US-Japan interdependence in a way that led the Japanese to fear that failing to take a risky alternative would lead to their strangulation.

An international deterrent relationship is an intricate set of repeated interactions between complex organizations that are not always unitary actors. These actors can adjust their perceptions in non-homogeneous ways over time, as has been the case in the US-China economic relationship. Deterrence rests on various means: punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. As Robert Axelrod notes in his classic work on cooperation, iterative relationships can develop a long shadow of the future that can lead to cooperative restraint in prisoner’s dilemma games.13 In addition, some interdependence is systemic, in which a state has a general interest in not upsetting the status quo and may develop interests in systemic stability. Of course, interdependence is a two-edged sword, and entanglement is not the most important cause of deterrence, but it can be easy to overlook the fact that, if carefully wielded, it can also contribute to deterrence and stability.

#### US and China are interdependent on international affairs, but are decoupling on everything else.

Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303,%20kavm)

Dimensions of US-China Interdependence There are many strands of interdependence in the US-China relationship, and the symmetry of vulnerability varies with each one. Former Australia Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently summarized six different dimensions.9 Trade Over the past decade, the United States received 19 percent of China’s exports, while China represented only 8 percent of US total exports. China’s leadership knows that the United States can inflict more damage on China from trade than vice versa, but they also know that US consumers are dependent on a range of goods that cannot be readily replaced in the near-term. Thus, despite a two to one asymmetry, “America does not have all the cards in this game, and China knows it.”10 There are limits to the power that comes from asymmetrical interdependence. Foreign Direct Investment In 2019, the total stock of US FDI in China reached US$269 billion while Chinese FDI in the United States reached US$145 billion, but annual flow rates have been decreasing as distrust on both sides tightens policy constraints. Rudd concludes that decoupling is happening in this area more rapidly than expected. Technology China’s program “Made in China 2025” and the goal to be first in Artificial Intelligence by 2030 have led the American government and companies to be more wary about a high degree of technology interdependence with China. Rudd concludes that a significant degree of technological decoupling is underway and that it “began nearly two decades ago when China decided to embark on internet sovereignty to restrict the free flow of information to its citizens.” A significant degree of technology decoupling is underway. Capital Markets The overall financial relationship is over US$5 trillion, including nearly two trillion in Chinese listings on US stock exchanges and US$l.3 trillion in Chinese official holdings of US government bonds. Rudd argues that “whatever strategic difficulties these two governments may have with each other, it continues to be in each countries’ interests to maintain these arrangements.” In other words, little decoupling. Currency Markets While China would like to see the yuan play a larger role in world markets, it is unwilling to make the domestic reforms to create deep and flexible convertible currency markets and a rule of law needed for the yuan to become a major reserve currency. Only 2 percent of global reserves are held in yuan; 62 percent are held in US dollars. The status quo will persist for a time. Education, Research, and Talent Over three million Chinese students have been educated in American universities over the past 20 years, and over 350,000 Chinese students study in the US each year. Over the past two years, however, there was a decline in international enrollments in American universities, and policy changes have made various types of visas more difficult to obtain. Rudd concludes that there are early signs of decoupling in the area of talent. Military There are other dimensions of interdependence in addition to the economic ones surveyed by Rudd, and they include military and environmental interdependence. In military terms, both countries hold each other hostage in nuclear deterrence, and despite the aspirations for strategic missile defense technology, it is unlikely that this relationship can be decoupled (for one thing, there are many ways to deliver weapons of mass destruction). Moreover, both countries are positively interdependent in slowing the spread of such weapons. Previously a one-time proliferator, China has become a supporter of the international non-proliferation regime. Environmental In the case of the environment, scientific evidence shows that climate change can do great damage to both countries. For example, melting glaciers in the Himalayas as well as in Greenland could inflict serious costs. China has now surpassed the United States as the largest producer of greenhouse gases, and together, China and the United States produce 40 percent of the global total. Neither country can solve this problem alone, nor can either decouple from it. Climate change obeys the laws of physics, not politics. And the 2020 coronavirus reminds us that pandemics respond to the laws of biology. Although epidemiological interdependence is asymmetrical, using it as a strategic weapon instead of cooperating would run a high risk of unintended consequences with uncertain strategic gains. Overall, while some types of interdependence produce asymmetrical vulnerabilities that can be used as weapons, other types produce a mutual vulnerability that is difficult to escape without cooperative measures. If power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, it is important to distinguish power over others from power with others. In some instances, such as climate change, power over interdependence can only be obtained with others. It is important to distinguish power over others from power with others.

### 2AC---AT: Thucydides Trap---Turn

#### **Turn---maintaining US heg is key to prevent the Thucydides trap**

Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, (Joseph, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav](https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303,%20kavm))

A Thucydides Trap as a Strategic Challenge?

Failure of the United States to successfully cope with the rise of China could have disastrous consequences for the United States and the rest of the world. Ever since the Peloponnesian war, realists have warned that the interaction of an established power and a rising power could lead to miscalculations that could disrupt this century, much as the last century was devastated in 1914. Graham Allison has recently labelled this strategic problem a “Thucydides Trap” and asserted that it has occurred in 12 out of 16 cases of hegemonic transition in recent history.14 While his numbers have been contested, the strategic problem has long been recognized.15

To avoid such an outcome, a successful US strategy on China must neither over nor underestimate Chinese power. Underestimation breeds complacency, while overestimation creates fear—either of which can lead to miscalculation. Contrary to current conventional wisdom, China has not yet replaced the United States as the world’s largest economy. Measured in purchasing power parity, the Chinese economy became larger than the American economy in 2014, but purchasing power parity is an economist’s device for comparing estimates of welfare, not for measuring power. Current exchange rates are a better measure of power, and they show that China is about two-thirds the size of the United States. Many economists do expect China to surpass the United States someday as the world’s largest economy (measured as GDP in dollars), but the estimated date varies from 2030 to midcentury depending on what one assumes about the rates of Chinese and American growth. Moreover, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a crude measure of power. Including per capita income gives a better index of the sophistication of an economy, and US per capita income is many times that of China’s. By any measure, however, the gravitational pull of China’s economy is increasing, and China is rising.

A successful US strategy on China must neither over nor underestimate Chinese power.

Thucydides famously attributed the Peloponnesian war to two causes: the rise of a new power and the fear that an established power creates. Most analysts focus on the first half of his statement, but the second is more within our control. It is unlikely that US foreign policy can prevent the rise of China’s economy, but the United States can avoid exaggerated fears that could create a new cold or hot war if it uses contextual intelligence well. Even if China someday passes the United States in total economic size, there are other measures of geopolitical power. China is well behind the United States on military and soft power indices. US military expenditure is several times that of China’s. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years and pose new challenges to US forces, analysts who look carefully at the military balance conclude that China is not a global peer and will not be able to exclude the United States from the Western Pacific so long as the United States maintains its alliance and bases in Japan. And opinion polls as well as a recent index published by Portland, a London consultancy, ranked China in twenty-sixth place in soft power, while the United States ranked near the top.16 Mao’s Communism had a far greater transnational soft power appeal in the 1960s than “Xi Jinping thought” does today.

On the other hand, China’s huge economic scale matters. The United States was once the world’s largest trading nation and largest bilateral lender—in 2001, more than 80 percent of countries traded more with the United States than with China. By 2018, only 30 percent reported the same, with 128 out of 190 countries trading more with China than with the United States.17 China plans to lend more than a trillion dollars for infrastructure projects with its “Belt and Road” initiative over the next decade, while the United States has cut back aid. China’s economic success story enhances its soft power, and government control of access to its large market provides hard-power leverage. Moreover, China’s authoritarian politics and mercantilist practices make its economic power readily usable by the government. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance. Of the seven giant global companies in the age of Artificial Intelligence (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent), nearly half are Chinese. With its large population and data resources that are becoming the “new oil” of world politics, China is poised to become the Saudi Arabia of big data.18

The United States has some long-term power advantages that will persist regardless of current Chinese actions. One is geography. The United States is surrounded by oceans and neighbors that are likely to remain friendly; China has borders with fourteen countries and has territorial disputes with India, Japan, and Vietnam that set limits on its soft power. Energy is another American advantage. A decade ago, the United States seemed hopelessly dependent on imported energy. Now, the shale revolution has transformed it from an energy importer to exporter, and North America may be self-sufficient in the coming decade.19 At the same time, China is becoming more dependent on energy imports, and much of the oil it imports is transported through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, where the United States and others maintain a significant naval presence. Eliminating this vulnerability will take decades. As we have seen, the United States enjoys financial power derived from its large transnational financial institutions. Although the dollar cannot remain pre-eminent forever, the yuan is unlikely to displace the dollar as a reserve currency in the near term.

The United States also has demographic strengths. It is the only major developed country that is currently projected to hold its place (third) in the demographic ranking of countries. While the rate of US population growth has slowed in recent years, it is not shrinking in population as will happen to Russia, Europe, and Japan. Seven of the world’s fifteen largest economies will face a shrinking workforce over the next decade and a half, but the US workforce is likely to increase by 5 percent while China’s will decline by 9 percent. China will soon lose its first place population rank to India, and its working age population already peaked in 2015.20 Chinese citizens sometimes say they worry about “growing old before growing rich.”

The United States has been at the forefront in the development of key technologies (bio, nano, and information) that are central to this century’s economic growth, and US research universities dominate higher education. In a 2019 ranking by Shanghai Jiaotong University, eighteen of the top twenty-five global universities were in the United States; none were in China.21 At the same time, China is investing heavily in research and development and competes well in some fields now, including artificial intelligence.22 Given the importance of machine learning as a general-purpose technology that affects many domains, China’s gains in AI are of particular significance. Chinese technological progress is no longer based solely on imitation. However, a successful US response to China’s technological challenge will depend more upon improvements at home than upon external sanctions. US complacency is always a danger, but so is lack of confidence and exaggerated fears that lead to overreaction. In the view of John Deutch, former provost of MIT, if the United States attains its innovation potential, “China’s great leap forward will likely at best be a few steps toward closing the innovation leadership gap that the United States currently enjoys.”23

In short, the United States holds high cards in its poker hand, but hysteria could cause it to play its cards ineffectively. When the Clinton administration published its East Asian Strategy Report in 1995, it decided to reaffirm the US-Japan alliance well before seeking to engage China in the WTO. The US approach to the rise of China was to engage but hedge its bets first. Discarding its high cards of alliances and international institutions would be a serious mistake. If the United States maintains its alliance with Japan, China cannot push beyond the first island chain because Japan is a major part of that chain. Another possible mistake would be to try to cut off all immigration. When asked why he did not think China would pass the United States in total power any time soon, former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew cited the ability of the United States to draw upon the talents of the whole world and recombine them in diversity and creativity that was not possible for China’s ethnic Han nationalism. If the United States were to discard its high cards of external alliances and domestic openness, Lee could be wrong.24

### 2AC---No China Transition

#### Hegemonic power transition to China won’t happen - its neighbors check naval expansion

Beckley 17 [Beckley, Michael, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion”, <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/42/2/78/1843874/isec_a_00294.pdf>]//AA

China’s neighbors can check Chinese maritime expansion and will remain ca¬pable of doing so for the foreseeable future. Given this regional balance of power, the United States should adopt an “active denial” strategy to preserve the territorial status quo in East Asia. The strategy would aim to raise the costs of military aggression for China, without backing it into a corner, and would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the A2/AD capabilities of China’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The goal would be to turn China’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying territory to China but not of taking and holding terri¬tory themselves.168 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. and Chinese forces by stationing most U.S. forces in hardened bases scattered around the East Asian periphery, where they could be called upon in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of most of China’s forces.169 Decreasing the number of U.S. forces near China’s borders would reduce the likelihood of air and naval clashes, help reassure China that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on the Chinese mainland at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balance of power in war-time, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coer-cion.170 The United States is uniquely empowered to impose financial sanc¬tions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international shipping and communications networks.171 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to ne¬gotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.172 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and, if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese mainland. These strikes could be conducted from submarines, stealth aircraft, or road-mobile shore-based missile batteries strung along the first island chain—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese A2/AD forces than surface ships and non-stealth aircraft. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could es-calate horizontally before doing so vertically—that is, by opening new geographic fronts (e.g., by blockading the Strait of Malacca) rather than pour-ing U.S. forces into the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for the sake of en-hancing crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over the PLA if it simply unloaded on China’s bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a conflict. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knock-out-punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition. Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China, however, a military posture primed for rapid escala¬tion could be a recipe for disaster. For starters, an offensive posture risks turning minor disputes into major wars. China might be tempted to shoot first during a crisis, in a desperate at-tempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out the PLA’s offensive forces.173 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and China’s interven-tion in the Korean War are just two examples of this “use it or lose it” logic in action. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and China; the two countries have long¬standing disputes over freedom of navigation, North Korea, Taiwan, and human rights, among other issues. A sensible U.S. security policy, therefore, must balance the need to deter China with the need to prevent disputes from escalating. Second, an offensive U.S. posture vis-à-vis China risks turning conventional wars into nuclear wars.174 Some of the systems that support China’s conven¬tional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support its nuclear arsenal, so Chinese leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemptive attack on China’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, some PLA officials have suggested that China would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on its homeland. Perhaps these declara- tions are bluffs, but is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential loss of its offensive forces, China might fire off a nu¬clear weapon in the hopes of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? If China were poised to overrun East Asia, then it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to check Chinese expansion. Better to address the problem than repeat the mistakes of the interwar period and appease ag¬gressors. China, however, is incapable of going on an Imperial Japan–style rampage across East Asia, so the stakes for the United States in a war between China and its neighbors would be moderate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little.175 Instead of rushing into a war with China, therefore, the United States should pick its battles selectively, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Some scholars argue that the United States should simply pull U.S. forces out of East Asia and hand over all responsibility for balancing China to local actors.176 Retrenchment, however, not only would reduce U.S. influence in the region, but also degrade crisis stability by undermining deterrence. China might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and ramp up coer¬cive pressure on its demoralized neighbors. As Thomas Christensen has shown, successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deter-rence.177 Retrenchment is skewed too heavily toward the former. An active denial strategy, therefore, remains the United States’ best defense policy toward China. The strategy maintains deterrence, by reducing China’s ability to achieve a quick military victory, while enhancing crisis stability, by reassuring China that it will not be cold-cocked on the first day of a war. Compared to slaying the forces of fascism and communism, stabilizing East Asia is an admittedly underwhelming call to greatness. It is not a mission that Americans are any more eager to undertake than the great geopolitical cam¬paigns of the twentieth century. But it is just as virtuous and just as vital.

#### American leadership in Asia-Pacific key to China deterrence

Hass 17 - served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff and served as a Foreign Service Officer in U.S. Embassy Beijing, 12/29/17 (Ryan, Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-case-for-continued-american-leadership-in-asia/>, accessed 6/20/22)//jd

There is a sense that the U.S. has pressing needs at home, that the North Korea challenge feels dangerous and intractable, and that China’s national power is on the rise — so China or others should do more to manage problems in their own backyard. While I support focusing on getting our house in order at home, I fear that it would be dangerously shortsighted for the U.S. to retreat from its 70-plus-year status as the leading power and agenda-setter in the Asia-Pacific region. We have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. Here’s why: First, the Asia-Pacific region is rapidly becoming the most important area in the world for the U.S. It accounts for nearly 60 percent of global economic growth, and U.S. exports to the region create more jobs (3.4 million) than any other part of the world. It is home to five U.S. treaty allies, many of the world’s most capable militaries and the most proximate threat to America’s national security: North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. When America has been active in the region, it has spurred Asian countries to share the burden in responding to humanitarian disasters, dealing with climate change, increasing pressure on North Korea and agreeing on trade rules for nearly 40 percent of the global economy. At the same time, the U.S. has led efforts to push China to emerge as a constructive — and not a coercive — actor. If the U.S. withdraws from these roles, there is no other country capable of pulling the region together in common purpose to address shared challenges. Second, America’s long and steady presence in the region has helped deter aggression, cool historical rivalries, and support the spread of market-based democracies. While the people of the region deserve credit, the U.S.-provided security umbrella also enabled progress. Up to now, the U.S. has served as a buffer in regional disputes, and a check against China or others seeking to use their military to move borders or seize resources. If confidence in U.S. resolve to protect the peace recedes, the risk of interstate conflict will rise. Countries will confront a choice between becoming more deferential to Beijing’s interests in exchange for hoped-for security and economic benefits, or developing military capabilities — including nuclear weapons — to guard against coercion by China or North Korea. If Japan goes nuclear, for example, South Korea and Taiwan could follow. A pattern of nuclear dominoes would elevate risk of a catastrophic conflict that could crater the global economy and create unimaginable destruction.

### 2AC---No China Rise

#### No China rise – failing economy, population loss, and lagging technology prove

Brands 4/14 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-14-22; "The Dangers of China’s Decline”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

China’s ascendance shook the world intellectually as well as geopolitically: It undermined post-Cold War Western beliefs that prosperity would lead inevitably to political liberalization, that democracies produced higher rates of growth than autocracies, and that tyranny was incompatible with sound economic management. As China became a global heavyweight, a new orthodoxy solidified—that a hegemonic transition was approaching as Beijing surpassed the United States. One dissenter was the political scientist David Shambaugh. In 2015, Shambaugh argued that China was suffering from a deep internal malaise and that Xi’s increasingly repressive rule was a sign of insecurity, not confidence. “[F]or all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut,” he wrote, China’s economy “is stuck in a series of **systemic traps** from which there is no easy exit.” Shambaugh struck a discordant note at a time when Beijing was tightening its control of the South China Sea and spreading its influence across multiple continents. He also happened to be right. Not least of the oddities surrounding contemporary China is that much of the world deemed its ascent inevitable just as its prospects started to dim. This may sound absurd, given all the hype surrounding China’s rise. After all, that country is supposedly destined, as the Harvard University political scientist Graham Allison (channeling legendary Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) has written, to become “the biggest player in the history of the world.” It’s true that China does boast many apparent advantages. It has an enormous domestic market and is the leading trade partner of roughly 130 countries around the world. It is making concerted investments in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and other critical technologies. If the United States doesn’t up its game, a national commission chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned in 2021, China could become the premier “AI superpower.” But look closer, and China’s trajectory starts to seem more tenuous. For one thing, many of China’s technological achievements are narrower and less impressive than they first appear. For example, Beijing has made great strides in AI applications focused on surveillance (no surprise there), but the United States still **leads significantly** across the wider expanse of AI subfields and uses. Despite vast state subsidies, China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. is **years behind** in the creation of cutting-edge semiconductors that make up the foundation of advanced economies in the information age. Just this year, Peking University published a candid assessment—which the CCP then predictably censored—of China’s progress in science and technology. The verdict was that China is “following [the United States] in most fields, running side by side in a few, and leading in very few.” And while China’s other strengths are not illusory, neither can they hide a reality that Beckley and I discussed last year: The magic that made China’s economic miracle is unmistakably fizzling. The country’s resource abundance is old news: Overuse devastated much of China’s arable land; industrialization and pollution left the country with severe water scarcity. More damaging still, China’s abundance of human resources is also a thing of the past. The one-child policy was a devil’s bargain that is now causing demographic implosion. China’s total population is set to peak by 2028 (or perhaps as soon as this year, by some estimates) and then plummet by as much as half by century’s end. Its working population crested in 2015; it will fall by 70 million between 2020 and 2035 and even faster after that. China will soon combine an enormous geriatric population with a rapidly shrinking workforce. It will experience one of the worst peacetime demographic crunches on record, a formula for stagnation at best and **catastrophic economic contraction** at worst. Making matters worse, the era of enlightened economic policy is over. The reform agenda has been stalled for more than a decade because further liberalization—necessary to make the leap to a more innovative, knowledge-based economy—would threaten the privileges of entrenched elites. If anything, Xi has thrown the country into reverse. Politically, he is taking China into neototalitarianism through pervasive repression and indoctrination. And economically, his policies have a decidedly retrograde feel. Xi’s agenda has featured a preference for state-owned enterprises at the expense of the more vibrant private sector; the imposition of severe, politically motivated restrictions on wide swaths of the economy; attacks on the autonomy of relatively technocratic institutions such as the central bank; and the empowerment of political minders in companies of nearly all sizes. China’s leaders may talk about the need to transition to a high-tech, services-based economy, but Xi’s policies are stifling the competence, creativity, and spontaneity necessary to make that shift. It all constitutes a “great leap backward”—a reversion to pre-Deng-era policies that condemned China to stagnation. There is also the question of what Xi’s consolidation of power means for the country’s long-term resilience. As the political theorist Francis Fukuyama has written, for nearly 40 years after Mao’s death China avoided the “bad emperor” problem—the worst pathologies that accompany authoritarian rule—by imposing term limits on its rulers and making them more accountable to other CCP elites. Yet Xi has systematically disassembled this system by purging rivals, sidelining potential successors, and entrenching himself in power. By doing so, he is enabling China to move faster and more decisively. But he is also leaving the country vulnerable to impulsive or unwise decision-making—a perpetual problem of one-man rule—and creating the potential for terrible instability when his reign finally ends. Xi’s centralization of authority, while seemingly impressive, is setting the country up for a fall. Finally, it doesn’t help that a more assertive China is now facing more international resistance. Trade barriers against Chinese companies and products proliferated in the decade after the global financial crisis. Washington has waged a technological cold war against Huawei, seeking to deprive that Chinese firm of high-end semiconductors and keep it out of the world’s 5G networks. Dozens of countries are more carefully scrutinizing their economic, financial, and technological ties with Beijing; the Japanese government is offering to pay companies to reduce their China exposure. China is still central to the global economy, but the days when the United States and other powerful countries eagerly abetted its ascent are over. Indeed, Xi’s effort to cultivate the domestic market is an implicit admission that China, which rose on the strength of an export-focused economy, now confronts a very different world. China’s predicament has been thrown into relief, ironically, by COVID-19. Early on, the pandemic seemed to herald an epochal global shift. Prominent U.S. analysts saw it as a “Suez moment,” the terminal crisis of the U.S. empire. Xi touted his regime’s success in containing COVID-19 at home (albeit after allowing it to escape to the world) as an advertisement for Chinese authoritarianism. Two years later, it’s clear that COVID-19 was a turning point but not in the way that Xi hoped. The pandemic hypercharged global anti-China sentiment, after Beijing concealed the initial outbreak and then exploited the resulting chaos to bully nations from Australia to Germany and the United Kingdom. It thereby encouraged a host of efforts—through multilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS, and the G-7, as well as the United States’ bilateral alliances in the Pacific—to counter Chinese power. “A Cold War mentality” had reemerged, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry complained, as the United States and its friends pursued “anti-China encirclement.” COVID-19 also confirmed how patchy China’s rise had been: The country’s biotechnology sector couldn’t produce anything like the revolutionary vaccines that democratic innovation economies in the United States and Europe churned out. Even China’s heavy-handed success in containing COVID-19 at home became a trap: The combination of “zero-COVID” policies, low levels of natural immunity, and vaccines that proved weak or worthless against highly contagious variants condemned the country to recurring lockdowns of major cities, with all the accompanying disruptions. Even before COVID-19, in fact, China’s economic vital signs were worrying. The government claimed a growth rate of 6 percent, but Chinese insiders and academic research indicate that the true number is considerably lower—and even that growth is inflated by the relentless injection of capital into a less and less efficient economy. As a result, overall debt grew eightfold between 2008 and the end of 2020, reaching 335 percent of GDP. In other countries, this combination of slumping productivity and growing debt usually presages sharp crises that turn into lasting economic quagmires. Xi’s Chinese dream involves catching up to the United States. In reality, his country is slowing down.

#### Independently, water and resource scarcity restrict Chinese power

Brands ‘21 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 12-29-21; "China Is Running out of Water and That’s Scary for Asia”; https://www.aei.org/op-eds/china-is-running-out-of-water-and-thats-scary-for-asia/; AEI; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

Of all Bejing’s problems — demographic decline, a stifling political climate, the stalling or reversal of economic reforms — dwindling natural resources may be the most urgent. Nature and geopolitics can interact in nasty ways. The historian Geoffrey Parker has argued that changing weather patterns drove war, revolution and upheaval during a long global crisis in the 17th century. More recently, climate change has opened new trade routes, resources and rivalries in the Arctic. And now China, a great power that often appears bent on reordering the international system, is running out of water in ways that are likely to **stoke conflict** at home and abroad. Natural resources have always been **critical** to economic and global power. In the 19th century, a small country — the U.K. — raced ahead of the pack because its abundant coal reserves allowed it to drive the Industrial Revolution. Britain was eventually surpassed by the U.S., which exploited its huge tracts of arable land, massive oil reserves and other resources to become an economic titan. The same goes for China’s rise. Capitalist reforms, a welcoming global trade system and good demographics all contributed to Beijing’s world-beating economic growth from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. The fact that China was nearly self-sufficient in land, water and many raw materials — and that its cheap labor allowed it to exploit these resources aggressively — also helped it to become the workshop of the world. Yet China’s natural abundance is a **thing of the past**. As Michael Beckley and I argue in our forthcoming book, “The Danger Zone,” Beijing has blown through many of its resources. A decade ago, China became the world’s largest importer of agricultural goods. Its arable land has been shrinking due to degradation and overuse. Breakneck development has also made China the world’s largest energy importer: It buys three-quarters of its oil abroad at a time when America has become a net energy exporter. China’s water situation is **particularly grim**. As Gopal Reddy notes, China possesses 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of its fresh water. Entire regions, especially in the north, suffer from water scarcity worse than that found in a parched Middle East. Thousands of rivers have disappeared, while industrialization and pollution have spoiled much of the water that remains. By some estimates, 80% to 90% of China’s groundwater and half of its river water is too dirty to drink; more than half of its groundwater and one-quarter of its river water cannot even be used for industry or farming. This is an **expensive problem**. China is forced to divert water from comparatively wet regions to the drought-plagued north; experts assess that the country loses well over $100 billion annually as a result of water scarcity. Shortages and unsustainable agriculture are causing the desertification of large chunks of land. Water-related energy shortfalls have become common across the country. The government has promoted rationing and improvements in water efficiency, but nothing sufficient to arrest the problem. This month, Chinese authorities announced that Guangzhou and Shenzhen — two major cities in the relatively water-rich Pearl River Delta — will face severe drought well into next year. The economic and political implications are **troubling**. By making growth cost more, China’s resource problems have joined an array of other challenges — demographic decline, an increasingly stifling political climate, the stalling or reversal of many key economic reforms — to cause a slowdown that was having pronounced effects even before Covid struck. China’s social compact will be tested as dwindling resources intensify distributional fights. In 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that water scarcity threatened the “very survival of the Chinese nation.” A minister of water resources declared that China must “fight for every drop of water or die.” Hyperbole aside, resource scarcity and **political instability** often go hand in hand.

### 2AC---Heg Solves China War

#### US Power checks Chinese revisionism – without it, China will invade Taiwan and take over the Pacific

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 10-1-21; "The End of China’s Rise”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

RING OF FIRE Eurasia has often been a deathtrap for aspiring hegemons: there are too many nearby enemies that can make common cause with offshore superpowers. For almost 40 years, a rising China avoided strategic encirclement by downplaying its global ambitions and maintaining friendly relations with the United States. But that period is over. As Beijing has become more **aggressive** in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and elsewhere, it has engendered hostility nearly all around. Over the past five years, the **United States** has abandoned engagement and **embraced neo-containment**. Washington has carried out its largest naval and missile expansion in a generation, imposed its most aggressive tariffs since World War II, and implemented its tightest restrictions on foreign investment since the Cold War—all directed at China. Arms sales and military support to frontline states have increased; U.S. technological sanctions are **threatening to destroy** Huawei and other Chinese firms. In 2021, China’s deputy foreign minister complained that “a whole-of-government and whole-of-society campaign is being waged to bring China down.” The United States’ **turn against China** has contributed to a broader backlash against Beijing’s power. In Northeast Asia, Taiwan has become more determined than ever to maintain its de facto independence, and the government has approved a bold new defense strategy that could make the island extremely hard to conquer. Japan has agreed to cooperate closely with the United States to fend off Chinese aggression in the region. Through its own belligerence, Beijing has given the U.S.-Japanese alliance an explicitly anti-China cast. The countries around the South China Sea are also starting to hedge against China. Vietnam is acquiring mobile shore-based missiles, Russian attack submarines, new fighter aircraft, and surface ships armed with advanced cruise missiles. Singapore has quietly become a significant U.S. military partner. Indonesia increased its defense spending 20 percent in 2020 and another 21 percent in 2021. Even the Philippines, which courted China for most of President Rodrigo Duterte’s term, is now reiterating its claims in the South China Sea and ramping up air and naval patrols. China’s ambitions are provoking a response beyond East Asia, too, from Australia to India to Europe. Everywhere Beijing is pushing, a growing cast of rivals is pushing back. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—has emerged as a focal point of anti-China cooperation among the most powerful democracies in the Indo-Pacific. The new AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) alliance unites the core of the Anglosphere against Beijing. The **United States** is forging overlapping mini-coalitions to ensure that advanced democracies stay ahead in key technologies, while the G-7 and NATO are staking out tougher positions on Taiwan and other issues. To be sure, counter-China cooperation remains a work in progress, because many countries still rely on trade with Beijing. But these interlocking partnerships could eventually form a noose around Beijing’s neck. FLAMING OUT China is a risen power, **not a rising one**: it has acquired formidable geopolitical capabilities, but its best days are behind it. That distinction matters, because China has staked out vaulting ambitions and now may not be able to achieve them without drastic action. The CCP aims to **reclaim Taiwan**, dominate the western Pacific, and **spread its influence** around the globe. Xi has declared that China seeks a “future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” Yet that dream is starting to slip away, as growth slows and China faces an increasingly hostile world.

#### Heg prevents Chinese military expansion and nuclear war through containment

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

Such costs might be acceptable in exchange for peace and security. But spheres of influence during the Cold War did not prevent the Soviets from repeatedly testing American redlines in Berlin, causing high-stakes crises in which **nuclear war** was a real possibility. Nor did those spheres prevent the two sides from competing sharply, and sometimes violently, throughout the “Third World.” Throughout history, spheres-of-influence settlements, from the Thirty Years’ Peace between Athens and Sparta to the Peace of Amiens between the United Kingdom and Napoleonic France have often ended, sooner or later, in war. The idea that spheres of influence are a formula for peace rests on assumptions that often go unexamined: that revisionist powers are driven primarily by insecurity, that their grievances are limited and can be easily satisfied, that the truly vital interests of competing powers do not conflict, and that creative statecraft can therefore fashion an enduring, mutually acceptable equilibrium. The trouble is that these premises don’t always hold. Ideology and the quest for greatness—not simply insecurity—often drive great powers. Rising states are continually tempted to renegotiate previous bargains once they have the power to do so. Offering concessions to a revisionist state may simply convince it that the existing order is fragile and can be tested further. Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply give that challenger a better position from which to realize its ambitions. Consider the situation in the western Pacific. The most minimal Chinese sphere of influence would surely include Taiwan. Yet if Taiwan became a platform for Chinese military capabilities, the defense of other U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines, would become vastly more difficult. Nor would such a concession likely satisfy Chinese ambitions. A growing body of literature by scholars such as Toshi Yoshihara, James Holmes, Liza Tobin, and Elizabeth Economy suggests that China desires at the very least to push the United States beyond the chain of islands running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Even a limited Chinese sphere in the western Pacific would serve as a springboard to this larger objective. Meanwhile, the United States will have sacrificed a number of critical advantages by pulling out. A free Taiwan offers proof that Chinese culture and democracy are not incompatible; subjugating Taiwan would also allow Beijing to remove this ideological threat. Worse still, the United States would lose the edge that comes from being the only great power without significant security hazards near its borders. It was only after the United States achieved dominance in the Western Hemisphere that it could project power globally. Russia and China, by contrast, still have to deal with **U.S. allies, partners, and military presences in their own backyards**—a circumstance that diverts resources they might otherwise use to pursue more distant ambitions and compete with the United States at a truly global scale.

## AT: China/Russia

### 2AC---China/Russia---T/L

#### **Expansion of US hegemonic influence in Eastern Europe is vital to deter China and Russia – perception is key.**

Rothman 22 – has a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Seton Hall, 1/24/22 (Noah, “What the Right Gets Wrong about Ukraine, Russia, and American Hegemony”, Commentary, <https://www.commentary.org/noah-rothman/what-the-right-gets-wrong-about-ukraine-russia-and-american-hegemony/>, accessed 6/26/22)//jd

With Russia bearing down on Ukraine and Western nations demonstrating more willingness to deter Moscow from starting another shooting war on the European continent, some on the American right are wondering why the West is invested in Ukrainian security at all. Indeed, they don’t see America’s commitment to deterring Russian aggression as deterrence. It is, to them, America sleepwalking into a disastrous conflict that is none of our business. They have gotten the stakes of this standoff and America’s interests precisely wrong. One of the primary sources of confusion among those on the right who favor a more introverted American foreign policy is that they have adopted Moscow’s confused rationale for its own aggression. Of this impulse, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat’s analysis is instructive. In his latest column, Douthat lays most of the blame for the current crisis at the Kremlin’s feet, but not all of it. He writes that, in the supposedly bygone era in which the United States was a “hyperpower,” America backed the eastward expansion of NATO that was both provocative and risky. This, he writes, was an aspirational foreign policy, not one that accounted for “the realities of power.” Douthat adds, “the attempt to draw Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the partway-open door to Ukrainians who preferred westward-focused alliances, was a foolish overcommitment even when American power was at its height.” This outlook is flawed in two ways. First, it assigns all agency to Washington and robs America’s non-allied partners of sovereignty. Washington didn’t grab Ukraine by the hand and guide it toward integration with the West. Ukrainians themselves have made that desire plain, and they have demonstrated a repeated willingness to fight for it. Ukraine’s present conflict with Moscow arguably began with the “Orange Revolution” of January 2005, xwhich culminated in the ascension of Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency. Almost immediately after that regime change, Ukraine and NATO inaugurated an “intensified dialogue” around a Membership Action Plan (MAP) that would one day result in Ukrainian ascension into NATO. But the conditions NATO attached to ascension were never met and, by 2008, a NATO summit in Bucharest that agreed to Ukraine and Georgia’s ascension only in the distant and indefinite future signaled the end of Ukraine’s progress toward becoming a NATO member. At the same time, the rise of “non-aligned” Viktor Yanukovych to serve as prime minister and, eventually, the president seemed like a concession to the “realities of power” in the region. But that proved a concession that Ukrainians were unwilling to make. A second revolution in 2014 ousted the Yanukovych regime, but the Ukrainians who fought and died fighting their own government in Maidan weren’t carrying NATO flags to the front. They carried the flags of both Ukraine and the European Union because the event that catalyzed that rebellion was the Yanukovych government’s unilateral suspension of a free trade agreement with the EU, not NATO’s enlargement. Westward alignment isn’t something that Ukrainians are ambivalent about. As recently as December, polling indicated that only about one-fifth of Ukrainians support joining a customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. They back integration with the EU and NATO by 58 and 54 percent respectively—a national ambition so central to Ukraine’s identity it is codified in its constitution. Consigning Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence wouldn’t be the natural course of affairs if we only extricated ourselves from Europe’s complexities, and that sentiment won’t go away just because we want it to. That brings us to the second flaw in Douthat’s analysis: Ukraine’s ascension into NATO was and remains a distant prospect. It is Kyiv’s desire to integrate economically and politically with the West that Moscow views as an imminent threat. Russia retails the notion that the present crisis is a response to the West’s heedless expansionism, but there’s no reason to lend credence to that dubious narrative. It’s Ukraine’s independence that so irritates the Kremlin. Douthat proposes an “ideal retreat” from Ukraine which would leave “NATO expansion permanently tabled, with Ukraine subject to inevitable Russian pressure but neither invaded nor annexed, and with our NATO allies shouldering more of the burden of maintaining a security perimeter in Eastern Europe.” He concedes that it would be a struggle to execute an immaculate retrenchment, as our bitter experience in Afghanistan suggests. But it might be the “least-bad” of our available options. This is exactly the concession Russia is demanding from the West. How else could you interpret Moscow’s demands in exchange for ratcheting down tensions? The Kremlin has insisted, in writing, that the United States and the West must commit not just to halting NATO expansion but must remove all troops and weapons from nations that entered the NATO alliance after 1997; namely, the entire former Warsaw Pact. Thus, Russia has effectively asked the West to gift them a sphere of influence they cannot secure militarily, diplomatically, or economically. To do so would abrogate the sovereignty of our partners and allies in Europe, shatter confidence in America across the globe, and represent a profound misreading of the imbalance of forces arrayed against Russian interests in its own backyard. Those who are attracted to Douthat’s argument appear to believe that the West’s only course of action short of war with Russia is retreat. There is, in the estimation of the American Conservative editor Rod Dreher, an “eagerness” among “American elites” to get involved in a real shooting war with Russia. “We have no realistic choice but to cede to at least some of Russia’s demands,” he writes, lest we abandon the geostrategic imperative of containing a revisionist China. Such a theory confuses deterrence with war-making. The dispatching of lethal arms into Ukraine, as well as the deployment of troops, naval assets, and area denial technology, is designed to raise the stakes of conflict to the point that Moscow blinks. That would be the best of all imaginable resolutions to the present conflict, because the refugee crisis, economic disruptions, and war of attrition in Europe that would follow a Russian invasion would be catastrophic. After all, the likelihood that U.S. could avoid becoming entangled in a conflict on NATO’s borders that involves America’s ratified allies is negligible. Nor is deterrence a zero-sum game. Both the Chinese and Taiwanese are watching events in Eastern Europe closely, the latter with a sense of existential dread. In recent weeks, Taiwan has committed to deepening its bilateral ties with post-Soviet states (in particular, Lithuania) including the establishment of a billion-dollar fund designed to offset Beijing’s economic pressure on these and other nations to abandon Taipei. In a 2019 report to Taiwan’s parliament, the country’s National Security Bureau warned that “the Chinese Communist Party is copying the methods used by Russia to annex Crimea against Taiwan.” The Taiwanese would rightly view a Western capitulation to Russian demands that acknowledges the legitimacy of a security architecture that robs Kyiv of its right to freely join foreign military alliances as a precursor to its own abandonment. Douthat is wrong insofar as the “least-bad” resolution to the crisis in Europe would be to defuse it without sacrificing either the post-Cold War order or Westphalian sovereignty. And the only way to secure that outcome amid the crisis Moscow has inaugurated would be to force it to back down—through troop deployments, diplomatic offensives, preventative sanctions, or even the provision of face-saving offramps like the restoration of defunct security agreements. But back down it must. What we cannot do is consign Ukraine to Russian domination. Even if we could, the Ukrainians themselves have proven they would never accept it. That is a challenge, indeed, but it’s a manageable challenge. By contrast, the wages of appeasement would be too costly to bear.

#### Heg checks Russian and Chinese revisionism through military deterrence

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

What a difference two decades make. In the early years of this century, the world appeared to be moving toward a single, seamless order under U.S. leadership. Today the world is fragmenting, and authoritarian challengers, led by China and Russia, are chipping away at American influence in East Asia, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush administration envisioned the end of great-power rivalries. In 2020, the question is how great powers can navigate their rivalries without stumbling into **war**. Writing in Foreign Affairs (“The New Spheres of Influence,” March/April 2020), Graham Allison offers a road map for this new environment: the United States should accept the return of “spheres of influence” and effectively let China and Russia dominate swaths of their respective geopolitical neighborhoods. Doing so, Allison contends, is actually in keeping with the United States’ best diplomatic traditions, considering that Washington tolerated a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe during the Cold War. Reviving that tradition is necessary, simply because the United States no longer has the military and economic dominance to deny China and Russia their geopolitical due. And it is desirable, because mutually accepted spheres of influence can promote stability and peace in a more rivalrous world. Allison’s argument is alluring but wrong. In truth, the United States has resisted the creation of rival spheres of influence for most of its history, even as it has worked assiduously to build its own. Ceding ground to China and Russia today would be not a recipe for stability but a blueprint for **coercion and conflict**, and it would weaken the United States’ geopolitical hand vis-à-vis its rivals. Nor is a return to spheres of influence foreordained—Washington still has the **power** to prevent Beijing and Moscow from dominating their regions, so long as it rejects Allison’s advice to cut loose its vulnerable frontline allies. A tougher, more competitive world is unavoidable. A far more dangerous world, divided into competing superpower fiefdoms, is not. AN AMERICAN TRADITION Spheres of influence have been common throughout history, but Americans have never been quite comfortable with them. In fact, much of U.S. foreign policy dating back to independence has consisted of efforts to prevent rival powers from establishing such domains. In the nineteenth century, U.S. leaders rejected the idea that any European power should have a sphere of influence in North America or the Western Hemisphere at large. They maneuvered—often quite ruthlessly—to evict European powers from these areas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States took this regional policy global. The so-called Open Door policy aimed to dissuade foreign powers from carving up China, and later all of East Asia, into exclusive spheres. Washington joined World War I in part to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant European power. A generation later, the United States fought to deny Japan a sphere of influence in the Pacific and prevent Hitler from establishing primacy over the entire Old World. During and after World War II, Washington also engaged in quieter diplomatic and economic efforts to accelerate the dissolution of the British Empire. Even during the Cold War, Americans never fully accepted Soviet control over eastern Europe. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to roll back the Iron Curtain through ideological warfare and covert action; later administrations expanded trade and diplomatic ties with Warsaw Pact states as a subtler way of undermining Kremlin control. The Reagan administration overtly and covertly supported political movements that were challenging the Kremlin’s authority from within. And when Washington had a chance to peacefully destroy the Soviet sphere of influence after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it did, supporting German unification and the expansion of NATO. Opposition to spheres of influence, in other words, is a part of U.S. diplomatic DNA. The reason for this, Charles Edel and I argued in 2018, is that spheres of influence clash with fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. Among them is the United States’ approach to security, which holds that safeguarding the country’s vital interests and physical well-being requires preventing rival powers from establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere or dominating strategically important regions overseas. Likewise, the United States’ emphasis on promoting liberty and free trade translates to a concern that spheres of influence—particularly those dominated by authoritarian powers—would impede the spread of U.S. values and allow hostile powers to block American trade and investment. Finally, spheres of influence do not mesh well with American exceptionalism—the notion that the United States should transcend the old, corrupt ways of balance-of-power diplomacy and establish a more humane, democratic system of international relations. Of course, that intellectual tradition did not stop the United States from building its own sphere of influence in Latin America from the early nineteenth century onward, nor did it prevent it from drawing large chunks of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East into a global sphere of influence after World War II. Yet the same tradition has led the United States to run its sphere of influence far more progressively than past great powers, which is why far more countries have sought to join that sphere than to leave it. And since hypocrisy is another venerable tradition in global affairs, it is not surprising that Americans would establish their own, relatively enlightened sphere of influence while denying the legitimacy of everyone else’s. That endeavor reached its zenith in the post–Cold War era, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc made it possible to envision a world in which Washington’s sphere of influence—also known as the liberal international order—was the only game in town. The United States maintained a **world-beating military** that could intervene around the globe; preserved and expanded a global alliance structure as a check on aggression; and sought to integrate potential challengers, namely Beijing and Moscow, into a U.S.-led system. It was a remarkably ambitious project, as Allison rightly notes, but it was the culmination of, rather than a departure from, a diplomatic tradition reaching back two centuries.

### 2AC---AT: Spheres of Influence

#### Allowing Russian and Chinese spheres of influence increases authoritarianism

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

GIVE THEM AN INCH… The post–Cold War moment is over, and the prospect of a divided world has returned. Russia is projecting power in the Middle East and staking a claim to dominance in its “near abroad.” China is seeking primacy in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia and using its diplomatic and economic influence to draw countries around the world more tightly into its orbit. Both have developed the tools needed to coerce their neighbors and keep U.S. forces at bay. Allison is one of several analysts who have recently advanced the argument that the United States should make a virtue of necessity—that it should accept Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, encompassing some portion of eastern Europe and the western Pacific, as the price of stability and peace. The logic is twofold: first, to create a cleaner separation between contending parties by clearly marking where one’s influence ends and the other’s begins; and second, to reduce the chances of conflict by giving rising or resurgent powers a safe zone along their borders. In theory, this seems like a reasonable way of preventing competition from turning into outright conflict, especially given that countries such as Taiwan and the Baltic states lie thousands of miles from the United States but on the doorsteps of its rivals. Yet in reality, a spheres-of-influence world would bring more peril than safety. Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence would inevitably be domains of coercion and **authoritarianism**. Both countries are run by illiberal, autocratic regimes; their leaders see democratic values as profoundly threatening to their political survival. If Moscow and Beijing dominated their respective neighborhoods, they would naturally seek to undermine democratic governments that resist their control—as China is already doing in **Taiwan** and as Russia is doing in Ukraine—or that challenge, through their very existence, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The practical consequence of acceding to authoritarian spheres of influence would be to intensify the crisis of democracy that afflicts the world today. The United States would **suffer economically**, too. China, in particular, is a mercantilist power already working to turn Asian economies toward Beijing and could one day put the United States at a severe disadvantage on the world’s most economically dynamic continent. Washington should not concede a Chinese sphere of influence unless it is also willing to compromise the “Open Door” principles that have animated its statecraft for over a century.

### 2AC---AT: Offshore Balancing

#### Offshore balancing fails – it encourages instability, human rights abuses, and nuclear proliferation.

Brands et al. ’16 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy. PETER FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.; November 2016; "Should America Retrench?”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/should-america-retrench; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It sounds too good to be true, and indeed, it is. Once the historically dubious claims and flawed strategic assumptions are corrected, the case for offshore balancing **collapses**. The concept may remain popular in certain academic circles, but it is no wonder senior policymakers have consistently rejected it in practice. REWRITING HISTORY Offshore balancers argue that their strategy represents the United States’ traditional approach to global affairs, and one that has consistently proved effective in advancing U.S. interests. In reality, however, U.S. policymakers have pursued offshore balancing only when they have been overly focused on avoiding short-term costs, such as those associated with overseas military deployments, and have thus been willing to accept a high level of strategic risk. The results have been ambiguous at best and **disastrous** at worst, which is why the strategy has so often been discarded in favor of a more engaged approach. In the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, the United States pursued a version of offshore balancing, by relying on regional governments to uphold power balances in Europe and East Asia. Those efforts failed, forcing the United States to enter World War II and launch major campaigns in both theaters. After sacrificing more than 400,000 American lives and spending the equivalent of $4.1 trillion today in the process, the United States rightly discarded offshore balancing as too costly and risky a way of defending its interests in those regions. Instead, U.S. policymakers committed the country to an **onshore military** presence that continues seven decades later, as well as to an ultimately successful effort to shape the internal politics and security dynamics of those areas. The United States’ next foray into offshore balancing, in Cold War Korea, ended no more successfully. In 1950, North Korean troops—responding in part to the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea the previous year—overran nearly the entire peninsula. U.S. forces then intervened, and, after some 36,000 U.S. soldiers were killed and the equivalent of $320 billion today was spent, the United States once again shifted to an onshore strategy, which has helped prevent a recurrence of the Korean War to this day. The United States’ longest reliance on offshore balancing has come in the Middle East—from 1945 until 1990 and again from 2011 to 2014. The United States did make brief onshore interventions (notably, in Lebanon in 1958 and again in 1982–84 and in Libya in 2011), but it primarily used economic aid, diplomatic support, covert intervention, and arms transfers to get major powers such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to defend a favorable balance of power. Even after the Iranian Revolution knocked out a key U.S. partner, the United States stuck with offshore balancing, supporting Saddam Hussein as the price of maintaining an acceptable balance of power in the Gulf, while also developing the over-the-horizon military capabilities needed to intervene in an emergency. It ended up having to do just that in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to overrun crucial Saudi oil fields, thereby threatening the regional balance and bringing yet another experiment in offshore balancing to a bloody conclusion. The subsequent discovery of an unexpectedly advanced weapons-of-mass-destruction program in Iraq, along with concerns over the weak Gulf states’ ability to balance against Baghdad on their own, convinced U.S. leaders to shift to an onshore strategy, which President George W. Bush doubled down on after the 9/11 attacks by invading Iraq. President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw from the country at the end of 2011 marked a shift back to offshore balancing in the Middle East, with the exception of Afghanistan, on the periphery of the region. But the rapid advance of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in 2014 convinced Obama to commit nearly 5,000 U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria, along with thousands more operating from air bases and ships in the region. In short, when leaders have tried offshore balancing, the strategy has tended to fail in costly ways, convincing them to shift to a more forward-leaning approach. Thus, Mearsheimer and Walt’s sunny claim that “for nearly a century, . . . offshore balancing prevented the emergence of dangerous regional hegemons and preserved a global balance of power that enhanced American security” masks a much darker reality: offshore balancing has succeeded only if one considers **World War II**, **the Korean War**, **the Persian Gulf War**, and the rise of **ISIS** an acceptable price for remaining offshore. If this is success, one shudders to imagine what failure might look like. FUZZY MATH Offshore balancing’s costs are not limited to the wars that must be fought when regional balances collapse. There are also the costs of maintaining those balances even when the strategy appears to be working. Offshore balancing requires the United States to become more dependent on morally bankrupt regimes, subordinating all else to the narrow realpolitik requirement of short-term stability. In the Middle East alone, offshore balancing tied the United States to its partnership with the ill-fated shah of Iran during the 1970s and caused it to turn a blind eye to Saddam’s domestic **terror**, **international aggression**, and widespread use of **chemical weapons** during the 1980s. In both cases, the consequences for **human rights**, as well as for longer-term regional stability, were problematic, to say the least. To make matters worse, offshore balancing encourages **nuclear proliferation**. Throughout the postwar era, maintaining an onshore presence has given the United States leverage to restrain allies’ nuclear ambitions while also mitigating the insecurity that might otherwise have driven such countries as Germany, Japan, and South Korea to pursue the bomb. Withdrawing offshore threatens to have the opposite effect. It is no surprise that South Korea expressed nuclear aspirations when the United States gestured at withdrawing its troops from the peninsula during the 1970s, or that Taiwan did likewise when U.S. rapprochement with China appeared to jeopardize the United States’ commitment to the island’s security. Offshore balancers may wave away the dangers of proliferation; given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, policymakers can hardly be so cavalier.

## AT: Econ Decline

### 2AC---Heg Prevents Econ Decline

#### Hegemony is necessary to prevent economic decline

Norrlof 17 [17 July 2017, Norrlof, Carla, Carla Norrlöf is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, a Senior Fellow of Massey College and a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council. Her research is on theories of international cooperation with a special focus on great powers particularly US hegemony in the areas of money, trade and security., “Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies”, Oxford University Press]//AA

Rationale for the Hegemonic Order Several international relations theories of dominance have emerged: the public goods version of hegemonic stability theory, the security version of hegemonic stability theory, the dyadic-hierarchy model, and unipolarity. All of these perspectives agree that it is worthwhile to study a concentration of power across different dimensions. Public Goods Version of Hegemonic Stability Theory (Kindleberger) Kindleberger proposed that a dominant power was necessary for stable, harmonious economic relations (Kindleberger, 1973, 1981). He explained international economic cooperation as a public goods problem, from which everyone could benefit but no one could be excluded (Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970). Since beneficiaries can enjoy public goods irrespective of their contributions, by free-riding, large groups encounter difficulties providing public goods (Olson, 1965). If everyone fails to contribute, the public good will not be fully provided. However, a single actor with sufficient interest in bearing the full costs of public good provision can solve the problem (Olson, 1965; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). In Olson’s (1965) famous assertion, “The small exploit the large.” From the theory outlining the difficulty of collective action, Kindleberger derived his proposition that, for “the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer—one stabilizer” (1973, p. 304). For Kindleberger, global economic stabilization meant “some country . . . would undertake to provide a market for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger, 1981, p. 247). He also added exchange-rate stabilization and coordination of monetary policies. In the late 1980s, Webb and Krasner (1989, p. 196) invited scholars to validate Kindleberger’s argument, which they said “might not have been truly tested . . . The real test of hegemonic leadership arises in times of crises.” Two decades passed before scholars met this call. The 2008 financial crisis brought renewed interest in the question of whether the United States, as the world’s dominant power, performed crucial stabilization functions during the crisis. Scholars were invited to reorient around real problems to explain the emergence and maintenance of global financial orders (Drezner & McNamara, 2013). Drezner (2014, p. 153, p. 156) drew on some of Kindleberger’s criteria to examine whether the United States and multilateral institutions helped stabilize the world economy and found that both played a role. Cohen (2015a) used Kindleberger’s five functions to explore whether China’s rise as a monetary power could be successfully accommodated, and concluded that accommodation is possible. However, his investigation did not settle whether and how stabilization occurred during the crisis. Norrlof and Reich (2015) examined Kindleberger’s five functions and asked whether the world economy requires one stabilizer or if these functions were shared between the United States and China. They found limited support for the first proposition, with stronger support for shared stabilization, during the global financial crisis. As more Chinese data become available, alternative methods should be used to determine the robustness of these findings and the validity of Kindleberger’s version of hegemonic stability theory. McDowell (2012) provided a detailed case study of the capabilities and incentives that resulted in the United States acting as an international lender of last resort during the global financial crisis, arguing that the Federal Reserve’s swap program is an example of U.S. structural power as conceived by Strange (1988b). Norrlof (2014) provided empirical snapshots of the dollar’s sustained preeminence despite deficits, wars, and the global financial crisis, and theorized how U.S. monetary capabilities translate into currency influence using power analysis. Cohen also explained the dollar’s supremacy after the financial crisis through a power lens, seeing autonomy as especially important for understanding the dollar’s global role (Cohen, 2015b). Helleiner (2014) described the continuity in the global financial order since the 2008 crisis, concurring with McDowell (2012) that Federal Reserve swap lines reflect U.S. structural power, and that the dollar’s reserve role has remained largely unchanged but Helleiner’s metrics are flawed. Security Version of Hegemonic Stability Theory (Gilpin & Krasner) More than any other scholar, Gilpin (1975, 1977, 1981) was the progenitor of hegemonic stability theory: “Just as the Pax Britannica provided the security and political organization for the expansion of transnational economic activity in the nineteenth century, so the Pax Americana has fulfilled a similar function in the mid-twentieth century” (Gilpin, 1975, p. 111). Krasner’s (1976) work was seminal in providing theoretical justification for why, and under what conditions, a hegemonic power supported free trade. Gilpin went beyond claims relating dominance to economic openness, arguing that the “Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security” (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 144–145). Reflecting on his contribution, Gilpin observed, “Stephen Krasner and I each appropriated Kindleberger’s basic idea that a political leader was needed to create and manage an international liberal economy. However, each of us made several modifications that placed Kindleberger’s insight within a state-centric intellectual framework of political analysis and thus fashioned a state-centric version of the theory of hegemonic stability” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 99). In this version of hegemonic stability theory, the hegemon provides an open economy as long as the distribution of gains does not compromise its security. As Webb and Krasner (1989, p. 184) explained, “. . . the dominant state can promote liberalization without jeopardizing essential security objectives. This is because an open system increases the income, the growth, and the political power of the hegemonic state without seriously affecting its social stability, and because the hegemonic state has symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure . . . If the pattern of relative gains threatens the security of powerful states, international economic liberalization will be restricted even though those states could have increased their absolute welfare by participating in a more open system.” Thus, the hegemonic power will only support openness as long as other states do not gain more than the hegemon from international economic exchange. If the distribution of gains were to shift toward other states, economic gains could be transferred to the security arena, undermining the hegemon’s dominance. These contributions have had tremendous impact and still resonate four decades later. The central claim embodied in Gilpin and Krasner’s version of hegemonic stability is that an economically open and peaceful international system is more likely to emerge when a hegemon is rising and has the capability and interest to foster open, peaceful interstate relations (Krasner, 1976, p. 323; Gilpin, 1981). Dominance breeds stability because only a dominant power has the incentive to single-handedly provide public goods from which everyone benefits.

### 2AC---Heg k2 Economic Growth

#### Having a strong military can spur economic growth

**ISA 2018** {International Strategic Analysis is one of the world’s leading providers of international market analysis, economic forecasting and country intelligence for many of the world's leading companies, organizations and governments, with clients in more than 115 countries**.** The Importance of Military Power in the 21st Century, [https://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx\_ttnews%5 BbackPid%5D=1&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=411&cHash=3c3785562e7d5a836189b87d09c8182e](https://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews%255%20BbackPid%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=411&cHash=3c3785562e7d5a836189b87d09c8182e) //KS}

Just as these other power factors influence a country’s ability to develop military power, a country’s military power also plays a key role in its development of these other factors of power.

Economic: A state that can protect its territory, resources and trade routes has a major economic advantage over others that are unable to do so. Furthermore, military power can be a catalyst for economic growth, if applied properly.

Demographic: A state with a relatively high degree of military power has the capability to protect its population and to allow for its population to grow at a healthy pace.

Environmental and Natural Resources: A strong military allows a country to protect its environmental and resource wealth, while giving it the option to seize the environmental and resource wealth of its weaker rivals.

Political: For better or worse, armed forces have played a major role in determining the level of political stability in states throughout history. When political-military relations are strong and stable, a country is able to achieve a higher degree of political power.

Technology: The armed forces have been the catalyst and the source for many of the major technological achievements reached throughout human history and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Cultural: Military power plays a lesser role in determining a country’s level of cultural power, although states with dominant military positions are often able to force their cultural norms on weaker states.

Many states throughout history have used their advantages in terms of military power to achieve great power status. For example, Macedonia under Philip II and Alexander was considered a backwater by other Greek powers, but its military advantages allowed it to become the most powerful of all of the ancient Greek states. Prussia too was considered a backwater by other European and German states, but its development of a strong military allowed it to unify Germany and emerge as continental Europe’s most powerful state. The Soviet Union’s great power status was also based upon a foundation of military power, something that it allowed it to emerge as a global superpower in the wake of the Second World War.

### 2AC---Heg k2 Free Trade

#### US hegemony key to free trade and NATO resilience

**Cambanis** **17** {He teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs .Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow and director of the international policy program at The Century Foundation in New York “Why It Pays to Be the World’s Policeman—Literally”, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/why-it-pays-to-be-the-worlds-policemanliterally-214605/> //KS}

The essential fact is that the United States sits at the pinnacle of a world order that it played a central role in designing, and which benefits no other country so much as it does — you might have guessed — America itself.

America runs a world order that might have some collateral benefits for other countries, but is largely built around US interests: to enrich America and American business; to keep Americans safe while creating jobs and profits for America’s military-industrial complex; and to make sure that America retains, as long as possible, its position as the richest, dominant global superpower. Rather than global cop, it’s more accurate to call America the world’s majority shareholder, investing its resources in global stability less out of charity than self-interest.

What this means is that as Trump develops his foreign policy — a dealmaking approach whose ultimate outlines we can only guess at — he will eventually have to walk back his promise or confront its real costs. It's easy to paint America as the rich uncle whom the world takes advantage of. That caricature certainly resonates with Trump’s voting base. But if Trump really tries to deliver on his promise and walk away from the world, the biggest price is likely to be borne by America itself.

The United States and its allies, in the wake of World War II, built a web of institutions that had an ideological goal: to reduce the risk of another murderous global conflagration. The United Nations would serve as a political-diplomatic talk shop that would reduce the chance of accidental superpower war and create avenues for managing the conflicts that did break out. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were designed to minimize the risk of another Great Depression. An acronym soup of other institutions sprang up along the same lines. When memories of fascism were fresh and Washington feared the allure of communism, it made some far-sighted, pragmatic moves. It funded the Marshall Plan for Europe, paying so the continent could recover economically and emerge to become a pivotal U.S. ally--and a profitable market for US companies. U.S. military occupiers in Japan and South Korea decreed progressive reforms and land redistributions in order to outflank communists.

In some cases, America really has underwritten most of the funding for international institutions, whether their purpose is to monitor ancient ruins (UNESCO) or inspect nuclear sites (IAEA). It hasn’t done so out of altruism. The investment has paid itself back many times over. These institutions have worked imperfectly, but they build goodwill and reduce risk. That’s good for the world in general, but it’s great for America.

It's true that America's role is expensive. In 2015, America spent more than the next seven nations combined on defense. Worried about this gap in the years after 9/11, some American officials and neoconservative ideologues complained that “Old Europe” should pay more for its defense. Like Trump, they argued that Europe has been able to reap an economic windfall because America shoulders so much of the NATO security umbrella.

At best, this analysis is a dangerous exaggeration; Europe could and probably should shoulder more of the cost, but the US investment in NATO is worthwhile for its own sake. At worst, by threatening NATO, the “free-rider” trope sets up America to shoot itself in the foot – shaking its security and breaking up a system with huge direct benefits to Americans.

Rather than a nation rooked by crafty foreigners, it makes more sense to see America at the center of a web of productive investments. Here’s how it works:

First, most of America’s defense spending functions as a massive, job creating subsidy for the U.S. defense industry. According to a Deloitte study, the aerospace and defense sector directly employed 1.2 million workers in 2014, and another 3.2 million indirectly. Obama's 2017 budget calls for $619 billion in defense spending, which is a direct giveback to the American economy, and only $50 billion in foreign aid – and even that often ends up in American pockets through grants that benefit American farmers, aid organizations, and other US interest groups. The U.S. military, and the Veterans Administration, are an almost socialist paradise of equality, job security and full health care when compared to life for Americans not on the payroll of the Defense Department and its generously (even absurdly) remunerated contractors. The defense budget, by playing on America’s obsession with security rather than social welfare, allows Washington to pump a massive stimulus into the economy every year without triggering another Tea Party.

Second, America’s steering role in numerous regions -- NATO, Latin America, and the Arabian peninsula -- gives it leverage to call the shots on matters of great important to American security and the bottom line. For all the friction with Saudi Arabia, for instance, the Gulf monarchy has propped up the American economy with massive Treasury bill purchases, and by adjusting oil production at America’s request to cushion the effect of policy priorities like the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Third, and most importantly, if you listen the biggest critics of the new world order, what you'll hear is that it’s rigged – in America’s favor. America’s “global cop” role means that shipping lanes, free trade agreements, oil exploration deals, ad hoc military coalitions, and so on are maintained to the benefit of the U.S. government or U.S. corporations. The truth is that America puts its thumb on the scale to tilt the world’s not-entirely free markets to America’s benefit. Nobody would be more thrilled for America to pull back than its economic rivals, like China.

Perhaps that’s why analysts in the business of predicting world affairs don’t think Trump is going to abandon America’s “world policeman” portfolio once he looks at the bottom line.

“Trump wants to be seen as projecting strength around the world and intends to expand spending on U.S. defense,” wrote Eurasia group’s Ian Bremmer shortly after the election. He might be more abrasive, and he might pressure some of America’s bottom-tier allies. But if he wants to be a strongman, he’ll have to keep America’s stick.

Obama, too, apparently thinks Trump will like being the world’s policeman even more than he’ll like being Putin’s friend. "There is no weakening of resolve when it comes to **America's commitment to** **maintaining a strong and robust NATO** relationship and a recognition that those alliances aren't just good for Europe, they're good for the United States. And they're **vital for the world,**" outgoing President Obama said on his valedictory trip to Europe, claiming confidence that Trump shared that view of global alliances.

Within Trumpworld, there’s no question a real rift exists on this question. Isolationist-nationalist America-firsters, like Steve Bannon, really do want to see America pull back, and downplay the costs in the interests of their ideological goals. Profit-driven internationalists like Rex Tillerson, however, are intimately acquainted with the benefits of keeping an American hand in global affairs.

#### US hegemony needed to protect free trade

**Aydin 2019** {Gülşen AYDIN, Assistant Professor, Ataturk University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, “The Ebb and Flow in the US Trade Policy: Does The Hegemonic Stability Theory Have Explanatory Power?”, pp 1347-1348, <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/841786> //KS}

Kindleberger belongs to the Liberal tradition and his arguments about the stability of the hegemonic systems are based on the game theory. He argues that international economic stability is a collective good to the benefit of all states. Small and medium states know that their individual contributions won’t be enough to provide public goods. Therefore, they are not expected to contribute to the provision of public goods. Rather, they tend to free ride and pursue their individual interests. As a result, the public goods of stability and free trade won’t be available in an international system composed of only small and medium-sized countries. **Only a hegemon possesses enough power** and motivation to provide these public goods (Webb and Krasner, 1989: 184). Therefore, for Kindleberger, one hegemon required **for a stable world economy** (Kindleberger, 1981: 247).

Krasner is another important scholar in the HST. Coming from the Realist tradition, he argues that the interests and capabilities of states with the aim of maximizing national interest set the structure of the international trade (Krasner, 1976: 317). He emphasizes that empirical data largely substantiate the argument that is there is a **hegemonic distribution of economic power** in the international system, this **brings about an open trading system** (Krasner, 1976: 318)

### 2AC---Heg Stops Extinction

#### American economic strength stops extinction from emerging tech and U.S.-Russia-China war.

Burrows ’16 [Matthew; September 2016; Director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, PhD in European History from the University of Cambridge; Global Risks 2035, “The Difficult Transition to a Post-Western Order,” Ch. 8, http://espas.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Global\_Risks\_2035\_web\_0922.pdf]

The multilateralist global system that the United States and the West built after the end of the Second World War was premised on an economically strong United States and West. In 1945, the United States was the only victor that was not completely devastated. World War II had brought the country out of the Great Depression, and the US GDP constituted more than 50 percent of the world’s total. Into the twenty-first century, the members of the Group of Seven (G7) were the world’s political and economic heavyweights. It has only been in the past several years that the collective GDP of the developing world—led by China—has surpassed the developed world’s. Even as non-Western powers grow, it is psychologically hard for the West to think about relinquishing its reins.

Demographically, the West has, for a long time, been in the minority. What’s more recent is the aging of the Western population (analyzed in chapter 2), which is already occurring in Japan and Europe, beginning to squeeze the availability of resources for anything but health, social security, and interest payments on debt. Unless healthcare becomes far more efficient, the US economy will be overburdened with healthcare and pension costs as the “baby boomer” generation ages. Healthcare constitutes a whopping 18 percent of the US GDP—significantly more than is the case for other industrialized countries—without necessarily providing better results.

With more going to health and pensions, there will be less capacity for defense and military spending. The United States is the biggest military spender, but China is increasing its portion of worldwide military spending, while the worldwide share of European NATO members is diminishing.

China’s military probably will not rival the United States’ power-projection capabilities even by 2035, but it will have greater anti-access and denial powers. In a military contest, China may never be able to deliver a knockout blow, but it could tarnish the US image of military invincibility in a conventional state-on-state contest held in its region. Equally, a confrontation that results in a Chinese humiliation could set back China’s aspirations for regional leadership, if not trigger a domestic legitimacy crisis for the Communist Party leadership.

Biggest Problem Is Domestic

The biggest psychological blow to ordinary Western citizens has been their sagging standard of living (more analysis in chapter 1). Despite a much better record of overall growth in the United States since the 2008 financial crisis, those with median incomes have taken a hit.

Worrisome for future US growth potential has been the drop in the labor-participation rate, from the 67 percent range before the 2008 financial crisis to 62-63 percent in the years since. The labor-participation rate was destined to drop due to a growing numbers of retirees, but much of the current sharp decrease comes from unskilled males in their prime working years—forties and early fifties—dropping out. Additionally, many younger women are not entering or staying in the job market. Global Trends 2030 looked at two scenarios for future US growth—one in which the United States maintained or slightly increased its average 2.5 percent pre-2008 growth rate, or one in which growth would slow to an average of 1.5 percent a year. In the first, there would still be the global economic shift to China. On the other hand, the 2.5 percent average growth would help boost average living standards, engendering a “feel-good” factor, which would make more Americans interested in reengaging with world issues.91

Given the record of slower growth and labor-force decline since the 2008 financial crisis, the likelihood of the second scenario is increasing. That scenario anticipated lower growth rates—which accelerated declines in average living standards—making it harder to continue trade-liberalization efforts. Indeed, the IMF warned in June 2016 that the United States faces potentially significant longer-term challenges to strong and sustained growth, saying, “concerted policy actions are warranted, sooner rather than later… focusing on the causes and consequences of falling labor force participation, an increasingly polarized income distribution, high levels of poverty, and weak productivity.”92

Moreover, it is not as if traditional US partners—Europe and Japan—are doing much better. Japan and many European countries are aging faster than the United States, eliminating labor-force growth as a driver of future economic growth. Europe’s and Japan’s economic performances have been declining since the 1990s.

In Europe, the public discontent with high unemployment and declining incomes has helped to spur the rise of antiestablishment far-right and populist parties that want to weaken the EU and transatlantic ties. Even in richer European countries, such as Germany, a backlash has been growing against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), out of fear that Europe’s rewards would be meager and European standards would be diluted. McKinsey Global Institute, for example, believes a “return to sustained growth of 2-to-3 percent” is possible for Europe, but would require many politically difficult reforms.93 These include: reducing dependence on imports (much coming from Russia) for crude oil and natural gas; fostering a more vibrant digital economy; increasing workforce participation by the elderly, women, and migrants; and promoting flexibility in labor markets. China now spends a greater share of its GDP on research and development than does Europe. The latest OECD figures show that Europe now spends even less than the rest of the OECD.94

In both the United States and Europe, there is increasing anti-immigrant sentiment despite documented economic benefits from immigration. According to EU Commission Employment Analyst Dr. Jorg Peschner, productivity, by itself, will not be enough to reverse the negative employment trend absent more immigration: “EU’s productivity growth would have to double in order to keep the EU’s economy growing at the same pace as it did before the crisis started.” For employment growth to remain positive as long as possible, improving the labor participation of women, low-educated people, and migrants will also have to be a priority. In the United States, many of the new businesses started every year are started by first- or second-generation immigrants.95

Politically, there has been a large rise in support for right-wing and populist parties in the United States and Europe, undermining traditional parties. The gaps, for example, between the leadership and supporters in the US Republican and UK Tory and Labor Parties have been particularly evident in the selection of Donald Trump as presidential candidate and the June 2016 victory of the “Leave” vote in Britain. Unfortunately, there is no end of economic disruption. The job churn will continue as more and more skills and professions are automated, also increasing the potential for more “losers” from globalization, greater political polarization, and inequality. The increased competitiveness of the developing world with the West is a particular morale buster for Western middle classes who got used to ever-increasing prosperity for themselves and succeeding generations. Adapting to a new norm of economic turbulence—more prevalent in other eras—may be one of the biggest mental hurdles for Westerners. The West is used to thinking of the “Third World,” not home, as the place where economic turmoil happens.

And a Multipolar Financial Architecture, Too

Historically, US and Western power has rested on having a monopoly on reserve currencies and a Western-dominated financial system. In 2035, the dollar will be the biggest reserve currency, but its share of global financial transactions is expected to drop from 60 percent today to 45 percent. The euro will probably remain the second reserve currency, while the Chinese yuan or RMB—which became a part of the IMF benchmark-currency basket in 2015—will become a third reserve currency, accounting for 10 to 15 percent of global finance in two decades’ time.96

The financial architecture will also become more regionalized. The central role played by the financial centers of New York and London will also diminish, and a multitiered financial architecture will develop. Following the UK Brexit, those centers’ share in financial intermediation will decrease, as a second pole of global finance forms in the Eurozone. A third pole will develop in East Asia and Southeast Asia.

Gradually, a growing share of global financial resources will be concentrated in those regional clusters. As with the growth of regional trade, the regional clusters will be more self-encapsulated, spurred by rising domestic demand in China and other developing countries with growing middle classes. With the role of electronic money likely to grow, the traditional banking system will probably also undergo major revision, with potential impacts on governmental powers.

A more multipolar reserve system and regionalized financial architecture should lessen risks and contribute to greater stability. But the large-scale technological innovations—some of which contributed to the 2008 breakdown—will continue, making global finance still volatile. Emerging-market countries with fragmentary regulatory regimes will be particularly prone to suffering financial crises. The aging-population factor also increases risks to public finances. This report anticipates modestly increased volatility, lower than what occurred in the global economy during the 1890s through the 1940s, but higher than in the 1950s and 1960s—more of a continuation of what has been the trend line since the mid-1980s.

Are There Alternative Visions to Western Order?

Four years ago, when Global Trends 2030 was published, the answer was largely no.97 Increasingly, the facts on the ground would suggest otherwise. They do not add up to a cohesive plan to substitute wholesale all Western institutions and practices. However, they clearly indicate that there are some no-go areas, particularly those connected to regime change, democracy promotion, state control over NGOs, and maintaining sovereignty. Russia and China, in particular, see themselves as great powers and, as such, believe they have special rights to dominance in their regions. However, as other powers like India develop, it is likely that they will see themselves as regional powers with inherent prerogatives. It is worth recalling the United States’ expansive Manifest Destiny and nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, claiming special rights to determine the future of the Western Hemisphere.

The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) has been closely following Beijing’s efforts to build a network of parallel structures to existing international organizations. It has concluded that China “is not seeking to demolish or exit from current international organizations…It is constructing supplementary— in part complementary, in part competitive—channels for shaping the international order beyond Western claims to leadership.”98

As the accompanying chart indicates, China’s shadow network of alternative international structures encompasses everything from financial and economic partnerships (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) to full-blown political groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the BRICS association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.99

Moreover, there is increasing cooperation among many of the emerging powers—beyond just authoritarians—to not just limit what they see as Western meddling in domestic affairs, but to go on the attack globally. According to a recent academic study, the “Big Five” authoritarian states of China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela “have taken more coordinated and decisive action to contain democracy on the global level.” They have sought to “alter the democracy and human-rights mechanisms of key rulesbased institutions, including the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and international bodies concerned with the governance of the Internet.”100

How durable are these preferences for nondemocracy and state control? By 2035, if not sooner (in the case of Venezuela), some of the now-authoritarian states could be liberalized, and the perceived threat posed by Western civil-society NGOs may ease. However, China and Russia are more likely than not to want to dominate their regions. Nationalism and democracy have been shown to be highly compatible. It is not clear that an even more powerful China or India would defer to Western leadership of the global order, even if both sides’ values in other areas begin to converge.

What Kind of Post-Western World? Clearly, there is a need to plan for a world that will not have the West as its big economic powerhouse—a prospect hard for Western elites and publics to conceive of, despite a decade or more of publicity about the “rise of the rest.” According to a recent survey, Europeans and Americans are more comfortable with each other than they are with anybody else. Although a majority of Europeans said, in the most recent German Marshall Fund transatlantic-trends polling, that they would like to see their country take an approach more independent from the United States, both Americans and Europeans still prefer each other over more Russian or Chinese leadership in the world.

The Obama administration—considered among the most multilateralist of recent administrations— campaigned hard in 2015 to convince Europeans not to join China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). It was as if the United States was against any governance structure not “made in the USA,” even when those running the AIIB have made clear their intentions of operating with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

More and more, the talk among Western elites is about locking in as much as possible the status quo, which favors the West, so that it will be harder for the newcomers to overcome. The TPP was sold as a way to set the rules before China gains much more power. A former Obama administration official advised that now might be the best time to undertake UN Security Council reform, before China and other uncooperative powers become more powerful. “A new US administration may be able to advance a proposal to address the Security Council’s anachronistic makeup while perpetuating a council that Washington can work with.”101

For Westerners, the challenge will be to plan for a future that will not be solely run by them, but which they can live with. Handovers have been historically difficult and fraught—more often than not, decided by bloody contests. One could envisage different scenarios, some already described in the earlier chapter on conflict, of military contests between the United States and China, or the United States and China with Russia, or the United States with NATO against Russia. Without delivering a knockout blow by one side or the other, these contests would most likely pit West against East, creating something akin to a new Cold War. Even if there were a knockout blow by the United States against China, it is hard to imagine a defeated China deferring permanently to the West. Its population has been imbued with such a narrative about the injustices by the West against China that any defeat or setback would be confirmation that the United States and West are dead set against a rising China.

Perhaps the most harmful effect of such a contest would be to convince both sides that neither is trustworthy. For the non-West, it would confirm the suspicion that the West does not want to relinquish its leadership position. For the West, it would make it harder to ever reach out and help establish a truly global system.

Need for a Second-Generation US and Western Leadership Model

War is not, and should not be, inevitable as the West struggles with the growing clout of China and other developing states on the world stage. Unlike during other transitions, the tools exist for ensuring more peaceful outcomes. They will require Western acquiescence to greater roles for the developing world to set and implement new rules of the road for the international order. A key feature of the post-1945 US design for the world order is its multilateralist structures. Many of these operate below most people’s radar. This plumbing of the international system has enabled the daily functioning of globalization. To keep it viable, China, as well as other developing countries, must be accorded more representation. There are too many long-term risks involved, for example, in China having only the equivalent of France’s voting rights in the IMF, when it is the first or second economic power in the world. This is how resentments are nurtured—all the more dangerous in China’s case because of its underlying “century of humiliation” mental complex.

As emerging technologies come online, the lack of a truly global institutional framework could be particularly dangerous. Assuring the future security of the Internet is particularly important in this regard, because all the new emerging technologies—bio, 3D printing, robotics, big data—take for granted a secure, global Internet. Everyone loses if cyber crime and cyber terrorism undermine the Internet. In the worstcase scenarios, in which cyber crime proliferates or strong national borders fragment the Internet, an Atlantic Council study, as mentioned, found that the economic costs could be as much as $90 trillion out to 2030, in addition to the risk of open conflict.102

Besides bringing the emerging powers into leadership roles in the panoply of multilateral institutions, the United States will need to temper its often “exemptionalist” stance to ensure the survival of the multilateralist order. According to the Council on Foreign Relations’ Patrick Stewart, a prominent scholar of global governance, one of the persistent paradoxes of the post-1945 decades has been that the “United States is at once the world’s most vocal champion of a rules-based international order and the power most insistent on opting out of the constraints that it hopes to see binding on others.”103 No country has the networks and connections that the United States does, but the system is now polycentric, rather than unipolar, and others resent the “exceptional” privileges that the United States claims. The Global Trends works have talked about the need for a new model of US global leadership. The United States needs to be guiding the international system as a “first among equals,” and willing to play by its own rules. Paradoxically, there is likely to be no vibrant global-governance system without US and Western leadership, but too much domineering behavior could doom it.

Even if the United States adapted its global role, this is not to say that the tensions and differences with many emerging powers would all disappear, or that the governance system would function seamlessly. In addition to the growing number of new state actors, the increasing importance of nonstate actors adds a new complexity to the functioning of global institutions. Moreover, there are clear-cut differences between the West and emerging powers on values-based issues, such as democracy promotion and the responsibility to protect. Many developing-country publics still resent Western colonialism and equate any intrusion with past historical wrong. They point to the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya, for example, as cover for the Western goal of regime change. Hence, the UN Security Council failure to stop the fighting in Syria, with more than two hundred thousand killed and 7.6 million displaced. Russia and China want to make a stand against the United States and the West getting their way and ousting the Assad regime. On the other hand, the lack of a solution smacks more of anarchy than global governance. Certainly, it shows one of the gaps that remains, and likely will remain, limiting global governance because of differences in values.

The speed with which new technologies are coming online and becoming an important political, military, and economic tool—for both good and bad—carries big risks for global governance. Stewart Patrick lists four potential new technologies that “cry out for regulation”: geoengineering, drones, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology. Without some setting of rules for their operation, there is the risk of major disruptions, if not catastrophes, stemming from their abuse. The recent advances in synthetic biology lower the bar to abuse by amateurs and terrorists alike, forever affecting human DNA. Geoengineering involves planetary-scale interventions that could interfere with complex climatic systems.

However cumbersome, politically unpopular, and ineffective at times, there is little alternative to increased global cooperation if one does not want to see higher risks of conflict and economic degradation. Without some sort of bolstered global governance, the West would end up with less sovereignty in a “dog-eat-dog” world, in which it was increasingly in the minority. But can the United States and the West rise to the challenge of investing in a global-governance system that will not always favor their interests on every issue? Historically, the United States could be especially generous because it was on top of the world in about everything after the Second World War. Europeans came to truly believe in pooling sovereignty and joint governance after centuries of internecine conflict. The tough economic times at home have seen US and European publics become distrustful of overarching multilateral institutions, believing the will of the United States or individual European countries will not be served. It is oftentimes easier for political leaders to fall in with the public mood rather than display leadership that might appear to work against it.

## AT: Indo-Pak War

### 2AC---Link Turn---Nuclear Exhange

#### Link turn---US heg prevents India-Pakistan nuclear exchange.

White 19, associate professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, Former senior adviser and director for South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, 3-6-2019, (Joshua, "Why America can’t escape its role in the conflict between India and Pakistan," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/06/why-america-cant-escape-its-role-in-the-conflict-between-india-and-pakistan/>, kav)

Here is what we know about the most serious India-Pakistan crisis in more than a decade. On February 14, the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked a paramilitarfy convoy in Pulwama in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. India, on the cusp of a general election, retaliated against its neighbor in the early hours of February 26 with a deep air strike targeting a terrorist camp near the town of Balakot, squarely within Pakistani territory. The following day, Indian and Pakistani forces were involved in an air skirmish in which at least one Indian MiG-21 was shot down; its pilot was captured and subsequently released. Both nuclear-armed countries placed their military forces on alert, and sustained vigorous artillery barrages across the Line of Control that divides them.

Although it might be too early to reconstruct precisely what transpired, the crisis yields some important lessons for the United States. With perhaps the exception of the Korean peninsula, India and Pakistan represent the world’s most likely venue for nuclear conflict. And Washington remains deeply involved with both countries, viewing India as a long-term partner that can play a supporting role in blunting China’s rise, and Pakistan as a frustrating but indispensable player in the negotiations to conclude America’s 17-year war in Afghanistan.

One unpleasant lesson is that the United States cannot meaningfully inhibit the sort of Pakistani risk taking that might spark military escalation with its larger neighbor. Americans have tried for years to stop Pakistan from using proxy militants to frustrate India. They have attempted a dizzying array of strategies: Increase security assistance and decrease security assistance; broaden diplomatic dialogue and constrain diplomatic dialogue; pursue cooperative counterterrorism strikes and engage in unilateral counterterrorism strikes; encourage international engagement and press for international isolation; threaten, cajole, praise, plead, and ignore.

If anything, the past several weeks have served as a reminder that neither the United States nor India has the tools to fundamentally alter, in the near term, what has been a long-standing attribute of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Perhaps Pakistani leaders have made quiet efforts to rein in India-focused terrorists, but the outcomes speak for themselves, and damningly: Attacks on Indian territory have continued unabated. It is foolish to assume that some uniquely clever or marginally novel combination of entrées from Washington’s policy menu will change this fact.

The United States can, however, still reduce nuclear risk in South Asia, first by helping India become more resilient in the face of terrorist provocation. Largely under the radar, U.S.-India partnerships in law enforcement, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, and border security have advanced considerably, but even more can be done. With India’s political resilience in mind, U.S. officials should also encourage their Indian counterparts to rethink their often heavy-handed management of Jammu and Kashmir, which gives unintended succor to terrorist groups and other enemies of the state.

Meanwhile, Washington can deliver a clearer public message to Islamabad. It should assert that Pakistan bears responsibility for these attacks—not because of any incontrovertible public evidence that shows directive control by the state over terrorist organizations, but because the flagrant openness with which supposedly “banned” groups operate within Pakistan suggests, at minimum, a policy of intentional state negligence. The United States and its partners should avoid the temptation to engage the sudden bouts of hyper-legalism that afflict Pakistani leaders following a terrorist attack in India, and focus instead on the uncomfortable truths that are already plainly in public view.

Moreover, together with its allies, the United States should continue to take steps to limit Pakistan’s access to global financial markets, and perhaps even the largesse of international financial institutions, until Pakistan demonstrates that it is meaningfully addressing the fundraising and operations of India-focused terrorist groups. This is best done matter-of-factly and without bluster, building on U.S. officials’ recent efforts in the Financial Action Task Force. Granted, Pakistan’s security elite are unlikely to fundamentally change course, and even Prime Minister Imran Khan—who has secured large loans from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to temporarily bolster Pakistan’s weak macroeconomic position—might feel like he does not need the wider financial backing that the United States can provide. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s economic self-isolation might, over a longer horizon, serve to clarify for the country’s elites the real choices they face.

Although some Pakistani officials admit in private that groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed are indeed a scourge of the state, they fret about “blowback” should the government act overwhelmingly against them. Americans might scoff at this argument. But ordinary Pakistanis have indeed suffered greatly from terrorism and fear poking a hornet’s nest. When I traveled to Pakistan in January, I was astonished at how dramatically the fear of terrorism had subsided; there was a palpable optimism about tourism and a return to normalcy.

The United States can and should find a way to acknowledge this concern while pointing out that Pakistan has already shown the world that it can deftly leverage all instruments of national power—law enforcement, media messaging, police and paramilitary forces, international partnerships, development assistance, and, of course, military operations—to degrade groups that it sees as a threat, such as the Pakistani Taliban. America’s message can be that uprooting India-focused terrorists is a decision that Pakistan itself has to make, one that speaks to its character and its desire to participate fully in the international community. Washington should signal that it will accept gradualism so long as Pakistan’s efforts are thorough and sustained.

There is a second important and unpleasant conclusion that American policy makers can already draw from these recent events: The decision not to inhibit Indian retaliation comes at some cost.

For many years after the 2001–02 crisis precipitated by a Jaish-e-Mohammed attack on the Indian Parliament, the political leadership in New Delhi sought to deflect Pakistani provocation, avoid escalation, and deny terrorist groups the satisfaction of disrupting India’s steady rise on the world stage. This strategy of restraint changed in September 2016, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi responded to a terrorist attack on an Indian army facility at Uri by conducting, and then publicly touting, so-called surgical strikes against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani Kashmir. The strikes were of questionable tactical value. But what they lacked in producing deterrence they made up for in catharsis—Modi was widely hailed within India for his boldness. He was also lucky in that Pakistan chose to deny that the surgical strikes ever happened. As a result, many Indians felt confident that they had outmaneuvered their Pakistani rivals with a new template for action.

They also concluded that perhaps they had found a newly sympathetic ear in Washington. Some days after the attack at Uri, National Security Adviser Susan Rice telephoned her counterpart in New Delhi to offer American support; the readout of that call “reiterated [the U.S.] expectation that Pakistan take effective action to combat and delegitimize United Nations-designated terrorist individuals and entities.” Then, after India’s surgical strikes, a senior White House official struck a careful tone, but pointedly noted that “we do empathize with the Indians’ perception that they need to respond militarily.”

I served in the White House during this period, and remember well that Pakistani officials and media commentators were surprised and dismayed at these comments. They should not have been. Many of the most contentious negotiations in advance of the 2015 visit by the previous Pakistani prime minister—the last official White House visit by a Pakistani leader—revolved around what Pakistan would say and what its military would do regarding India-focused terrorists. Assurances had been given, and had not been kept.

If Uri was an inflection point, this latest crisis—with even more assertive Indian military actions accompanied by even stronger signals of American acquiescence to Indian retaliation—might be a watershed. After the terrorist attack on Pulwama, President Donald Trump hinted that “India is looking at something very strong,” and National Security Adviser John Bolton was quoted by the Indian government as being supportive of India’s right to self-defense against cross-border terrorism. Following India’s retaliatory strikes, however, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pivoted quickly, urging both sides to “exercise restraint, and avoid escalation at any cost.”

India’s decisions since 2016 to retaliate against terrorist provocations are both politically explicable and emotionally satisfying. But they have also had the effect of raising the minimum, politically acceptable threshold of response in a way that makes future crises riskier. Over the past decade, I have observed or participated in more than a dozen war games that sought to model future India–Pakistan conflicts, and one lesson from those simulations is that neither party can reliably judge how or whether its retaliation will escalate the conflict closer to the nuclear threshold. Neither side can be assured that its move will be the final one.

For this reason, the recent crisis should prompt questions about the wisdom and sustainability of telegraphing that the United States will tacitly support a major act of Indian retaliation but will disapprove of further escalation by New Delhi even if Pakistan raises the stakes with a counterstrike.

One of the dirty little secrets of diplomacy is that exerting influence on friends is often harder than exerting influence on adversaries. The much-welcomed trend toward a deeper U.S.-India relationship has naturally raised each country’s expectation of support from the other in times of trouble. Perhaps American officials judge that counseling restraint of a close but independent-minded partner such as Prime Minister Modi in the face of sustained provocation would be pointless. Or that structural changes in the international system are making it harder for the United States to unilaterally influence the course of global emergencies. But at the very least, the February incidents should prompt U.S. planners to press New Delhi for more substantive U.S.-India conversations on crisis management; to find ways to publicly intimate that U.S. support for India during a crisis is in principle assured but in practice not unbounded; and to encourage their Indian counterparts to undertake realistic assessments of the value of military actions that generate more political fervor than actual deterrence.

### 2AC---Alt Cause---Terrorism

#### Terrorism is an alt cause to Indo-Pak war

**Center for Preventive Action 5/12**/22

(Global Conflict Tracker, “Conflict Between India and Pakistan”, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan//KRS)

With continued violence in Kashmir and a **heightened threat of terrorist activity by Pakistan-**based militant groups, tensions and concerns over a serious military confrontation between nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan remain high. In August 2019, following a deployment of tens of thousands of additional troops and paramilitary forces to the region, the Indian government moved to revoke Article 370 of the Indian constitution, removing the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. India-administered Kashmir remains under lockdown, with internet and phone services intermittently cutoff and thousands of people detained.

In February 2019, an attack on a convoy of Indian paramilitary forces in Indian-controlled Kashmir killed at least forty soldiers. The attack, claimed by Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad, was the deadliest attack in Kashmir in three decades. Two weeks later, India claimed to have conducted air strikes targeting a terrorist training camp inside Pakistani territory. Pakistan retaliated a day later with air strikes in Indian-administered Kashmir. The exchange escalated into an aerial engagement, during which Pakistan shot down two Indian military aircraft and captured an Indian pilot; the pilot was released two days later.

## AT: Multilateralism

### 2AC---Multilat Fails---Pandemic/CC

#### Multilateralism fails---failed to tackle the pandemic and can’t deal with climate change

David McNair 21 - David McNair is executive director for Global Policy at ONE, and an ECFR Council member., “Multilateralism’s failure to tackle our biggest challenges is compounding them”, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/article/multilateralisms-failure-to-tackle-our-biggest-challenges-is-compounding-them/ //AA

Our collective failure to end the pandemic now will cause even deeper and more costly problems in the future At the Global Health Summit in May 2021, G20 leaders declared that the pandemic “will not be over until all countries are able to bring the disease under control and therefore, large-scale, global, safe, effective and equitable vaccination … remains our top priority.” Campaigners could be forgiven, then, for feeling optimistic that meaningful action to address vaccine inequity would be taken at the G7 leaders’ meeting in Cornwall in June, or the G20 finance ministers’ meeting in Venice in July. Alas, they have been sorely disappointed. The members of the G7 pledged to share just 870 million of their 3 billion surplus doses by the middle of 2022, a paltry sum compared with the 11 billion doses that are urgently needed to reach global herd immunity. And the G20 produced little more than excruciatingly vague “support for collaborative efforts” on global vaccine distribution. Meanwhile, since that grand declaration in May, covid-19 has continued to wreak havoc around the world: an additional 400,000 people have died as the global death toll has ticked past four million. Africa finds itself in the grips of a truly devastating third wave of infections, with only 1.4 per cent of the continent’s population fully vaccinated. There will be a price to pay for this inaction even beyond the untold human cost. Our collective failure to end the pandemic now will create and compound even deeper and more costly problems in the future. The immediate knock-on effects, including for the West, will be severe. But this historic failure of multilateralism is also undermining the trust and incentives necessary for effective international cooperation on the other existential challenges of the day – most notably, climate change. In the short term, for as long as the virus is raging anywhere in the world, variants will continue to emerge that have the potential to send us all back to square one. The World Health Organisation warned last week that there is a “strong likelihood” that more dangerous variants will develop that may be even more challenging to control, underlining that “the pandemic is nowhere near finished”. We’re already seeing the damage that can be done by such variants, even in highly immunised countries. Cases are rising in Australia among fully vaccinated people due to the spread of the highly transmissible Delta variant. The United Kingdom, having vaccinated 68 per cent of its population, is now facing worker shortages, with up to 20 per cent of the workforce in some firms self-isolating. In June, a covid-19 outbreak at China’s Yantian port threatened to hold up 5 per cent of global freight capacity. These disruptions are, in turn, contributing to rising inflation due to increased commodity prices. But the economic impact of the ‘great divergence’ in the global pandemic response is just beginning. Last year, the International Chamber of Commerce estimated that vaccine hoarding by rich countries could cost the global economy $9 trillion, half of which would be borne by rich countries facing supply chain disruptions. In the medium term, the needlessly prolonged pandemic is likely to undermine global security and stability. Pandemic-driven social unrest is on the rise around the world, including in Africa. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that frustration over governments’ handling of the crisis, as well as mounting inequality and corruption, may lead to “a new wave of unrest” that could hinder the recovery from the pandemic, especially in developing countries. Again, we’re already seeing this play out. Nigeria reported recently that the pandemic has worsened the security situation in the country, as 100 people have been killed during a nationwide lockdown. Nigerian Minister of Interior Rauf Aregbesola attributed the killings to the frustration caused by rising unemployment and restrictions on movement. In South Africa, more than 70 people have been killed and over 1,300 arrested amid riots triggered by the jailing of former president Jacob Zuma. The health ministry warned that the country’s vaccination rollout and other essential healthcare services have been severely disrupted, and there are also reports of an impending food shortage. The European Asylum Support Office warned that the risk of conflict-related displacement is likely to increase due to the pandemic – raising the spectre of the 2015 refugee crisis, which pushed the EU’s multilateral institutions to the brink of collapse. Of course, the greatest threat to global stability is climate change. There are depressing parallels between the international responses to the covid-19 pandemic and climate change. Like the climate crisis, the pandemic reveals a lot about our inability to act in our own enlightened self-interest when faced with an urgent and obvious threat, and provides overwhelming evidence of the humanitarian and economic costs of inaction. As so eloquently argued by the Financial Times’s Martin Wolf, “even against such a self-evidently global threat, where the costs are huge and immediate, we seem unable to act with essential urgency,” and, consequently, when it comes to the climate, “it is impossible to imagine we will do much more than fiddle while the planet burns.” Needless to say, truly global cooperation is required to effectively address the climate crisis, which is arguably an even more complex and profound problem than covid-19. But the trust and goodwill such cooperation demands have been decimated by the West’s short-sighted nationalism in the face of the pandemic. It is hard to overstate the anger that vaccine inequity has created in Africa, where a meagre 4.3 vaccines have been administered per 100 people (compared to 77 per 100 in North America and 75 per 100 in Europe). We have the resources and capabilities to end the pandemic everywhere; it is simply a matter of political will.

### 2AC---Multilat Fails---Outdated

#### Multilateralism is ineffective and outdated

Amrita Narlikar 1/23/20 [Professor Amrita Narlikar is the President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Honorary Fellow of Darwin College (University of Cambridge), Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation, Distinguished International Fellow of the Indian Association of International Studies (IAIS), and Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow of the Australia India Institute., “The malaise of multilateralism and how to manage it”, Observer Research Foundation<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-malaise-of-multilateralism-and-how-to-manage-it/>]//AA

Why multilateralism is in such a mess today boils down to three reasons: disillusionment with globalisation, lacklustre narratives in support of multilateralism, and the inadequacy of existing multilateral rules to meet new challenges. Ups and downs in the lives of individual international institutions are not new, but the malaise that now afflicts multilateralism is unprecedented in range and depth. It transcends issue-areas, and occurs at a time when the need for sensible rules of international cooperation has greater urgency than ever before. Even as trade wars rage outside, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) finds itself paralysed due to the blocked appointments/re-appointments of judges in its Appellate Body. Public awareness of climate change as a global emergency may have increased, but the United States has at the same time delivered a serious blow to the mitigation regime by moving to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. In his remarkable interview with The Economist in November this year, French President Macron declared the “brain-death” of the NATO and pointed to the fragility of Europe. Impending Brexit is one thorn in the side of the European project; the rise of the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party in Germany is another. Multilateralism, in both its universal and non-universal versions, and across economic and security issues, is under severe strain. Explaining the malaise It is commonplace — especially by those with liberal and/or centrist inclinations in politics — to attribute the crisis of multilateralism to two factors. First, many observers point the finger at President Trump and his “America first” agenda. Is it surprising then, they ask, that others follow suit when the world’s largest economy behaves with such great irresponsibility and chooses to turn its back on the very system that it had once led the way in creating? Second, some see Trump’s politics as part of a broader phenomenon involving the rise of strongmen leaders with populist inclinations who fan nationalist sentiment, framing the rights and interests of local populations as pitted against those of a “global elite.” Both explanations, however, are deeply misguided. Nor is the wrong-headedness of such applications purely an academic matter. Rather, the knee-jerk solutions that they result in are likely to worsen the malaise of multilateralism. Reacting to Trump’s message of “Make America great again,” Macron countered with “Make our planet great again.” This was not a bad response per se, especially given the crudeness of Trump’s pledge. Yet, the Yellow Vests protests showed that Macron’s (probably well-meant) moral high-horsiness did not find many takers. The problems of multilateralism predate the arrival of Trump on the international scene; failure to recognise this will keep taking us down the same cul-de-sac as Macron’s “Make our planet great again.” Take the case of trade multilateralism. True, Trump may have called the WTO “the single worst deal ever made” and severely dented the system by launching his supposedly “good, and easy to win” trade wars. But amidst this drama, it is too often forgotten that dissatisfaction with WTO functioning has been brewing for years. The recurrence of deadlocks in the Doha Round for over the last 15 years is a clear sign of discontent from multiple stakeholders (and not just the US). Similarly, it is worth recalling that although many blame the Trump administration for the wreckage that is the WTO’s Appellate Body today, the practice of actually blocking appointments and re-appointments of judges in fact goes back to the Obama administration (although admittedly not on the same scale as practiced by the current US administration). It was also under President Obama that the US dabbled in the rhetoric of protecting American workers, showed great reluctance to make concessions during Doha negotiations. And again, it was the Obama administration that precipitated a turn away from the multilateralism of WTO and towards the (mega-) regionalism of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership. Trump’s angry and public pronouncements against various multilateral institutions, or the rhetoric of some populist movements against the global order, have certainly multiplied the problems facing multilateralism. But they are not the root cause. Why multilateralism is in such a mess today boils down to three reasons: disillusionment with globalisation, lacklustre narratives in support of multilateralism, and the inadequacy of existing multilateral rules to meet new challenges. First, backing Trump’s narrative of “America First” or the Brexiters’ slogan of “Take back control” is the fact that significant proportions of the electorates of these countries believe that the gains of globalisation have passed them by. They attribute increasing inequality within their society, and the job losses and declining wages that they personally endure, to the costs of international trade. The hardships that these groups suffer have several causes, which range from technological change to inadequate welfare mechanisms that could allow for better wealth distribution. But trade is often the easy scapegoat, especially as blame can be all too conveniently attributed to international deal-making. The current US administration is an example of a government that has effectively harnessed this discontent — perhaps even stirred it further by building a narrative that links domestic inequalities and poverty within the US to multilateral governance. But this disillusionment with the system is a real and potent force, which will survive irrespective of what happens in the upcoming US elections. Second, a solid and convincing counter-narrative has been missing. Telling the malcontents and the disillusioned — especially if they face personal economic hardships amidst increasing inequality — that they should think about the planet first will not reassure them. If anything, such narratives will only exacerbate the backlash against those increasingly seen as part of a “global elite” and the values of internationalism that they represent. The takeaway for many parts of the electorate (in different countries) from such cavalier attitudes will likely be along the lines of ‘only Mr Trump understands my pain, only the AfD is willing to stand up for my rights.’ Third, the liberal fixation on Trump as the root cause for the decline of multilateralism diverts attention from another equally serious cause: the rise of an increasingly assertive China. One reason for this blind spot may be that China itself has been doing an impressive job — at least until recently [1] — in presenting itself as a guardian of globalisation and multilateralism. Declarations of support for the system, for example at the World Economic Forum by President Xi, stand out in stark contrast to the havoc wreaked on the system via President Trump’s angry tweets and trade wars. But recent scholarship by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman on “weaponized interdependence” has begun to highlight the use of global economic networks for geostrategic purposes.[2] Combine these insights with China’s meteoric rise and controversial expansionism in its region and beyond (e.g., via the Belt and Road Initiative), and it is clear that the underlying premises of the postwar multilateral system are being put into question. Much of the post-war order was built on an assumption of the virtues of economic interdependence, which were supposed to bring nations together and promote peace. But if multilateral rules to promote economic interdependence have been used — or could be used in the future — by “systemic rivals” to gain geo-economic advantage, then a backlash against these rules is bound to come sooner or later. While the US has voiced these concerns most vociferously, others too have been raising them in different settings as they argue in favour of institutional reform and updating. Finding sustainable solutions To fix the malaise of multilateralism, technical solutions — for example, improving the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism — will of course be important. But given the deep-rooted nature of the challenge, a purely technocratic response will not suffice. Four sets of additional measures will be crucial. First, the only way that we will be able to bring the discontented many on board (and bring them on board we must, if we are to restore trust in the system) is by taking their concerns seriously. This means reconsidering past trade-offs and developing a new bargain on globalisation with better distributive mechanisms, both domestically and internationally. Trump-bashing — and its equivalent in other countries — on its own and ridiculing populist supporters will only exacerbate polarisation. Second, multilateralism will need a brand new narrative. This narrative will have to convey clearly why reformed multilateralism is of direct benefit to citizens across the board, and not only tomorrow but also today. Appealing to global public goods and the welfare of future generations are likely to prove insufficient as rationales, especially to those who feel shortchanged and are enduring economic hardships. This new narrative will need to have individual and group appeal. It will also need to work across different levels of politics — local, regional, national, and global. [3]

## AT: Iran War

### 2AC---Iran War---Soft Power

#### Heg key to Iran containment – hard and soft power solve

Esfandiaryis 20 - holds a PhD in the War Studies Department at King’s College London and master’s degrees from King’s College London and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, 2/11/20 (Dina, “A Practical Policy to Re-Engage and Contain Iran”, The Century Foundation, <https://tcf.org/content/report/practical-policy-re-engage-contain-iran/>, accessed 7/5/22)//jd

It is by now clear that Donald Trump does not have an answer to one of the most bedeviling foreign policy problems of the last four decades: Iran. In this, he is not alone. Since the Islamic Republic’s founding in 1979, no American president has been able to figure out how best to manage the challenge that Tehran poses for stability and American interests in the Middle East. But three years into the Trump administration’s erratic and aggressive Iran policy, Washington’s aims and strategy are more adrift than ever. Although it is uncertain whether Trump’s presidency will last another year or five—and whether a progressive administration will eventually succeed him—the time is ripe for the United States to develop an intentional, coherent, and effective policy toward Iran. American voters of different political stripes are raising fundamental questions about their role in the world—about U.S. core interests and priorities in a changing global order—creating an unprecedented opportunity to rethink U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. When the time comes, a new plan with a strong foundation will be needed. The principles of de-escalation, diplomacy, and containment should guide U.S. policy toward Iran going forward. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) would have provided an ideal springboard for such a policy. But Trump has withdrawn from that agreement, and rejoining will not be possible. If the deal collapses entirely, Washington will have to rebuild trust in order to start new, broad negotiations; dial down conflict points; and find less risky ways to challenge and contain Iran. To this end, the United States’ first step must be to accept that, while Iran is a problematic actor, Washington has only a limited capacity to control its behavior. Second, the United States must compartmentalize regional and foreign policy as it relates to Iran. Iran cannot continue to be the lens through which Washington evaluates relationships with every other country in the region, or its basis for responding to every crisis. Third, the United States must right-size the perception of the Iranian threat—and manage political expectations about the possibility of reducing it. Fourth, the U.S. government must decide how best to engage Iran in diplomacy, and what format this engagement should take. In the formulation of a new Iran policy, taking lessons from the past will be important. Barack Obama’s policy of engagement held promise, especially the nuclear deal. Importantly, the JCPOA successfully mitigated the possibility that Iran could pursue nuclear weapons. The agreement thus put a tangible constraint on one aspect of Iran’s most threatening behavior, and avoided further U.S.–Iran tension over Obama’s most serious Iran policy priority. Further, the JCPOA created a framework to negotiate on other important matters, including Iran’s missile program and involvement in regional wars. Obama’s diplomatic engagement came with its own controversies, however. It didn’t slow down Tehran’s regional meddling, whether in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, or elsewhere. Opponents of the JCPOA also argued that Iran accelerated its missile program while Washington was focused on negotiating the nuclear deal.1 More than likely, though, the JCPOA would have yielded additional positive results down the road. We will never know. Worse still, the Trump administration’s post-withdrawal campaign, which it dubbed “maximum pressure,” has only emboldened Iran. Tehran has increased its military activity, raised its political demands on partners, and begun to downgrade its implementation of the nuclear deal (which is supposed to remain in force for the remaining members, but is critically weakened without the United States). The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has only emboldened Iran. Still, new policy must go further than a repudiation of Trump’s failures. Through both the Trump and Obama administrations—and indeed those of all the other presidencies since 1979—there has been a lack of reasonable and balanced assessments of the true threat that Iran poses to the United States and its interests. In some ways, the chaos of the Trump presidency has opened a door to reevaluate old assumptions, and to reconsider the goals for Iran and the Middle East that Washington’s strategists and politicians have long taken for granted. Barriers to Dialogue with Iran The basis for formulating a new approach to Iran must be a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges that Iran poses—and the ways that past American policy has failed to meet those challenges or evolve with them. One of the biggest barriers to Washington’s dialogue with Iran is mutual lack of trust, which dates to the founding of the Islamic Republic. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, anti-Americanism became one of the main tenets of the new regime. Washington, for its part, was scarred by the 444-day hostage crisis, during which a group of Iranian students and revolutionaries detained fifty-two Americans in the U.S. embassy in Tehran.2 This watershed moment traumatized the minds of Americans and their officials alike. It also affected officials of the Islamic Republic, some of whom later regretted the hostage taking, believing it has since “colored relations between the two countries.”3 This history of mistrust made the 2015 JCPOA agreement, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany), all the more significant. The nuclear deal not only resolves a long-standing international concern, but was also the culmination of years of dialogue, which only came to fruition when the United States engaged Iran directly. But, as mentioned above, the nuclear deal had its limitations: while it ensured that the United States and Iran could engage and compromise on one important matter of substance, the nuclear talks did not curb or counter Iran in the region. Candidate Trump made it clear that, as president, he would not hesitate to pull the United States out of the deal, and he did exactly that in May 2018. As a result, American credibility, reliability, and reputation as a state party to an international agreement has taken a real hit. The argument goes: why negotiate and make deals with the United States if subsequent administrations can then choose to ignore them—and seek to punish allies simply for upholding their end of the agreement? American credibility, reliability, and reputation as a state party to an international agreement has taken a real hit. The problems created by the withdrawal, however, go beyond damage to American credibility and reliability. The increased partisan nature of U.S. politics has become brutally apparent to Iranians. Iranian officials now believe that it is futile to negotiate with a Democratic administration, because a later Republican administration will likely overturn its decisions. To them, engagements taken on by a Republican administration are more likely to last and be respected by subsequent administrations. This effectively means that Iranians are less likely to engage with a Democratic president than they are with a Republican. In addition, today, as a result of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran and the United States are locked in a spiral of escalating tensions with little or no off-ramp. The lack of direct communication between the two governments means that there are more serious risks of escalation following a miscommunication or misperception. The campaign has also led to a hardening of Iranian positions vis-à-vis Washington: the domestic political cost of negotiating with the United States for an Iranian official is too high, especially after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani—a high-level and popular Iranian official.4 Many Iranians do not condone what Soleimani did, and those who protested against the regime in November 2019 have not forgotten their discontent. But the threat from an external enemy has brought them together, at least momentarily, in a show of unity. The persistent problem when assessing U.S.–Iran relations is that anti-Americanism is endemic to the political and security leadership of the Islamic Republic under the current supreme leader, and being anti-Iran is endemic to the American political sphere (and arguably so for both major political parties). Because of these dynamics, many influential decision-makers in the United Kingdom, for example, believe that a new deal is “inconceivable until [Iranian supreme leader Ali] Khamenei dies,” according to a recent research paper that polled officials and analysts.5 In the short term, the political climate in both Iran and the United States will make it difficult for either side to compromise. The United States is in full election mode, and after parliamentary elections in February 2020, Iran will hold presidential elections in 2021. These elections will happen at a turbulent time for the Islamic Republic, following the nationwide protests in November 2019, which it brutally suppressed, and the show of unity that followed Soleimani’s assassination. The current environment, as well as the Iranian Guardian Council’s disqualifying of thousands of moderate candidates from the parliamentary elections, suggest that the Iranian government is likely to become yet more conservative.6 The greater alignment between factions in Iran’s political system, which Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign has partly caused, could make it easier to build a consensus in favor of a new deal. However, conservatives in Iran are tougher negotiators and less likely to compromise—in other words, the new Iranian consensus may be for an even more hard-line position. American Priorities in the Region The United States has not clearly articulated what its policy objectives are for Iran: To contain it? To change the current government? To integrate it into international relations in order to moderate its behavior? Each successive U.S. presidency has focused on one or a combination of the above. But American objectives for Iran, and the wider Middle East, have hit a wall, because events in the region have often overtaken decisions and affected which policy options are available. The United States must build internal consensus on what it wants from Iran and the region. In other words, it should carefully consider and revise its “list of grievances.” American priorities in the Middle East have included counterterrorism, stability, Israel’s security, and energy security—though the latter is becoming somewhat less important.7 Ideally, the United States should also prioritize fostering the establishment of good governance in the region. But the American government and voters are tired of their country’s decades of risky and costly involvement in the Middle East. Expensive ventures and considerable policy failures have done little to effectively secure the United States.8 Washington must decide how much it can and wants to continue to contribute to regional security. Iran policy can only be determined in the context of a wider Middle East strategy, which should promote regional peace and stability; de-emphasize military means of promoting American interests; and seek to de-escalate abusive governance and militarism by regional governments, whether allied or opposed to the United States. American priorities in Iran should include the release of dual nationals, the respect of human rights, and containing Tehran’s proxies, partners, and allied hybrid actors, such as Hezbollah. With regard to Iran, Washington should also be clearer about its aims. These will include the release of dual nationals currently detained in Iran, the respect of human rights in Iran, and containing Tehran’s proxies, partners, and allied hybrid actors, such as Hezbollah. The United States should perhaps even explore cooperation with Iran in specific, limited areas, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. But Washington must ensure these goals are achievable: issuing a twelve-point plan that is tantamount to calling for Iran to utterly capitulate to the United States—as U.S. secretary of state Michael Pompeo did in May 2018—will only make dialogue and the pursuit of these goals more difficult.9 Such an approach simply entrenches Iranian positions. Accepting Limits The first and most important component of a new U.S. policy on Iran is to understand that Iran is a threat that can be managed, but not eradicated. Washington can try to balance Tehran, contain it, discourage bad behavior, and encourage better behavior, but it must also accept that it has a limited ability to control Tehran. Further, Iran will continue to be an important regional player. The United States also cannot forcibly prevent Iran from seeking a nuclear weapon or running militias in the region, if that is what Tehran is set on doing—no amount of brute force will remove Iranian knowledge of the nuclear program or erase intent, for example. However, the United States can deal with Iran in such a way as to secure incremental gains for American interests in the Middle East. Washington’s ability to coerce Iran is limited, but it can persuade or induce Iran to adopt certain policies. As such, Washington should treat Iran as a problematic actor, whose behavior it cannot control or change by force. Expectations on what the United States can achieve with Iran must be lowered. It is crucial to understand that even if one problem area is resolved or managed, the United States will always have areas of contention with the Islamic Republic. The United States must manage the Iranian “problem,” while publicly stating what aspects of its behavior it finds most problematic, so that Washington is able to maintain the moral high ground as it navigates the complicated and difficult field of Middle Eastern politics. Part of accepting that not everything is within Washington’s control involves deciding, firstly, what the United States can and cannot abide in the region, and secondly, what it can and cannot abide with respect to Iran, specifically. A formal policy review by a new U.S. administration would help whittle American priorities down to a realistic and limited set. In addition to justified fears of Iranian nuclear capabilities and missile range, the United States could, for instance, seek to limit Iran’s ability to strike regional energy infrastructure. Washington could also accept shared influence in contested zones such as Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, rather than always seeking to dominate them. On the other hand, the U.S. government would have to grudgingly accept that Iran will continue to wield influence and counter American priorities through its proxies and partners in Iran’s near neighborhood, which includes current or former U.S. priority areas such as the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant. A meaningful prioritization would allow the United States a better chance to politically manage Iran: work with it when it serves American interests, but at the same time contain Tehran and its influence. The United States has ample experience dealing with problematic countries whose policies it cannot simply ignore. For example, Turkey frequently operates counter to American interests even though it is a NATO treaty ally; China and Russia sometimes undermine and sometimes directly resist U.S. policy in the region, but are far more powerful than Iran and intersect with U.S. interests—sometimes productively—on a global scale, rather than regionally. None of these examples is an exact parallel to Iran, but each provides lessons from which Washington can draw. In sum, the United States must establish realistic priorities, and then manage domestic political expectations about what can be achieved. Concretely, this would involve making some difficult decisions that many in the U.S. system will struggle with. For example, the United States will have to accept that Hezbollah and its link with Tehran are intractable problems. The Islamic Republic’s relationship with Hezbollah is one that Tehran will not give up—there is no scenario in which this is something that Tehran will consider. Iran played a key role in setting up the group, and Hezbollah represents and symbolizes the scale of Tehran’s reach into the region.10 As a Tehran-based Iranian academic close to the government put it: “The link between Iran and Hezbollah is very close. It takes two to three weeks for the cabinet to see the supreme leader, but Hassan Nasrallah will be granted an audience faster and with more ease than [Iranian president Hassan] Rouhani.”11 Nasrallah’s access to Iranian leadership demonstrates the depth of Hezbollah’s ties to Iran. Washington’s insistence on imposing wide-ranging sanctions on Lebanese officials associated with Hezbollah, and its withholding of assistance to Lebanon because of Iran’s influence over the country (through Hezbollah), are counterproductive. These measures prevent American officials from engaging with a group that is problematic (to say the least), but nevertheless, a significant player in the Lebanese political scene. Like it or not, Washington must work with the fact that Hezbollah has evolved into a status quo movement operating largely within the framework of the Lebanese state. The United States’ longtime designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group is of similarly questionable expediency: the designation cuts off first-hand insight into the powerful militia-cum-political party. In addition, the designation prevents “deconfliction” (the term for avoidance of military engagement between two adversaries). Diplomatic contact with groups like Hezbollah would be integral to the de-escalation of tensions and crisis management. As it stands, the lack of communication that the terrorist designation requires makes it more likely that, say, a misunderstanding at the Lebanon–Israel border erupts into a major conflict. Washington doesn’t need to approve of or endorse troubling groups in order to accept that dealing with such groups might be practical. In addition, Washington’s current stance on Hezbollah is problematic because it sets the breaking of ties between Tehran and Hezbollah as a precondition to meaningful dialogue with Iran. Since Tehran will not give up that relationship, this precondition only limits the United States’ flexibility in its foreign policy. This is not to say that a new approach will be easy to effect: changing Washington’s position on Hezbollah and Iran in this manner would represent a major shift, and require overcoming political and psychological blockages in place since 1979.

#### United States hegemony in the Middle East aligns with Iran’s interests

Allison 16 – is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, March 2016. (Graham, “US and Iranian interests: Converging or Conflicting?”, Belfer Center, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-and-iranian-interests-converging-or-conflicting>, accessed 7/5/22)//jd

The nuclear issue has dominated relations between the US and Iran over the past decade. Now that the two countries have shelved that issue by agreeing to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it is appropriate to ask where and how the national interests of both countries converge and conflict. In my class at Harvard, to lift students’ sights above the instant images and chatter that consumes most of their attention, I sometimes ask them to step back -- way back -- and consider the perspective of a strategist from Mars. Reviewing recent history, and setting the nuclear issue aside, what would this Martian observe about US-Iranian relations? As a start, the Martian would note that since it took power in 1979, the Islamic Republic has faced three primary enemies: Soviet Union, Saddam’s Iraq, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan. The Martian would point out that, in 1991, the United States won the Cold War and the Soviet Union disappeared. In 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. And in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and quickly overthrew Saddam’s government. He would, of course, add that the United States did not undertake these efforts for the sake of Iran. But it is indisputable that, in all three cases, Iran was a major beneficiary. Looking to the future, are US and Iranian national interests more likely to be aligned or opposed? The vitriol of the current political season in both countries suggests the latter. But the Martian, and perhaps wise leadership on both sides, would recognize distinct areas of convergence. Two in particular stand out as opportunities for further (if unstated) collaboration: Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, Iranian and American interests align in the desire for a stable, majority-dominated and thus Shia government in Bagdad, and in the war against ISIL. First, consider how both countries’ military capabilities complement each other. While the US is unwilling to commit large numbers of troops in Iraq, Iran has aggressively deployed special forces advisers, weaponry and intelligence assets on the ground to combat ISIL. On the other hand, while the Iranian air force is essentially obsolete, the United States has sent some of its most sophisticated aircraft to prosecute the war from the skies. The uncomfortable but undeniable fact is that Iranians and Americans are working in concert to fight ISIL in Iraq. The mechanisms allow both a degree of deniability – such as using Iraqis as intermediaries – but the result is clear, and positive: ISIL’s rampage across Iraq has been halted and they have suffered significant defeats, such as in Tikrit. This cooperation will continue to be critical as Iraqi forces fight in Anbar Province and prepare to take back Mosul. Politically, in the short term, both Iran and the US seek to create a stable and unified Iraq (although these goals diverge in the long-term). The interests of the two nations converge more than they conflict in Afghanistan as well. This convergence dates back to 2001 when Iran provided critical support to US forces in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and played a decisive role in the formation of the new, US-backed Afghan government. According to Jim Dobbins, who lead the US diplomatic efforts in Kabul in 2001, it was the Iranians who suggested the inclusion of elections in Afghanistan’s new constitution. Last year, Iran helped facilitate the political compromise between Ashraf Ghani and Abdallah Abdallah that allowed for Afghanistan’s first democratic transfer of power. Today, both the United States and Iran are concerned with the revival of the Taliban, the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the newly formed Islamic State province in Afghanistan, and Iran is particularly concerned about the drug trafficking and lawlessness that prevails along its 900 km border with Afghanistan. The list of issues on which American and Iranian interests diverge is a long one, including the security of Israel, the political future of Syria, and Iran's support for various groups across the region whom Americans see as terrorists. But the dispassionate Martian observer's main point would be to insist that the two states have much more in common than the political leadership of either acknowledge.

### 2AC---Iran War---Hard Power

#### Only containment solves escalation with Iran – every other policy empirically fails

Cook 20 - holds a BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and an MA and a PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, 3/11/20. (Steven, “The Only Sensible Iran Strategy Is Containment”, The Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/article/only-sensible-iran-strategy-containment>, accessed 7/5/22)//jd

I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons, daily Nightline updates, and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States. People actually walked around with “Fuck Iran” buttons on their jackets, and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “Ayatollah”—to the tune of the Knack’s “My Sharona”—that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation. It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the world beyond soccer practice, the New York Yankees, and Wonderama. The subject hasn’t gotten any less confusing since. In the past 40 years, U.S. policymakers have endlessly debated a central issue in U.S.-Middle East policy: What should the United States do about Iran? The answer has often proved to be elusive in large part because of domestic politics. The traumas of the late 1970s and early 1980s have rendered parts of the U.S. policy community needlessly bellicose, others credulously dovish, and the remaining wary of both in search of a “just right” strategy to modify Iran’s behavior. But the central question has now taken on a new urgency. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to kill Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a drone strike on Jan. 3 has raised fears of violent escalation—even war—between the United States and Iran. It’s time to directly address the question of what exactly the United States can do about Iran—and fortunately, there’s a good answer available, even if it’s not satisfying for anyone in Washington. What’s already clear is that the current U.S. approach needs improvement. Despite his hit on Suleimani, it is not at all clear what the president wants to achieve regarding Iran. He has combined hawkish rhetoric with periodic offers to negotiate with Tehran while pursuing a “maximum pressure” policy that until recently did not employ military force. Depending on whom one asks or who is doing the asking, the administration is seeking either full-scale regime change or simply a more robust nuclear deal than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the agreement negotiated by the Obama administration, which set limits on Iran’s nuclear program. This confusion comes against the backdrop of the Democratic presidential primary, in which all the leading candidates have declared their intention to return to the JCPOA so long as Iran maintains its commitment to the agreement (Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren)—or, in the case of Bernie Sanders, without any conditions at all. Yet just because the Trump administration and the politics of U.S.-Iran relations have imposed a binary choice on policymakers—regime change or the existing nuclear agreement—does not mean that there are no other possibilities. The U.S. government could pursue, for example, a “grand bargain” with Iran that would settle all the outstanding issues—notably, the nuclear program, Iran’s use of proxies to meddle in the region, and the release of Americans held in Tehran—between the two countries. Yet the most rational option under the present circumstances is another strategy that no longer goes mentioned in Washington: containment. Consider the other potential strategies in turn. Regime change has, for obvious reasons, become a scary term and a policy one would think officials and analysts would want to avoid given the U.S. experience in Iraq, but it remains an option if only because influential people continue to advocate for it. It would not necessarily require a march on Tehran, but it would be costly, requiring the United States to provide far more military, political, and financial resources to Iran’s opponents around the region than current policy. This seems an unlikely scenario for two important reasons: 1) The potential for further regional chaos is high, and 2) the American people and Congress would likely be reluctant to support policies that would undoubtedly include augmenting the already sizable deployment of almost 45,000 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the Persian Gulf. Returning to the JCPOA or negotiating a new nuclear deal that addresses some of the defects in the original agreement—for example, the failure to set limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program—is the flip side of Washington’s Iran debate. Reviving the JCPOA would mean acceptance of Iran’s alleged right to develop nuclear technology, sanctions relief, and the normalization of Tehran’s commercial ties with the world. It would also require implicit acceptance of Iran’s role in the region, especially its influential positions in Lebanon and Syria. The problems with returning to the JCPOA or an enhanced agreement that addresses Iran’s missile program, for example, are similar to the one’s the Obama administration encountered, including opposition from regional allies and hawks in Washington determined to scuttle a deal, with one additional, notable challenge: Iran’s leaders would likely be reluctant to enter an agreement with the United States after the Trump administration breached the JCPOA in May 2018. The Iranians would also resist limits on their ballistic missiles given their reliance on those weapons for regional deterrence. There are also constraints on the U.S. side: In order for the Trump administration to make a new agreement work, it would need to convince its regional allies of its wisdom. This would be a hard sell—not only because the Israelis, Emiratis, and Saudis continue to have zero trust that the Iranians would uphold their commitments in a deal but because leaders in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh are no longer confident that Trump would hold Tehran accountable for whatever violations might occur. This is especially the case after the Trump administration’s halfhearted response to Iran’s provocations during the summer of 2019, culminating with the attack on Saudi oil processing facilities. A return to the nuclear agreement or a new JCPOA would create the same dynamics as the original deal, in which the authors and signatories have incentive to overlook violations or other related problems, such as Iran’s irredentist approach to the region. This gives other regional powers incentive to push back on their own, thus further destabilizing the region. The inadequacy of an updated and expanded JCPOA raises the possibility of a grand bargain. In this scenario, Iran would relinquish its nuclear capabilities for an explicit U.S. recognition of the country’s role as a regional leader and a partner in developing the regional rules of the road. The underlying assumption of a grand bargain is that once Iran’s demands for a seat at the table are recognized, it will end its malevolent activities around the region. It’s a tempting thought—but entirely unrealistic, given the utter absence of trust in the region. The safeguards that would be needed to persuade Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates of the wisdom of such a deal—including an end to Iran’s support for allies around the region, restrictions on its military, and a clear statement from Tehran renouncing territorial claims on its neighbors—would render it anathema to the Iranians, who would likely view it as little more than regime change by another name. The United States, of course, could forgo restrictions on Iran that would satisfy its allies and instead pressure Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to accept a grand bargain. But that would not diminish the ability of U.S. allies to leverage their political clout in Washington and make mischief regionally in an effort to undermine a grand bargain. In other words, a grand bargain would likely meet the same fate as the Obama administration’s JCPOA or a JCPOA 2.0. That leaves the United States with the most realistic option: containment. The record over the last four decades indicates that the United States cannot change Iran’s behavior through either coercion or incentive. And it does not have the kind of influence to force other countries in the region to alter their own approaches to Iran and the broader region. Under these circumstances, anything that’s possible is better than aspirations that bear little resemblance to reality—and what’s possible is containment. Containment, which guided Washington in its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a way in which the United States can restrain Iran and its effort to undermine U.S. policies and goals in the region. The Clinton administration pursued this policy—along with containment of Iraq—with success in the 1990s. Sure, there were problems with Tehran at the time, but the relationship between the United States and Iran was more stable in that outright conflict and escalation were less likely. That is because the United States and Iran established an equilibrium of sorts in which everyone understood some basic rules of the game that made it possible to manage crises. Containment requires U.S. forces in the region, and possibly the application of violence, in order to demonstrate what is acceptable. It is not risk-free for the United States. But the approach does reduce the possibility of escalation because U.S. policymakers would cease to consider regime change an option. With both the idea of regime change and the necessity of defending a flawed nuclear deal taken off the table, the stakes for the U.S.-Iranian relationship will be demonstrably lower, thereby stabilizing Gulf. This leaves the gnarly issue of what to do about an Iranian nuclear program unfettered by any international agreement. But containment is capable of handling any outcome that produces. Indeed, that is precisely what U.S. policy has been toward nuclear-armed North Korea. Nobody would argue that this has been an ideal outcome, but it has been better than any easily identifiable alternatives—and it’s hard to understand why it should be anathema when it comes to Iran. Indeed, the Gulf states are less worried about Iranian nukes and more concerned about its desire to extend its influence around the region. The Israelis would eventually need more security assistance, but that shouldn’t be a deal breaker for containment, given the other available policy options. Containment would not preclude dialogue between Iran and the United States and may even improve it, given the way it would produce implicit but well-understood rules for behavior. It would also provide the United States some much needed diplomatic room to help manage regional crises like Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The Iranians are more apt to press their advantages in these places so long as they believe the United States might end their regime or look the other way. Most important, containing Iran represents the most realistic assessment of what either U.S. or Iranian politics can bear. It is not as romantic as the idea of secret meetings in Oman or long negotiation sessions in Vienna. It lacks the bravado of bringing down leaders of a system that has vexed, maimed, and killed Americans. Containment is nevertheless the best option. It simultaneously reduces the risk of war, protects Americans, and renders the U.S. presence in the region less expensive. It would be foreign-policy malpractice not to embrace it.

#### Only maximum hegemonic pressure can prevent Iran from going nuclear and initiating conflict

Phillips and Brookes 6/30 – Phillips holds a master of arts (MA) as well as a master of arts in law and diplomacy (MALD) in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Brookes is a retired naval officer with the rank of Commander and holds a doctorate from Georgetown University and a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University, 6/30/22 (James and Peter, “Time for the Biden Administration to Get Tough on Iran”, The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/time-the-biden-administration-get-tough-iran>, accessed 7/5/22)//jd

The deadlocked negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resumed in Qatar on June 28, after European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell visited Tehran to coax Iran back to the negotiating table. Resuming the nuclear talks makes sense only if the United States and its allies step up pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Otherwise, Tehran is sure to continue its delaying tactics while pretending to take the negotiations seriously, advancing its nuclear program, and orchestrating proxy attacks on U.S. military forces and allies in the Middle East. If the Biden Administration fails to adequately ratchet up pressure on Tehran, then Iran’s radical regime will become a nuclear-armed menace that will pose much greater threats to the U.S., its allies, and partners and stability in the Middle East than it already does. The Biden Administration’s single-minded efforts to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, have been stalemated by Iran’s hard-line Islamist regime, which continues to push for additional, unwarranted concessions. Despite the Administration’s eagerness to renew the deeply flawed nuclear deal, the Vienna nuclear talks have been suspended since March because Iran has insisted on receiving two additional concessions that were not part of the original deal: the lifting of U.S. terrorism-related sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a guarantee that the U.S. will not withdraw from any nuclear deal again. Meanwhile, Iran has seemingly reduced its “breakout time” to a few weeks if not less, enriching enough uranium to build at least one nuclear weapon—and eventually more.1 Iran also continues to attack U.S. allies and U.S. military forces in the Middle East with rockets, armed drones, and its terrorist proxies. It is long past time for the Biden Administration to drop its soft-minded, soft-power diplomacy on Iran’s deeply troubling nuclear program and adopt a realistic and proactive strategy. This new strategy should penalize and undermine Iran’s outlaw regime and pressure it to end its hostile anti-U.S. policies; at the very least, Iran must pay a much higher price for them. Time for Plan B The Biden Administration’s complacent “diplomacy first” approach to Iran has amounted to little more than “diplomacy only.” The Administration’s reliance on open-ended diplomacy using “carrots” but few “sticks” gave Iran cover to rapidly advance its nuclear and missile programs and orchestrate multiple attacks on U.S. forces and its allies via its proxies. The Administration committed diplomatic malpractice by abandoning the Trump Administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy, turning a blind eye to Iran’s surging illicit oil exports to China, and downplaying the possibility and utility of using military force if Iran continues down its path to nuclear weapons. These self-imposed constraints enabled Iran to expand its oil exports and foreign currency holdings while minimizing the perceived risks to Tehran of potential military action. These miscalculations greatly reduced pressure on Iran to compromise at the negotiating table on its nuclear program. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, an ultra-hard-line protégé of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was inaugurated last August and is more willing than many past Iranian leaders to sacrifice national economic interests to advance the regime’s Islamist totalitarian and regional agenda. The Raisi regime has blocked any resolution of the nuclear issue unless the Biden Administration first lifts its designation of the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization and removes the economic sanctions on it.2 The IRGC controls key parts of Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic and cruise missile forces, and armed drone arsenal, and orchestrates Iran’s shadow war against the U.S. and its allies, including Israel, often using proxy attacks by terrorist and other militant groups.3 In addition to threatening Iran’s external enemies, the IRGC is a pillar of internal repression on which the Raisi regime increasingly depends to control Iran’s disaffected citizens,4 and also controls up to one-third of Iran’s economy,5 two more reasons that the regime is adamant about lifting U.S. sanctions on it. The Biden Administration initially sought to trade the lifting of sanctions for a public statement that Iran would not attack U.S. interests, but Tehran balked at making even such a weak and non-binding statement. Buoyed by high oil prices, which have eased the pain of sanctions, the Raisi regime is in no hurry to reach a deal while it fills government coffers. The regime also believes that its growing stockpile of enriched uranium, which puts it ever closer to fielding a nuclear weapon, gives it significant negotiating leverage and allows it to make a litany of demands of the U.S. at the table.6 Even if renewed negotiations yield another nuclear agreement, which looks increasingly unlikely, it will not be the “longer and stronger” agreement that the Administration promised,7 but a “shorter and weaker” one that will not address the JCPOA shortcomings, such as its “sunset provisions” and failure to capture Iran’s ballistic missile program—the largest in the Middle East.8 It is long past time for the Biden Administration to get tough on Iran to protect and advance U.S. interests. The Administration must bolster its diplomatic demands by fully using all the tools of national power, including punitive economic sanctions and military force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from deploying a nuclear weapon. To address Iran’s intensifying nuclear and regional challenges, the U.S. should: Ramp up U.S. sanctions on Iran. The Biden Administration relaxed its enforcement of sanctions in a misguided effort to lure Tehran back into the nuclear deal. It failed to stem the smuggling of illicit Iranian oil exports to China, Iran’s biggest customer.9 Adam Kredo, “Iranian Oil Sales to China Skyrocket as Experts Say Biden Admin Turns Blind Eye to Sanctions Enforcement,” The Washington Free Beacon, November 2, 2021, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/iranian-oil-sales-to-china-skyrocket-as-experts-say-biden-admin-turns-blind​-eye-to-sanctions-enforcement/ (accessed June 29, 2022).﻿ Washington should crack down on and penalize oil-smuggling entities and Chinese firms buying the illicit oil. To enable the vigorous enforcement of sanctions, the White House should order the intelligence community to prioritize the gathering of intelligence on how Iran circumvents economic sanctions. It should also order the Departments of State and the Treasury to update their lists of Iran’s front companies and foreign enablers of sanctions busting more frequently, and to share the lists with appropriate foreign governments to enhance enforcement. Work with European allies to “snap back” U.N. sanctions on Iran. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany also are part of the 2015 nuclear agreement and can trigger the automatic reimposition of multilateral U.N. sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA. The sanctions snapback would further isolate Iran politically, make it pay a higher economic price for its nuclear defiance, help to stifle Iran’s conventional military build-up, and discourage other countries from helping Iran to evade sanctions. One of the weaknesses of the Iran deal is that the snapback option expires in 2025, removing a major source of leverage over Tehran. Develop, with allies, a favorable military force posture in the Persian Gulf region to balance Iran. The Pentagon, its allies, and partners should develop the capability in the region to dissuade, deter, and deny (if necessary) Iranian acts of aggression. With U.S. military forces already stretched thin to meet global military commitments, regional allies and partners must do more to balance Iranian forces. In the current geopolitical environment, burden-sharing among U.S. partners is critical. The Biden Administration also must be prepared—in concert with allies and partners—to take military action against Iran’s nuclear program to prevent the development and deployment of a nuclear weapon capability. Strengthen the security of regional allies. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been frequently targeted by Iran and its proxy network. Through international arms sales, the U.S. should help them to bolster their defenses against Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and armed drones, with the goal of eventually building an integrated air defense system that also enhances the security of U.S. forces in the region. In addition to selling more air and missile defense systems to Arab partners, Washington should also encourage Israel to consider selling some of its own air and missile defense systems to Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Doing so would strengthen a burgeoning relationship that would protect and advance U.S. interests as well as enhance the security of U.S. troops located in the region. Washington should also strengthen Israeli deterrence of Iran by accelerating the sales of aerial refueling tankers, precision-guided munitions, and bunker-buster bombs capable of destroying Iran’s fortified underground nuclear facilities and missile bases. Expand the Abraham Accords. The Trump Administration brokered the Abraham Accords that normalized bilateral relations between Israel and Bahrain and between Israel and the UAE in 2020. Morocco and Sudan later signed similar agreements to normalize relations with Israel. The Biden Administration should strongly support the expansion of the accords to include Saudi Arabia and other Arab states threatened by Iran. Establishing this diplomatic framework would clear the way for expanded Arab–Israeli security cooperation in a regional partnership to defeat Iranian threats. Iran Must Be Stopped, Not Appeased After complacently allowing U.S. sanctions on Iran to be undermined and tolerating a drumbeat of Iranian proxy attacks for almost 18 months, the Biden Administration needs a realistic and proactive approach to defeat Iran’s nuclear, regional, and terrorist challenges. The United States must hold Iran accountable for its accelerating nuclear program and multiple proxy attacks against U.S. forces and interests.10 It must compel Iran’s regime to pay a much higher price for those actions, or Tehran will continue to act with impunity. And, the U.S. must develop policies that will prevent Iran from becoming the world’s tenth nuclear-armed state.11 The nine states that currently possess nuclear weapons are the U.S., Russia, China, U.K., France, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. The failure to do so will result in a nuclear-armed radical regime that will threaten the U.S., its allies, and partners in the Middle East and beyond, support international terrorism, drive nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and destabilize the region through crisis and conflict, deeply undermining American interests.

#### Only credible military presence deters Iran

Singh 21 – has a M.B.A. from Harvard University (Baker Scholar) and a B.A. from Princeton University, and was responsible for devising and coordinating U.S. national security policy toward the region stretching from Morocco to Iran, with a particular emphasis on Iran’s nuclear and regional activities, 10/25/21 (Michael, “A Plan B for Iran”, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2021-10-25/plan-b-iran>, accessed 7/5/22)//jd

As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden laid out a two-part strategy designed to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. First, his administration would propose a return to “mutual compliance” with the 2015 nuclear agreement, which the United States left in 2018 and Iran subsequently violated. Second, Washington would commence new negotiations with Tehran on a “stronger, longer” accord to replace the original deal. When Biden announced this policy, it was widely assumed that the first step would be the easy part. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign, despite failing to attract support from the United States’ partners, had left Iran’s economy reeling. And Tehran’s violations of the accord, however egregious, seemed designed to leave it room to return to the nuclear agreement. But subsequent events have proved such analysis to be overly optimistic: Iran has made impossible demands in the negotiations to revive the nuclear deal, reportedly seeking sanctions relief beyond that provided in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while hesitating to commit to rolling back the nuclear activities it has undertaken in violation of that agreement. In any negotiation, each party compares the deal on offer with its best alternative option. Iran’s obstinacy in the talks to revive the JCPOA that have taken place in Vienna suggest the calculation it made in 2015—that the nuclear accord was preferable to continued economic pressure—has changed. This likely reflects the lower regard for the 2015 deal held by the hard-line government of President Ebrahim Raisi and its brighter view of Iran’s alternatives. Iran likely concluded from the last four years that sanctions relief was not all it was cracked up to be—both because foreign firms were reluctant to reenter Iran even when the JCPOA was in effect and because it was so easy for the United States to unilaterally rescind the accord in 2018. Raisi may also doubt the Biden administration’s willingness to enforce sanctions in the absence of a deal and pin a good deal of hope on Iran’s growing relationship with China as a counterweight to U.S. economic pressure. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. In other words, Iranian officials may believe that returning to compliance with the JCPOA is inferior to the alternatives. By developing a credible Plan B that sharpens the consequences for Iran should it continue to rebuff diplomatic overtures and expand its nuclear activities while simultaneously offering Iran a diplomatic proposal that has a better chance of outlasting his tenure in office, President Biden may be able to change Iranian leaders’ calculus. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE As the Biden administration weighs its choices, it should draw upon a long history of U.S. policy failures and successes with Iran. The central lesson from past diplomatic engagements is that the United States has been least successful when relying too heavily on a single approach or policy instrument and achieved the most when it has employed several policy tools in conjunction with one another and acted in concert with key partners. For example, Iran’s suspension of its nuclear weapons drive in 2003 is generally seen as a result of U.S. military pressure and European diplomacy working in concert. The combination of sanctions and diplomacy also produced nuclear agreements in 2013 and 2015—albeit ones subsequently deemed insufficient by both Trump and Biden. The Biden administration should learn from these experiences as it seeks to worsen Iran’s alternatives to a deal. First and foremost, the United States must demonstrate that Iran will face consequences for the unreasonable stance it has taken at the Vienna talks, where it has insisted on sanctions relief well beyond that provided in the JCPOA and on assurances that future administrations will not again leave the deal—assurances that Biden could not provide even if he wished to do so. Should Iran’s obstinacy persist, the Biden administration should enforce and expand existing economic sanctions. Doing so would disabuse Iranian officials of any notion that Biden officials’ past criticism of Trump’s maximum pressure approach means that sanctions will simply be permitted to weaken or lapse in the absence of a deal. In order to accomplish this, the Biden administration will need to underscore its commitment to enforcing Trump-era sanctions on Iran and filling in the gaps of the sanctions regime that have emerged in recent years. Foremost among these are Iran’s sales of oil to China, which increased dramatically starting in 2020 and are reportedly facilitated by deceptive maneuvers such as transfers at sea. China’s oil purchases from Iran reached nearly one million barrels per day in March 2021, higher than any period over the preceding two years, and Iran’s global petrochemicals exports rose as well. To their credit, U.S. officials have warned that tightened sanctions may be coming, but concerns about Iran’s reaction and competing priorities in the fraught U.S.-Chinese relationship will likely make it difficult to pull the trigger. Iran probably concluded that sanctions relief was not all it was cracked up to be. Such a decision would be easier to take, and the overall pressure on Iran would be magnified, if the United States acts in concert with partners. In particular, if the so-called E3 of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were to join the United States in withdrawing from the JCPOA in light of Iran’s refusal to return to mutual compliance, it could lead to the reimposition of both EU and UN sanctions—the “snapback” that the Trump administration sought. The past several years demonstrated that such a move may have marginal economic significance for Iran, for the simple reason that unilateral U.S. sanctions accomplished so much by themselves. But it would nevertheless represent an important escalation of diplomatic pressure on Iran, as its leadership is also sensitive to the perception that it is internationally isolated. This is why the Biden administration’s pursuit of a revival of the JCPOA may prove useful, even if its proximate objective is not achieved. If nothing else, it serves as a demonstration of diplomatic good faith and makes it more politically palatable for U.S. partners in Europe and Asia to once again act in concert with Washington. Convincing the E3 to withdraw from the Iran deal will be no easy task. Despite the fact that the agreement is no longer honored by either the United States or Iran, the group may fear that withdrawal could prompt an even more destabilizing response from Iran or that it would be sacrificing elements of the agreement that are still operational despite the U.S.-Iranian conflict. They may also be reluctant to act without consensus in the EU, which is also a party to the agreement. While that last problem may prove the most difficult, the first two are easily countered—Iran’s actions already risk serious instability, and Tehran’s recent moves to curtail its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency on inspections and monitoring of its nuclear activities mean that other elements of the JCPOA are unlikely to be preserved in the long run. The E3’s departure, on the other hand, would signal clearly that Iran was increasingly alone in its defiant stand and that a new agreement was needed. But the Biden administration should also prepare for the eventuality that diplomatic and economic pressure will not be enough to deter Iran’s leadership from its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Officials in Tehran have already demonstrated that they are willing to permit their country to endure severe economic hardship for the sake of nuclear advancement. As a result, the United States will need to send a clear message that it is willing to go beyond sanctions and conduct a military strike as a last resort to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. A restored JCPOA would likely be scuttled if Republicans win the presidency. The Biden administration’s reluctance to do this is understandable. Neither Democrats nor Republicans are particularly interested in yet another military conflict in the Middle East, and the White House likely worries that issuing threats would prompt Iran’s new, hard-line administration to refuse diplomatic engagement out of pique. But a credible U.S. military deterrent has three advantages worth considering. First, it would send a message to Iran that acquiring a nuclear weapon may be not simply costly but impossible. Second, it may offer assurance to U.S. partners in the region, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel, which may otherwise feel compelled to act against Iran themselves or pursue their own nuclear capabilities. Third, it is almost certainly the case that any U.S. president, regardless of party affiliation, would consider military action if confronted with urgent and credible intelligence that Iran had decided to dash for a nuclear weapon, given the threat such a development would pose to U.S. national security. It is thus far preferable that Iran understand the consequences of such a decision, rather than misperceive the risks and instigate a conflict with the United States owing to miscalculation. The real challenge is how to ensure that threats of military action are credible as the United States executes a long-delayed strategic shift away from the Middle East and toward Asia. The danger Iran poses to U.S. national security is real, but it cannot compare with the challenges presented by increasingly aggressive nuclear-armed states such as China and Russia. Maintaining the credibility of U.S. threats will require continuing to act when Iran and its proxies target American interests. However, rather than accompanying U.S. responses with a surge of heavy assets drawn from other regions, such as aircraft carriers and long-range bombers, the United States should work steadily to bolster its allies’ and its own ability to counter Iran’s probable responses. U.S. credibility will also be enhanced if Washington affirms its commitment to the region while articulating what American strategy in the Middle East will look like amid a greater focus on Asia. BUILDING A BETTER NUCLEAR DEAL Devising a Plan B for Iran should not mean abandoning diplomacy—worsening Iran’s alternatives will succeed only if a credible diplomatic proposal is also on offer. The Biden administration should focus on replacing rather than reviving the JCPOA, as the restoration of the 2015 accord is unlikely in the long run to satisfy either the United States or Iran. For its part, Tehran has already invited discussion of a completely new deal by requesting major changes to the JCPOA that would prevent the United States from once again withdrawing. Biden has also indicated that negotiating a stronger deal, not merely restoring the JCPOA, is his ultimate objective. And it seems inevitable that a restored JCPOA would be scuttled once again should Republicans retake the White House. Ironically, the most straightforward way for the Biden administration to offer Iran a “better” deal may be to present it with a diplomatic agreement that asks more of Tehran but is also able to attract bipartisan support and is thus more sustainable. Such a deal could take the form of a “JCPOA Plus,” which would aim to expand the nuclear restrictions on Iran and add limitations on its missile activities. The Biden administration, as well as JCPOA critics, has also suggested that regional issues such as Iraq or Yemen be included in these negotiations. But Washington should think twice about negotiating these issues bilaterally with Tehran—or, for that matter, with Moscow and Beijing. Such matters are arguably better handled separately, with a different set of parties engaged. Alternatively, the United States could put aside the JCPOA and pursue an entirely different model. One option would be an arms control–style agreement in which the obligations on both sides expire after a set period if the deal is not superseded—an improvement over the JCPOA, in which Iran’s obligations phase out but those of the United States and its partners never do. While adopting a new diplomatic paradigm would hold the considerable disadvantage of discarding an agreement that already enjoys wide international support, it would also allow the United States and Iran to jettison the baggage that has accompanied discussion of the JCPOA in recent years. Ultimately, reaching a diplomatic accord with Iran may not be strictly necessary. If the consequences for expanding its nuclear program are sufficiently strong and clear, it is possible that Iran could be deterred without an agreement. Nevertheless, a negotiated agreement should remain the preferred objective of U.S. policy, as a strong agreement can reduce the instability and potential for miscalculation that relying on containment and deterrence entails. It is becoming increasingly likely, however, that any new agreement between the United States and Iran will not be a revival of the JCPOA. Moving directly to the negotiation of a new agreement will undoubtedly be fraught with risk in the short term—but if the Biden administration takes care to build both domestic and international support for its efforts, it could deliver a more successful and sustainable result in the long run.

### 2AC---Sanctions Key

#### Effective sanctions key to prevent Iranian nuclear acquisition.

**Morrison 21** --- Master of Arts of Political Science, University of Waterloo.

Kallen, 2021, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Non-proliferation: A Comparative Study of North Korea and Iran, “University of Waterloo, Fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts, https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/16666/Morrison\_Kallen%20.pdf?sequence=3

Economic sanctions have been successful in stopping Iran from pursuing their nuclear program thus far. Iran has conceded multiple times to the United States and the international community to halt the enrichment of uranium and the advancement of their nuclear program. The most notable example of Iran’s concessions has been the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in which Iran agreed to halt and greatly reduce their nuclear program in return for substantial easing of economic sanctions. The second criteria has been met as Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to continued economic pressure from the United States and the international community. Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to continued economic pressure from the United States and the international community. Continued economic pressure has been paramount to bringing Iran to the negotiating table. While the United States and its regional allies do pose a military threat to Iran, that is unlikely a sufficient factor in dissuading Iran.

We have established that the level of political contestation in the targeted countries, their economic and security vulnerabilities, and the degree of international cooperation are important factors in determining if economic sanctions are effective at limiting nuclear proliferation. In Iran’s case the regime, while authoritarian, allows for limited political contestation. The general public gets to elect the president (even if candidates are handpicked by the supreme leader). Iranians have been able to protest against the government. One goal of economic sanctions is to galvanize the general public against the government and their policy decisions. Iranians have indeed been frustrated by the sanctions and voiced their discontent with the government policies targeted by the sanctions.

Iran’s international environment is also conductive for economic sanctions to be effective. Iran is a regional power with an impressive arsenal of missiles and extensive network of proxy forces. Therefore, nuclear weapons are not imperative for Iran’s defence. On the other end, Iran’s economy is largely based on oil and gas exports. Integration into the global market is very important for Iranians and a vital source of revenue for the government. Economic sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy and therefore have hurt Iranians. The economic squeeze has brought Iran to the negotiating table in the past and will likely do so in the future. The international approach to Iran has been encompassing with the European Union and the United Kingdom taking a common stand with the United States in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Even after the United States left the JCPOA the EU and UK have attempted to develop mechanisms to provide Iran with economic incentives to keep Iran abiding to the JCPOA. Even though China has given Iran an economic lifeline there is tension within Iran over concerns of becoming too economically dependent on China.

## AT: Oil Wars

### Heg Solves Oil Wars

#### Abandoning hegemony causes middle east war- 6 reasons

Mansoor, PhD, 20

(Peter, retired history prof@OhioState, <https://www.hoover.org/research/leaving-middle-east>, 3-31)

Why have presidents of both parties, despite their stated willingness to remove U.S. forces from the Middle East, proven unable to do so? The fact is that promises to reduce the U.S. military presence abroad in order to nation-build at home sell well on the campaign trail, but once in office presidents are confronted with challenges that do not lend themselves to trite slogans or easy solutions. Flashy campaign promises set the stage for foreign policy failure, for in the Middle East, Las Vegas rules do not apply: What happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. Promises of retrenchment poll well, until the realities of migrant displacement, terrorism, and oil shocks cause reconsideration of simplistic policies ungrounded in Middle Eastern realities. In a recent op-ed, Janan Ganesh put the issue clearly. “The problem, I used to think, is the failure to honour these promises of retrenchment. In truth, the promises are the problem. The US accumulated foreign interests over the course of the 20th century that cannot be divested at speed, at least not without grievous cost, and at least not in a region as intractable as this one. A responsible political class would not pretend otherwise every four years. It would gird voters for a process of extrication that might turn out to be the work of a human lifetime.”1 Here are six reasons why the United States must remain engaged in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. 1. Terrorism. In 2011 President Barack Obama opted to allow the Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq to lapse, bringing home all of the U.S. forces deployed to that country. His desire was to normalize relations, removing forces that some believed served as an irritant to a smoother U.S.-Iraq relationship. But by removing U.S. forces from Iraq, the Obama administration squandered the leverage those forces created for U.S. interests in the region. High among these interests was the war against Islamist extremists, which did not magically disappear with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. I need not go into the subsequent rise of the Islamic State here, but suffice it to say that Middle Eastern political and security realities intruded on the view of the region held by some in the Obama administration. It turned out the tide of war was not receding, at least not without substantial investment by the United States in stabilizing troubled areas. Now that the Islamic State has been defeated, some in the Trump administration are all too ready to make the same mistake, believing that the war is over and the troops can now come home. Such hubris ignores the history of the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the rise of ISIS, a history that may rhyme if not exactly repeat itself absent continued U.S. involvement in the region. And lest we think that the war against the Islamic State wasn’t important to our security, I would note that since its destruction there have been no ISIS-inspired mass murder events in the West. 2. Iran. Retrenchment comes at a cost. We can debate whether the cost is acceptable, but we cannot ignore that there will be a cost to withdrawal from the region. Iran in particular desires to establish hegemony across the Middle East, and is likely to achieve that goal absent U.S. resistance. We may want Saudi Arabia to assume the costs of containing Iran, but it is unable to do so. Iran’s population of 81 million dwarfs the Saudi population of 33 million. The Saudi economy is also highly vulnerable to disruption, something the world discovered when cruise missiles and drones damaged a facility at Abqaiq and thereby halved Saudi oil production. 3. Oil. Although thanks to the fracking revolution the United States is now nearly self-sufficient in the production of oil and natural gas, the other major industrial nations of the world still rely on Middle Eastern oil to fuel their economies. The hydrocarbon market is global, so any disruption to oil exportation from the Middle East will have an impact on the availability and price of oil, which in turn could cause economic disruption or recession. It is convenient to say the Europeans, Chinese, or Japanese should defend their access to Middle Eastern oil since they are more dependent on it than the United States, but this is a pipe dream. Those nations would rather allow Iran to run roughshod over the Middle East than to defend their interests there with force. And do we really relish the prospect of Chinese military forces intervening in the Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to Asia? 4. Israel. Despite the lack of a formal alliance with Israel, that state is America’s only reliable partner in the Middle East. It is also highly vulnerable, surrounded by an Arab-Islamic world that desires its destruction. Abandonment by the United States would jeopardize its security in any number of ways that could lead to unpredictable results, including a potential war between Israel and Iran that would threaten the use of nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945. 5. Counter-proliferation. Possession of nuclear weapons by major powers have arguably kept cold wars from turning hot in the 75 years since the end of World War II, but a significant increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology would likely destabilize the international security environment. Imagine if Iran had nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles today; pushed to the brink by economic sanctions, the Supreme Leader might opt at some point for a nuclear attack against Saudi Arabia or Israel, leading to certain retaliation by the latter. Saudi Arabia would hardly stand by as Iran acquired these technologies; instead, it would simply purchase devices from Pakistan or North Korea or buy the technical expertise to develop its own weapons and delivery systems. This is a likely scenario, but one that can be avoided provided the United States remains engaged in the region. 6. Refugees. Millions of refugees have departed their homelands in the Middle East for safer destinations. Most of these people have settled in other Arab nations, but around 3.5 million are in Turkey. Since 2008 more than 5 million refugees, many of them from the Middle East, have arrived in the 28 states of the European Union, significantly destabilizing the domestic political climate of a number of countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. A U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East, if it led to a war between Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran, would lead to another refugee crisis.

#### Retrenchment causes oil wars in the middle east- Russia fills in

Indyk, PhD, 22

(MARTIN INDYK is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022-02-14/price-retrenchment)

In the past, Saudi Arabia would not have hesitated, calculating that responding to its American ally at its moment of need was like paying an insurance premium to help guarantee that the United States would be there to defend Saudi Arabia when necessary. But that pact fell apart in September 2019, when Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq were attacked by Iranian drones and missiles that knocked out 50 percent of its oil production. Instead of rushing to Saudi Arabia's defense, Trump equivocated and then noted that it was an attack on Saudi Arabia and not on the United States. If he decided to respond, Trump vowed the Saudis would have to pay for it. Trump’s disregard for traditional U.S. security commitments compounded the doubts already raised by Obama’s decision in 2013 not to enforce his own stated redline against the Assad regime in Syria, when it used chemical weapons against its own people. Biden continued this trend, deemphasizing the Middle East as he made combatting China his first priority. When he ended the “forever war” in Afghanistan and brought the remaining U.S. troops and American citizens home in a shambolic evacuation, Middle Eastern leaders reached a common conclusion: the United States was no longer a reliable partner in the security of the region. Because this trend of U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East had been developing over the last decade, and because the region’s leaders are always sensitive to shifts in the balance of power, they have been looking around for alternative guarantors of their security for some time. Russia was quick to put up its hand, intervening militarily in Syria’s civil war in 2015 to save the regime of Bashar al-Assad. At the time, the United States was pursuing regime change in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The contrast was not lost on the region’s Arab leaders: Russia had become a status quo power in the Middle East; the United States was the one that seemed to be promoting instability. This did not precipitate a headlong rush into Moscow’s embrace, however. Memories of Soviet destabilizing behavior and the hope that a new president in Washington might turn things around led to more cautious explorations. But over time, Arab leaders have become comfortable with a hedging strategy that involves warmer relations with Russia. TIME TO CUT SOME SLACK For Israelis, the calculation is not that different, notwithstanding their heavy dependence on the United States. Their existential threat is Iran. On three of Israel’s four borders, Iranian proxies are gathering strength: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iranian-controlled militias in Syria. Israel is fighting what it calls “the war between the wars” to prevent the transfer through Syria of Iranian advanced missiles and guidance systems to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to thwart attempts by Iranian-backed militias to open yet another front with Israel, on the Golan Heights. Russia’s military presence in Syria makes it more of a player in this conflict than is the United States, which maintains a limited force in eastern Syria, to fight the Islamic State (or ISIS), but has left Israel to fend for itself in the rest of the country. The only way that Israel can keep up its frequent aerial attacks on Iranian targets in Syria is if the Russian air force acquiesces in Israel’s use of Syrian airspace. For that reason, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made ten visits to Russia between 2015 and 2020 to kiss Putin’s ring, secure the Russian president’s cooperation, and make sure that Russian and Israeli air force operations in Syria did not get in each other’s way. Similarly, once Bennett became prime minister last year, he wasted no time in reaffirming those arrangements on a visit to the Kremlin in October 2021. In January of this year, however, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that Russian and Syrian jets had conducted a joint patrol over the Golan Heights and that these patrols would continue. This was a symbolic warning shot across Israel’s bow, signaling to Jerusalem that if Putin wanted to, he could easily put an end to Israeli military operations in Syria. If Israel were thinking of siding publicly with the United States over Ukraine, Moscow had just signaled that there would be a steep strategic price to pay. Washington might have to release the Saudi crown prince from the penalty box. U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East are not critical to the effort to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. They may even be willing to help on the margins: Qatar could divert gas supplies from long-term contracts in Asia to the European spot market, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could ease the pressure on oil prices in the event of an invasion, and Israel can continue passing private messages to the Kremlin, urging de-escalation. But the public silence of all those countries in this crisis speaks volumes about the new geopolitics of the Middle East. Russia has become a player in the region, partially filling the vacuum left by U.S. retrenchment. And to some U.S. allies, Moscow appears more reliable than Washington. There is no getting around this fundamental tradeoff given the reality that a rising China and an aggressive Russia require greater U.S. attention. Rather than demand that his Middle Eastern partners and allies take a public stand, Biden is going to have to cut them some slack. And this extends beyond pronouncements and condemnations over Ukraine. Washington might have to release the Saudi crown prince from the penalty box if Biden needs MBS to reduce the price of oil. U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to end their war in Yemen may have to give way to support for their efforts to deter Iranian-backed Houthi aggression. The United States may have to continue giving Israel a free hand to deal with Iran’s regional subversions even as Biden reenters the nuclear agreement with Iran. And cooperation with Egypt in Gaza and Libya may have to take priority over U.S. demands that Sisi ease up his repression at home. The Ukraine crisis has spotlighted a cruel paradox for U.S. policy in the Middle East. Even though it has downgraded its interests there, which should have allowed for a greater assertion of American values, the return of geopolitics is forcing the Biden administration to adopt a new realism. Whatever good intentions the United States might have in the region, its interests there are increasingly taking priority over its values.

### No Oil Wars

#### No oil wars – states fight for other reasons.

Meierding, PhD, 20

(Emily; 8/2/20; Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School; “The Exaggerated Threat of Oil Wars”; https://www.lawfareblog.com/exaggerated-threat-oil-wars#:~:text=These%20confrontations%20have%20prompted%20concerns,its%20various%20international%20territorial%20disputes)

Over the past year, Chinese seismic survey vessels and their paramilitary escorts have interfered repeatedly with Vietnamese and Malaysian oil and natural gas exploration in the South China Sea, harassing drilling rigs and support ships. These confrontations have prompted concerns that they could provoke a larger military conflict, especially as China exploits the unsteadiness created by the coronavirus to become more aggressive in its various international territorial disputes. Happily, the historical record indicates that China and its neighbors are unlikely to escalate their energy sparring. Contrary to overheated rhetoric, countries do not actually “take the oil,” to use President Trump’s controversial and inaccurate phrase. Instead, my recent research demonstrates that countries avoid fighting for oil resources. No Blood for Oil Between 1912 and 2010, countries fought 180 times over territories that contained—or were believed to contain—oil or natural gas resources. These conflicts ranged from brief, nonfatal border violations, like Turkish jets entering Greek airspace, to the two world wars. Many of these clashes—including World War II, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990), the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Falklands War (1982), and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1935)—have been described as classic oil wars: that is, severe international conflicts in which countries fight to obtain petroleum resources. However, a closer look at these conflicts reveals that none merits the classic “oil war” label. Although countries did fight over oil-endowed territories, they usually fought for other reasons, including aspirations to regional hegemony, domestic politics, national pride, or contested territories’ other strategic, economic, or symbolic assets. Oil was an uncommon trigger for international confrontations and never caused major conflicts. On approximately 20 occasions, over almost a century, countries engaged in minor conflicts to obtain oil resources. However, these “oil spats” were brief, mild, mostly nonfatal, and generally involved countries whose hostility predated their resource competition. Greece and Turkey have prosecuted oil spats. So have China and Vietnam, Guyana and Venezuela, and a dozen other pairs of countries. These confrontations inspired aggressive rhetoric while they were underway, but none of them ever escalated into a larger armed conflict. Oil has periodically influenced the trajectories of major conflicts that were launched for other reasons. At the end of World War I, British troops seized Mosul province in order to secure its oil resources. Oil aspirations also motivated Germany’s invasion of the Russian Caucasus (1941-1942) and Japan’s invasion of the Dutch East Indies (1941-1942). While the latter attack precipitated U.S. involvement in World War II, it was also a continuation of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). All of these “oil campaigns” were inspired by aggressors’ wartime resource needs. Absent the ongoing conflicts, these countries would not have fought for oil. The historical record also reveals one “oil gambit”: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Conventional explanations for the attack assert that Saddam Hussein was either greedily attempting to grab his neighbor’s oil resources or needily attempting to limit Kuwait’s oil output in order to raise oil prices and escape from a deepening economic crisis caused by falling oil prices and Iraq’s large debts, incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. The first explanation is wrong. The second is correct, but incomplete, because it omits Saddam’s larger motive for aggression: his fear of the United States. The regime’s records, seized during the 2003 U.S. invasion, reveal Saddam’s belief, nurtured since the 1970s, that the United States was determined to contain Iraq and remove him from power. In 1990, this false conviction led Saddam to assume that the United States was engineering Iraq’s economic crisis by encouraging Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to exceed their OPEC oil production quotas and refuse Iraq’s repeated entreaties to cancel its war debts. After his infamous meeting with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie failed to persuade Saddam of the United States’s benign intentions, he concluded that conquering Kuwait was his only remaining means of survival. Fear of U.S. hostility, not oil aspirations, prompted Iraq to invade Kuwait.

#### Costs are too high- Not worth the effort

Meierding, PhD, 20

(Emily; 8/2/20; Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School; “The Exaggerated Threat of Oil Wars”; https://www.lawfareblog.com/exaggerated-threat-oil-wars#:~:text=These%20confrontations%20have%20prompted%20concerns,its%20various%20international%20territorial%20disputes)

A Question of Value The absence of oil wars is surprising and counterintuitive. Petroleum is an exceptionally valuable resource. It fuels all countries’ economies and militaries. Oil sales are also a crucial revenue source for producer states. Surely, countries are willing to fight to obtain petroleum resources. In fact, classic oil wars are extraordinarily costly. A country that aims to seize foreign oil faces, first, the costs of invading another country. International aggression is destructive and expensive under the best of circumstances. It may also damage the oil infrastructure that a conqueror hopes to acquire. Next, if a conqueror plans to exploit oil resources over the long term, it faces the costs of occupying seized territory. As the United States has learned from its “endless wars,” foreign occupation is extremely challenging, even for the world’s most powerful country. Additionally, a conqueror faces international approbation for oil grabs. As censorious responses to Trump’s proposition that the United States “take the oil” from Syria, Iraq and Libya have indicated, seizing another country’s oil is considered reprobate behavior. It violates international laws against plunder and materially threatens to consolidate control over global oil resources. As Iraq learned in 1990, other countries and international institutions respond to oil grabs with diplomatic censure, economic sanctions and even military force. Finally, if a conqueror manages to maintain control over foreign oil resources, it may not be able to exploit them. Conquest scares off the foreign oil companies that many countries rely on to finance and manage oil production. Because of the high costs of invasion, occupation, and international opprobrium, classic oil wars are simply not worth the effort, regardless of petroleum’s value. Countries may occasionally decide that it is worth initiating an oil spat to obtain desired resources, especially when targeted territories are contested and other issues are at stake. However, fighting major conflicts for oil does not pay.

#### Domestic politics dictates oil wars NOT heg.

Maria Prebble 13, MA from Duke in Environmental Management, B.A. from Wessley college in Internatinal Relations and Affairs, 3-27-2013, "Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War," <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/petro-aggression-when-oil-causes-war>, kav

While there has been much research on the effect of valuable natural resource extraction on a state’s domestic development (e.g., the “resource curse”), Wilson Center Fellow Jeff Colgan focuses on how natural resource extraction affects foreign policy. In Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War, Colgan finds that “petrostates” – countries where revenue from oil exports exceeds 10 percent of GDP – are twice as likely to engage in inter-state conflict than non-petrostates.

“America has the unfortunate habit of getting into war with oil-exporting states,” said Colgan. Understanding the dynamics of petrostates’ aggressive behavior is therefore a vital security interest.

Low Risk, Little Reward

High oil revenue, due to its dependability and worth, reduces the risk of foreign policy adventurism, Colgan explained, because it lowers the domestic political accountability of leaders.

For example, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched an unpopular, expensive, and bloody eight-year war with Iran from 1980-88 and lost a devastating invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Despite these failures, Hussein remained in power until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.

Likewise, Muammar Qaddafi involved Libya in violent clashes with Chad in the years between 1978 and 1987, sent soldiers to Tanzania and Uganda, and financed global terrorist networks, but remained in power for more than 40 years.

Regardless of whether or not the oil sector is nationalized, oil wealth is often controlled by the state, which leads to clientelism and bought-off political support, Colgan explained. In his book, Colgan writes that Qaddafi was able to benefit from Libya’s oil revenue with “political autonomy that would have been difficult in [oil’s] absence.” This wealth in turn supported his more aggressive tendencies: Libya’s military expenditures were as high as 25 percent of total revenues in some years.

Revolutionary Leadership Key

Not all petrostates are created equal, however. “The effect of oil does depend on domestic politics,” Colgan said.

Colgan analyzed militarized interstate disputes in 170 countries from 1945 to 2001. In addition to the delineation between petrostates and non-petrostates, he also found that leadership has a strong effect, specifically whether a state has post-revolutionary leadership or not.

Colgan defines revolutionary leaders as leaders who “transform the existing social, political, and economic relationships of the state by overthrowing or rejecting the existing institutions of society.”

Because they tend to be more aggressive and have higher risk tolerance, personalist, revolutionary leaders, like Muammar Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, and Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran, “find themselves in more crises,” said David Edelstein, an associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. As a result, petrostates with revolutionary leaders are 3.5 times more likely instigate aggression or conflict than non-petrostates with non-revolutionary leaders , said Colgan.

Counter Incentives

Still, not all petrostates or even petrostates with revolutionary leaders have gone to war.

Edelstein emphasized the role of geography in influencing a state’s behavior. For example, Iran, Iraq, and Libya are able to be more aggressive because of weak institutions and insecurity in the region. Hugo Chavez, however, only engaged in what Colgan referred to as a “war of words” because Venezuela is surrounded by strong neighbors.

Oil income also generates some incentives to avoid war “because there is a financial opportunity cost,” said Colgan.

Conflict may disrupt a petrostate’s oil industry through physical damage to oil wells and pipelines, and targeted sanctions can be levied as punishment for aggressive behavior, like in the case of Iran.

A peace-dividend may offset the opportunity costs of a petrostate’s aggressive behavior as well. For example, Colgan writes in his book that despite poor diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela, the United State remains Venezuela’s largest oil importer, and, “it seems clear that oil is providing incentives for Venezuela to avoid a total break with the United States.”

Policy Implications: Know Your Petrostates

The relationship between petrostates, revolutionary leaders, and conflict has important policy implications, Colgan said.

For example, as late as July 1990, the U.S. intelligence community predicted that Iraq would not invade Kuwait, but on August 2, 100,000 Iraqi troops crossed the border, launching what would evolve into the First Gulf War. Understanding earlier that a petro-revolutionary leader like Saddam Hussein was at a higher risk to initiate conflict might have led to a different response from United States and the international community, Colgan suggested.

On the positive side, Colgan pointed to the possibility of better relations with hitherto aggressive petrostates after the first wave of revolutionary leaders is passed. For example, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, age 73, is one of the last of Iran’s revolutionary leaders. As he and other leaders from the 1979 revolution are gradually replaced, Iran may become less tolerant of risk and therefore less aggressive.

Colgan also recommended that policymakers increase transparency in the oil industry and reevaluate how it is governed. “We need to provide more support for anti-resource curse initiatives,” he said, like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Cardin-Lugar amendment of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The Cardin-Lugar amendment requires American oil, gas, and mineral companies to report all taxes and expenditures paid to foreign countries. Human rights groups applauded the requirement , but it faced heavy opposition from industry, and the Securities and Exchange Commission only put the rule into effect last August.

“Efforts to manage the resource curse, by putting in place institutions, norms, and practices to better manage the inflow of oil income and enhance domestic political accountability, are in everyone’s interest,” Colgan concludes in his book.

“It would be wise of the United States to end its dependence on foreign oil,” Edelstein concluded. “A world of revolutionary petrostates is a dangerous world, but thanks to Jeff, it is a devil we know.”

### Renewables Solve War

#### US renewables prevent rampant oil interventionism – we avoid global conflcits

**Bolstad & Lee ’21** — Parker Bolstad, Military Intelligence Officer, United States Army, former research assistant at the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Research Service, graduate, Colorado School of Mines; Jordy Lee, Program Manager, Supply Chain Transparency Initiative at the Payne Institute for Public Policy; (July 26th 2021; “Energy Independence Doesn’t Mean What It Used To”; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/26/energy-independence-climate-change-us-national-security/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921>; //LFS—JCM) [\*\*\*NOTE\*\*\* — paragraphs have been condensed for readability, no text changed, omitted, or altered]

For decades, U.S. policymakers failed to understand the full meaning of energy independence. Their definition centered on the need for a self-sufficient supply of cheap oil and gas. That understanding was so dominant it became a matter of national security—eclipsing nearly all other environmental considerations. U.S. President Joe Biden is making a different bet. Biden realizes two things. First, climate change is its own national security threat; second, real energy independence now means securing the resources and ideas needed for 21st-century energy technologies—among other things, solar panels, rare-earth metals, batteries, and wind turbines. Yet although the Biden administration has made great strides forward with this acknowledgment, its climate strategy has room to grow. As climate change continues to destabilize at-risk regions worldwide, threatening to draw the United States into more protracted, international conflicts, the administration needs to do more to treat climate change as a matter of national security rather than as just an environmental concern—and to move toward true energy independence in the process.

For too long, policymakers thought the oil and gas industry was the key to energy independence. They gave the industry special treatment, allowing it to operate with minimal environmental restrictions in an effort to boost the economy and unshackle the country from its reliance on foreign hydrocarbons. From one perspective, that made sense: The oil and gas boom that began in the early 2000s, with the advent of hydraulic fracturing (or fracking), made the United States the largest oil producer in the world. It provided a significant [windfall](https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2017/wp1708.pdf) to the economy and enabled the country to cut its reliance on foreign oil and gas [in half](https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/data.php).

However, this traditional promotion—and conception—of energy independence ignored the pressing issue of climate change. The United States [failed](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/) to effectively diversify its energy portfolio, and now, it lags behind other nations in renewables. This oversight has become a liability. Other countries are outright refusing to buy U.S. natural gas for being “too dirty”; carbon border adjustments, or tariffs on products with high carbon emissions, [threaten](https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/544230-administrations-messaging-on-carbon-border-adjustments) to disrupt the competitive advantage U.S.-made products have; and now, sourcing the materials from abroad to build renewables has become [trickier](https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/21/china-raises-threat-of-rare-earth-mineral-cutoff-to-us/) than it was before.

As hydrocarbons become less of a geopolitical priority, the meaning of “energy independence” is changing—in ways that have made it hard for the United States to keep up. It’s no longer measured by oil extraction, but by new, low-carbon energy technologies, such as solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and even responsibly sourced natural gas. China has the power to influence U.S. energy production, defense technologies, and other industries. Although U.S. policymakers dithered for the past 30 years, the country continued to lag behind the competition for these newer technologies and the critical minerals needed to build them. And China has rushed ahead. It’s now [responsible](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/solar-pv-module-shipments-by-country-of-origin-2012-2019) for more than half of the world’s solar panel module exports, and it [controls](https://about.bnef.com/blog/china-dominates-the-lithium-ion-battery-supply-chain-but-europe-is-on-the-rise/), for instance, 80 percent of the world’s battery material refining and 77 percent of the world’s battery cell capacity. By now, Washington relies on other nations—especially China—for the critical mineral imports needed to build everything from electric vehicles to solar panels and wind turbines. Limitations on these minerals can make it harder to adopt low-carbon technologies and can leave Washington vulnerable to the whims and desires of those nations. China, essentially, has the power to influence U.S. energy production, defense technologies, and other industries that rely on the same critical materials.

Meanwhile, as the United States continues to be the second largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, climate change has amplified everything from humanitarian crises that drag Washington into protracted foreign conflicts to the growth of terrorist organizations that threaten domestic security. According to the [Climate Impact Lab](http://www.impactlab.org/map/#usmeas=change-from-hist&usyear=2080-2099&gmeas=absolute&gyear=1986-2005&usvar=mortality), some nations, including Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, could see more than a 20 percent reduction in their GDPs by 2090 due to climate change as they face deaths from heat waves, famines, floods, and crumpling infrastructure from storms and rising sea levels. The destruction wrought by these changes can be a catalyst for humanitarian crises, genocide, and terrorism. For instance, competition over depleting resources can worsen regional fighting, as it did in 1994 when arable land shortages contributed to the genocide in Rwanda. It can also spark conflict, as it did in Syria in 2007 when drought was [linked](https://www.pnas.org/content/112/11/3241) to the nation’s protests and subsequent revolution. The last two decades have shown it is increasingly difficult for Washington to stay out of international conflicts—either because they pose a direct threat to the United States, as the stability of Afghanistan did, or because they make the country vulnerable to criticism that it is complacent in the face of international travesties, as it was during the revolution in Syria.

## AT: Prolif

### 2AC---Heg Solves Iran Prolif

#### US power checks Iran prolif through military power and sanctions

Palti 6/30 [Zohar; Zohar Palti is the International Fellow at The Washington Institute. He previously served as head of the Policy & Political-Military Bureau at Israel's Ministry of Defense, where his responsibilities included directing defense and security relationships with foreign countries. Prior to that, he led the Mossad Intelligence Directorate and served as deputy head of the Research Division in the IDF Intelligence Corps at the rank of colonel.; 6-30-22; "Israel Hoping for Shift in US Iran Policy from Diplomacy to Deterrence”; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-hoping-shift-us-iran-policy-diplomacy-deterrence; accessed 7-5-2022; AH]

Applying **pressure** is something the West knows how to do. During the George W. Bush administration, when the US deployed a huge number of troops into next-door Iraq, fear of an American **military invasion** compelled the Iranians to suspend their nuclear weaponization program. And the application of massive economic pressure by the US and its European partners during the early years of the Obama administration is what forced the mullahs to the bargaining table and eventually into the original JCPOA. Israel’s security professionals believe now is the time to return to a policy of pressure. Only if Iran’s leaders truly believe that something more valuable is at risk than the nuclear program—namely, the very stability of the regime—will they be open to compromise. This can only be achieved if America can instill a sense of fear in Iran. This requires American contingency planning and **military training operations** to **convince Iran** that the US commitment to act militarily to prevent its nuclear progress is real. At the same time, a policy of pressure would include reinvigorated **sanctions**, especially in the fields of energy and finance. This has to include a willingness to target Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, which may run counter to the short-term desire to tamp down gasoline prices but is necessary to convince Iran that the cost of its nuclear brinkmanship will not be tolerated. And a policy of pressure would require extensive coordination—political, military, economic and diplomatic—with a wide array of countries. These need to include traditional allies and partners in Europe and the Middle East as well as the ring of countries that surround Iran—Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, even Afghanistan—that control the land bridges to the Islamic Republic and whose assistance in enforcing sanctions can make a huge difference. Admittedly, this is a tall order. A policy of pressure on Iran is dramatically different from the one adopted so far by the Biden Administration, which hoped that benign diplomacy would push the Iran problem down the road. At a time when the world is focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine, rising anxiety over Chinese ambitions in the Pacific, and deepening fear of a global recession, it will be tough to convince the White House to invest the time, resources and energy to orchestrate this complex and potentially risky initiative. But one thing the advocates of a pressure policy have in their favor is that staying the course—letting Iran proceed on its current path—is bound to be worse for US interests. If America doesn’t get its hands dirty now with **restoring deterrence** to its relationship with Iran, the Tehran leadership may decide to move forward to 90 percent enrichment, at which point Iran becomes a nuclear threshold state. Without American action before then, Israel will feel isolated, alone and compelled to consider measures to prevent what it would view as a strategic catastrophe, measures whose reverberations no one can confidently predict. All Israelis, regardless of their politics, hope America leads the world in preventing the Iran nuclear problem from crossing that dangerous line.

### 2AC---Heg Solves Prolif

#### US alliances and nuclear guarantees are the most effective way to ensure nonproliferation

Ford ‘21 [Christopher; Christopher Ford is an an American lawyer and former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation; 4-7-21; " Reassuring U.S. Allies and Preventing Nuclear Proliferation”; https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/reassuring-u-s-allies-and-preventing-nuclear-proliferation; New Paradigms Forum; accessed 7-5-2022; AH]

I. The Critical Importance of U.S. Alliances Let me begin, however, by pointing out the obvious. It is, I would argue, very clear that the United States’ alliance relationships – both in Europe, centered upon the NATO Alliance, and in the Indo-Pacific through multiple bilateral alliances – are extremely important to U.S. national security, and to international peace and security more broadly. Indeed, I would contend that alliance relationships are perhaps more important to America today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The United States, after all, does not now stand astride the world as a global “hyperpower” in the way that it did a generation ago, and we cannot alone meet all the challenges we face from revisionist great power competitors who seek to diminish, destabilize, and supplant us – and whose increasingly aggressive agendas are proving ever more dangerous to the free and open international order upon which global peace and prosperity have depended for a very long time. To succeed against these challenges, it is necessary to work with others, and this requires careful attention to our alliances and partnerships. Our alliance relationships have been critical bulwarks of international peace and security for many decades. Established most fundamentally to deter aggression, the United States’ alliances have so far succeeded brilliantly in this task. Anchored in U.S. military power – in both our conventional strength and in the “extended” nuclear deterrence guarantees we have long offered military allies – these alliances faced down threats from the Soviet Empire in both Europe and Asia throughout the Cold War; they continue to deter belligerence by a resurgent Russia in more recent years; and they have protected East Asia from intimidation and aggression from the People’s Republic of China and from North Korea all the while. And U.S. alliances have done even more for international peace and security than just deter aggression by militarized authoritarian states. **America’s alliances** have also proven to be the world’s most **effective and successful nonproliferation** tools. They have not merely deterred would-be aggressors, but they have also provided reassurance to those who might otherwise fear being the victims of such aggression – thus **reducing the incentives** that such threatened states would otherwise have felt to pursue the development of nuclear weaponry. It is actually quite **striking** how many of the countries the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) once identified as being most likely to develop nuclear weapons in the postwar era ended up not doing so as a result of their relationships with the United States. Specifically, as I pointed out in a speech I gave in my previous job, the growth and institutionalization of America’s postwar alliance networks and other security relationships helped both **persuade** these countries that they did not need nuclear weaponry – because their existential security needs could be met through collective security, backed by U.S. conventional military power and nuclear weapons – and give Washington leverage over them that we used to insist that several nascent nuclear weapons development efforts be **terminated.** In fact, I’d be willing to wager that U.S. alliance and security relationships are actually responsible for shutting down **more previously** active nuclear weapons development programs even than was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself. As declassified memoranda from the late 1960s have documented, even the Soviets eventually came to appreciate the nonproliferation benefit of U.S. alliances during the negotiation of the NPT, agreeing to accept an understanding of that Treaty that would permit NATO to continue with its arrangements for coordinating deployment of U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons as a means not only to deter the Warsaw Pact but also to prevent access by additional NATO allies to such devices. All in all, between deterring World War III and preventing a long-anticipated “cascade” of nuclear weaponization, we clearly have enormously compelling reasons to be **grateful** to U.S. alliance relationships.

## AT: Retrenchment/Transition Wars

### 2AC---Retrenchment = Russian Invasion

#### Retrenchment causes Russia-Europe-invasion.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\_a\_00405, kav)

Europe is characterized by profound, continent-wide divergences across national defense policies, particularly threat perceptions, as well as by a fundamental defense capacity shortfall that cannot be closed anytime soon because of a series of overlapping challenges. Given the combination of strategic cacophony and capacity gaps, which are mutually reinforcing, Europeans are currently not in a position to autonomously mount a credible deterrent and defense against Russia. This situation would likely continue for a very long time, even if there were a complete U.S. withdrawal from the continent, and all the more so in the event of a partial U.S. withdrawal, a much more likely counterfactual. If a U.S. pullback were to occur, it would leave Europe increasingly vulnerable to Russian aggression and meddling, allowing Russia to exploit Europe's centrifugal dynamics to augment its influence. A U.S. withdrawal would also likely make institutionalized intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder. Accordingly, a U.S. pullback would have grave consequences for peace and stability on the continent.

These findings have major implications for both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, scholars and policymakers need to be realistic. The strong desire for strategic autonomy is justified and understandable, but it is necessary to discern between distant hopes and present realities. Ultimately, the barriers to strategic autonomy are so substantial that the achievement of this goal would require a long-term, sustained and coordinated effort. Sound European defense policymaking needs to reflect this: working under an unrealistic assumption that Europeans can quickly achieve strategic autonomy is both unwarranted and unwise. Pursuing unrealistic goals can, in fact, undermine the achievement of realistic ones. Instead, European policymakers should focus on a manageable, affordable set of initiatives for augmenting military capacity in the short term that the United States would see as valuable—and thus would help consolidate the transatlantic alliance—but that would nevertheless also prove useful if the United States does someday pull back. Such an approach could gradually and cumulatively create the foundations for greater commonality and cooperation in the future and, over time, help mitigate the centrifugal dynamics at play in Europe.

In the United States, restraint scholars—virtually all of whom are self-described realists—also need to be realistic. Far from portraying the world as it is, their assessment of Europe is guided by an unfounded optimism that Europeans can easily balance Russia if the United States pulled out. Currently, Europe is presented by restraint scholars as the “easy” case for a U.S. withdrawal, with Asia being the “hard” case.169 Although China is rising fast and already has much more latent power than Russia, the latter is a greater threat to the United States' European allies than the former based on the other three components of the balance of threat: geographic location, offensive military capabilities, and aggressive intentions.170 The assessment of restraint scholars that pulling back from Europe is an easy call ultimately rests on a wholly unsubstantiated assumption: that an effective European balancing coalition would emerge quickly if the United States pulled back. What our analysis shows is that Europeans would for a very long time be unable to effectively confront Russia on their own if the United States were to withdraw, and thus if America does want stability in Europe, it should retain a presence on the continent.

To be clear, this analysis does not mean that the United States should never pull back from Europe: in an ideal world, Europeans would and should develop the institutional and material capacity to defend themselves without needing to rely on the United States. But until Europeans can come together effectively in the political and foreign policy realms—a process that will take a very long time to emerge—it is important to be realistic and recognize that a U.S. departure would be destabilizing.

#### Europe doesn’t have the capacity to prevent a Russian invasion.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\_a\_00405, \*charts removed\*, kav)

European Defense Capacity Shortfall

European national assessments thus diverge profoundly regarding the prioritization among different threats. Significantly, Europe's strategic cacophony greatly exacerbates a second overarching constraint on Europe achieving strategic autonomy: severe military capacity gaps that cannot be closed anytime soon.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe's defense capacity has markedly decreased.88 Operationally, the 2011 European military action in Libya revealed a severe shortage of key enablers for offensive military operations: the United States had to provide critical capabilities that the Europeans otherwise lacked, such as air-to-air refueling; suppression of enemy air defenses; and intelligence, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.89 Indeed, a recent systematic study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations found that, because their capability shortfalls are so significant, Europeans would struggle to autonomously undertake operations even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict (such as peace enforcement missions).90

In this section, we focus on Europeans' capacity for conventional warfare because it is indispensable for defense and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia and because this allows us to directly address the argument of restraint scholars who maintain that the Europeans could autonomously balance Russia with ease. We identify four major challenges that are likely to hinder the capacity of Europeans to develop an autonomous conventional defense capacity.

Lack of weapon systems for conventional deterrence and defense

During the Cold War, Europeans invested heavily in the kind of conventional capabilities required for conventional deterrence and defense. But after the Cold War, European defense spending plummeted, and a great proportion of these limited resources were directed toward out-of-area operations.91 As a result, Europeans are lacking in even the most basic conventional deterrence and defense capabilities. A key reason for this situation is Europe's strategic cacophony. The five economically largest European countries—the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy—are all located in Western or Southern Europe, which collectively have greatly de-emphasized the territorial defense mission since the end of the Cold War. In contrast, states in Central and Northern Europe have tended to focus relatively more on territorial defense, especially after Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea; yet, these parts of Europe contain only small to medium-sized countries.92

Until now, there has been no long-term examination of the year-to-year shift across all of Europe of the kinds of core capabilities needed for conventional deterrence and defense. To address this gap, we systematically gathered data from the IISS Military Balance for the 1990–2020 period on three core military systems for conventional warfare: main battle tanks (MBTs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery. To be sure, conventional warfare requires more than simply land capabilities. Yet, Russia's A2/AD capacity is aimed at eroding, or nullifying, NATO's local control of its airspace, thus compelling NATO forces, in the case of conflict, to operate in an environment of land warfare with contested air support.93 In this context, land resistance—and thus land capabilities—become key, which is why we focus on these three specific systems (they constitute a sample of the needed land warfare capabilities). The data for MBTs of Europe's major powers are displayed in figure 1.94 (Online appendix C shows the data on MBTs of medium and smaller European countries as well as the data for APCs and artillery for all European countries.)

These data underscore the marked decline of European conventional warfare capabilities in the past three decades. From 1990 to 2020, the combined European total number of MBTs plunged by 85 percent; APCs fell by 64 percent; and artillery declined by 56 percent. As Sven Biscop concludes, “Europe's capability shortfalls are such that it can neither meet its NATO obligations for territorial defense, nor achieve strategic autonomy with regard to the protection of Europe.”95

In reality, the situation is even worse than these data indicate, because most European militaries have significant readiness deficiencies. For example, an analysis by the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces concluded in 2018 that the “readiness of the Bundeswehr's major weapons systems is dramatically low in many areas,”96 noting that only 39 percent of Germany's Leopard 2 battle tanks were available for use given a lack of spare parts; the operability of only a quarter of its PUMA infantry combat vehicles; the nonavailability of any of its six submarines; and the ability of less than half of its Eurofighters and Tornado combat aircraft to fly.97 Significantly, Europe's readiness problems, such as the obsolescence of its MBTs, are projected to become even more challenging in the decades ahead.98

the complexity of employing modern weapons systems

As dramatic as these weapons shortfalls are, European defense spending—if allocated properly—could eventually secure the needed systems. Yet, not only is the efficient allocation of resources a major challenge because of Europe's strategic cacophony (as detailed below), but securing the needed weapons systems would only be the first step.

The effective employment of modern weapons systems is far more challenging than in past eras for a variety of reasons. A key consideration is the immense premium put on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). C4ISR—often referred to as the “nervous system” of modern militaries—is crucial for gathering information about the combatants, for effectively processing that information, and for disseminating and using that information to develop and implement complex plans.99 NATO's 2011 mission in Libya shows the heavy reliance of Europeans on the United States' C4ISR capacity. Europeans would therefore need to develop their own C4ISR capacity to be able to autonomously balance Russia, which would not be an easy undertaking given that Russia is no Libya. They would need large amounts of new C4ISR systems (e.g., reconnaissance and communication satellites; early warning and control aircraft; sensor systems; air, naval, and land command and control platforms), the most complex of which have very long development times. Notably, the already significant difficulty of Europeans assembling the needed systems would be made even more acute if the UK's exit from the EU ends up meaning that British capabilities also need to be replaced: at present, the UK detains, among other capabilities, 53 percent of the EU's combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance heavy unmanned aerial vehicles (CISR UAVs), 42 percent of airborne early warning and control aircraft, and 38 percent of electronic-intelligence aircraft.100

In addition, European countries lack the kind of specialized personnel needed to operate modern weapons systems effectively. Redressing this weakness would be a significant undertaking, as they have reduced their number of military personnel drastically since the end of the Cold War. As figure 2 shows, the size of the total active militaries of the large European powers declined by 57 percent during the 1990–2020 period.101 Furthermore, beyond the difficulty of securing the financial resources to pay the needed personnel, recruiting sufficient specialized personnel would be a major challenge, as demonstrated by the difficulties faced by many European militaries in attracting personnel for skilled positions.102 Notably, a recent study has shown that the employment of advanced weaponry calls for highly skilled and highly trained military personnel, which are now more difficult to recruit and retain in the military.103 Obtaining specialized military personnel to operate modern weaponry is only the beginning; they must also be trained to effectively use modern weapons, which is extremely challenging and time consuming, partially because these weapons need to be used as part of a cohesive package that places a premium not just on information gathering, but also on coordination and delegation.104 It has taken U.S. military personnel an extraordinarily long time to develop the skills required for effectively using today's weapons systems: as Posen stresses, the United States' “development of new weapons and tactics depends on decades of expensively accumulated technological and tactical experience.“105 It would likely take Europeans even longer to develop the needed skills, given differences across countries regarding operational cultures, levels of ambition, languages, and so on.106

Finally, the effective use of modern weaponry in the European theater depends on European forces being able to move quickly and securely over large distances within Europe. Yet, as a UK parliamentary report puts it, “NATO has difficulty moving large forces” across Europe.107 In recent years, the Europeans have sought to bolster military mobility through a variety of initiatives dispersed across different institutions (within both the EU and NATO).108 Yet, the movement and training of military personnel and assets in Europe remain severely hampered by a combination of capability shortfalls, legal/procedural hurdles, and infrastructural deficiencies that will not be easy to resolve.109

the difficulty of institutionalized military cooperation

An additional challenge is institutional. Europe's strategic cacophony has prevented Europeans from developing an autonomous, military-planning, command and control (C2) structure.110 Indeed, a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service explains that one of the greatest challenges of European defense is “the lack of integration of the military structures of the Member States.”111 Although an effective and autonomous European defense would require the creation of a permanent planning and C2 infrastructure, the question of developing an autonomous Operational Headquarters (OHQ) has proven highly divisive.112 An OHQ was never established because of conflicting national interests and priorities among Europeans, in particular France, Germany and the UK. Whereas Paris has long supported the establishment of a military OHQ to bolster the EU's strategic and operational planning structures and its contingency planning and C2 capacity, London has strongly resisted, seeing it as a duplication of NATO's assets. Germany has stood somewhat in between, though closer to the UK, favoring a focus on civilian-military planning and C2, not least to avoid duplicating structures already existing at NATO.113 As a result, the EU remains entirely dependent on NATO or national assets for the planning and conduct of major executive operations, for which it has no autonomous military structures.114

If the United States were to pull back from Europe, it remains to be seen whether the Europeans could rely on a “Europeanized” NATO, in which the integrated structures would stay in place but without the United States.115 Military planning and C2 require a clear chain of command. When NATO was created, Europeans agreed to be under U.S. military command, rather than attempting the far more difficult task of agreeing to be under the command of another European country or group of European states. More generally, as the hegemonic power in NATO, the United States has facilitated institutionalized cooperation among Europeans and helped partly contain Europe's strategic cacophony.116 For decades, a U.S.-led NATO has been the overarching shaper of national defense policies and military transformation in Europe, helping overcome coordination and collective-action problems.117 In light of Europe's deep-seated strategic divisions, a U.S. disengagement would amplify these coordination and collective action problems (assuming NATO survived) and would further hinder institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation at all levels: strategies and doctrines; training; operational learning; interoperability; and joint capability development. Likewise, without the United States, the persistent and profound divergence of threat perceptions and strategic priorities among Europeans is likely to impede their capacity to agree on shared C2 structures for conducting operations, except for the lowest end of the spectrum of conflict (e.g., peace support operations).118

As a result of strategic cacophony, the EU has, in fact, struggled mightily to create even the most minimal C2 structure. As Luis Simón underscores, “It has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly significant steps for the European Union to establish a ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and assistance) missions,” with an advisory role only.119 Ultimately, given Europe's deep-seated divergences, there is no basis for optimism that Europeans will be able to agree being under the permanent command of another European country for deterrence and defense or to consistently undertake effective institutionalized military cooperation without the enabling role played by the United States within NATO.

the fragmentation of europe's defense industrial base

If Europeans want to be strategically autonomous, they will have to produce the defense systems they need without being reliant on the United States. The entrenched fragmentation of Europe' defense industrial base, however, would make this a daunting task.

On the demand side, European states have consistently privileged domestically procured defense equipment over European arms cooperation. According to data from the European Defense Agency, from 2006 to 2015, collaborative defense procurement in Europe accounted for less than one quarter of total procurement.120 For example, a mere 7 percent of the European surface vessels currently in use have been built through European armament cooperation.121 As for fighter aircraft—where the economic incentives for European-wide collaboration are especially powerful given the immense cost and complexity of these systems—there has been relatively limited defense cooperation: less than a third (32.6 percent) of combat aircraft used by EU militaries come from European collaborative production.122 Similarly, European states spend more than 80 percent of their military research-and-development budgets within national borders.123

#### Retrenchment causes Russia-invasion

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\_a\_00405, kav)

conventional defense and deterrence. As Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly convincingly argue, “Russian military expenditure is considerably higher” than commonly estimated.142 Of key importance, they stress, is that Russia gets a lot for what it spends on its military: it pays its soldiers a pittance in rubles, and, even more important, it buys its weapons from its own defense contractors in rubles, not dollars. Moreover, the Russian government has squeezed profits in the defense sector, making the weapons it buys artificially cheap. Notably, Russia's unusually high capacity to produce advanced weaponry using domestic resources is a legacy of the Soviet Union's massive level of defense production during the Cold War. Ultimately, Kofman and Connolly maintain that, because Russia's rubles can purchase so much military power so cheaply, it is inappropriate to use market exchange-based estimates of its military spending. Based upon purchasing power parity exchange rates, “Russia's effective military expenditure actually ranged between $150 billion and $180 billion annually” (from 2015 to 2019), and “taking into account hidden or obfuscated military expenditure, Russia may well come in at around $200 billion.”143 Given this understanding, Russian military spending likely exceeds the combined levels of defense expenditures of the three major European powers (France, Germany, and the UK).

High levels of military spending have, in turn, spurred significant modernization and expansion of Russia's military forces, particularly in the 2010s.144 The Russian Federation is the descendent state of the Soviet Union, which created a formidable military industrial base with a huge cadre of highly trained personnel, providing a strong foundation for Russia's current military infrastructure. Although the Russian armed forces still display important weaknesses in areas such as surface shipbuilding, in the past decade Moscow has substantially “modernized its armed forces through a massive introduction of new and modernized weapons and infrastructure, accompanied by radical structural changes in the military organization, evolving modes of operation and a sharply increased number, scale and complexity of military training and exercise.”145 Of particular note, from 2015 to 2019, Russia's army increased in size by almost 25 percent.146 (In online appendix D, we measure the military capabilities of Russia and four potential European balancing coalitions regarding two overall indicators of military personnel [total active and total reserves] and three core weapon systems for conventional warfare [main battle tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers]. Across all five of these measures, the data show that Russia possesses a very substantial military superiority as compared to all four potential European balancing coalitions.)

Additionally, Russia possesses substantial C4ISR capabilities for employing weapons systems in a coordinated manner and for managing military operations. These capabilities are the combined result of legacy Soviet systems and of the Kremlin's ongoing military modernization effort.147 Especially in the past decade, Russia has developed a more modular, flexible force structure with an emphasis on joint forces through a large-scale military modernization.148

Military satellites are a useful indicator for understanding why Europeans would have difficulty building up the necessary C4ISR infrastructure for balancing Russia. For one, military satellites are critical, because they enable the rest of the C4ISR architecture to operate effectively by facilitating the flow of informational inputs. Specifically, military satellites are crucial for communications, navigation, early warning, attack assessment, and surveillance and reconnaissance—and thus are key for pooling and employing military power. Other C4ISR systems, such as ISR UAVs and airborne early warning and control systems constitute more specific components of a C4ISR architecture that play particular roles therein. Furthermore, whereas full comparison data are available for military satellites, existing databases do not list other C4ISR capabilities systematically. The profound gap between Russia and European countries in military satellites is shown in table 2.

To be sure, notwithstanding such quantitative preponderance in military satellites, one challenge faced by the Russian military in past decades has been the integration of highly interoperable systems for network-centric warfare.149 Yet, Russia has placed such systems (referred to as the Reconnaissance Strike Complex in Russian strategic parlance) at the “epicenter” of its military modernization in the 2010s, investing massively in C4ISR integration and electronic warfare and in modernizing infrastructure, while boosting and streamlining command and control, among other features.150

The net result is that, as stressed by a 2019 RAND report, the Kremlin has implemented “a modern, whole-of-government C4ISR infrastructure that will enable Russia to pursue its vision of net-centric or ‘non-contact warfare’”; these “advances in long-range strike, Russia's command and control and information gathering systems are fundamental in their ability to compete directly with the West and dominate regional adversaries”151—an assessment shared by other studies.152 Significantly, the Russian military tried and tested its C4ISR capabilities during the Syrian conflict.153

The experience of European states during the 2011 Libyan conflict showed that they lack the technological infrastructure and personnel to autonomously use weapons systems in a coordinated manner: they would need to replace the United States' C4ISR systems that they currently rely on; hire and train the personnel to operate them; and develop a permanent, effective command structure to conduct effective joint military operations in wartime. Likewise, in stark contrast to Russia's unity of command, Europeans display an “enormous variation” in their C4ISR capacities, with “both technological and operational gaps within Europe.”154 In sum, Europe exhibits a cacophony of C4ISR capabilities.

A final and related consideration that restraint scholars do not sufficiently recognize is that Russia gains efficiencies—when compared to Europe—because it is a single actor, rather than a collective patchwork of countries. By contrast, as a 2018 European Parliament report concludes, “It is precisely because European defense is fragmented by the decisions of 27 political and military chiefs of staff, duplicates the same research, the same programs and the same capabilities and has no chain of command that it is, collectively, inefficient.”155 The report notes further that “increasing the level of spending without first addressing the coherence between the different national defense systems would only increase the amount of wastage.”156 Exactly how much efficiency is lost would depend on how many European countries would need to act together to balance Russia; but even two actors working together would result in less efficacy and effectiveness as compared to a single, unitary actor of comparable size.157 If the United States pulled back, a single, centralized Russian actor would confront a group of potential European balancers with diverging threat perceptions that would face coordination challenges likely to hamper their capacity to devise a common strategy, to share the burdens of their defense investments, to rationalize Europe's highly fragmented defense industrial base, to build integrated C2 structures, and to sustain the development and deployment of a C4ISR capacity. As a report of the French Senate states, “Compared to other European countries, Russia enjoys a considerable but not quantifiable advantage: unity of command. The Russian army has one commanding authority, one hierarchy, one language, and one equipment range. Obviously, at the operational level, these are very important assets.”158

### AT: Retrenchment /= Russian Invasion

#### Their ev is wrong – Europe’s major powers underestimate Russia.

* France, Germany, and the UK

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Russia is uninmportant or not a threat

Most smaller powers in Western and Southern Europe prioritize as their main sources of concern transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation, and instability across the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) and the resulting flows of migrants (see table 1).46 By contrast, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was perceived as the overarching conventional and nuclear threat during the Cold War, Russia has little, if any, significance in their national threat assessments.47 Indeed, some of these countries, such as Italy or Spain, have long advocated for sustained engagement with Moscow.48

Likewise, two countries that do not share the same level of anxiety held by most Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis Russia are Hungary and Bulgaria. Considering the threat of conventional war to be minimal, and given their strong ties with Moscow, they instead prioritize terrorism, migration flows, WMD proliferation, and cyberattacks.49

Russia is a threat, but other threats are more significant

Other countries also prioritize transnational terrorism, regional turmoil around Europe and the MENA, cyberattacks, and illegal migration, but display higher threat perceptions of Russia than do states in the first category (see table 1). They perceive Russia as a threat, but nonetheless see other threats as relatively higher sources of concern.50

Croatia's threat assessment, for instance, focuses largely on challenges such as terrorism, regional instability, migration, and the proliferation of WMD.51 Still, in a veiled yet clear reference to Russia's influence in the Western Balkans, Croatian policymakers put greater emphasis than the first group of countries on threats such as “non-conventional, asymmetric, and cyber actions” that are “planned, permanent and systematic activities supported by state bodies.”52

France is the only major power in this group. Its threat perceptions revolve, foremost, around transnational terrorism and regional instability in Europe's southern periphery. French policymakers consider jihadist terrorism as “the most immediate” threat,53 especially in light of the steep rise in the number of terrorist attacks on French soil since the mid-2010s.54 France is also concerned with the proliferation of conventional and WMD-related technology,55 as well as with regional instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East.56 The French government puts particular emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa, where, partly because of its postcolonial history, France retains “a direct security and economic interest” in the stability of the region.57 Accordingly, although France has displayed growing concerns vis-à-vis Russia's assertiveness after the Ukrainian crisis,58 other threats remain more significant.

Russia and other threats have roughly equal significance

The United Kingdom and Germany—together with less powerful Western European states (Belgium and the Netherlands) and Denmark—consider Russia and other security challenges to be equivalent threats (see table 1).

British policymakers include both Russia and terrorism in the UK's “Tier One“ category of risks (in terms of probability and impact).59 In light of Russia's increasingly assertive behavior, they assess that the ”risks from state-based threats have both grown and diversified,“60 which is why the UK ”cannot rule out the possibility that [Moscow] may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.“61 According to a UK former senior defense official, the main areas of concerns vis-à-vis Moscow are (1) Russia's military modernization, including the development and deployment of weapon systems that can threaten the UK's NATO allies; (2) Russia's gray-zone activities (e.g., subversion, use of proxies, cyberattacks, use of military-grade nerve agents for targeted killings); and (3) Moscow's activities outside Europe, such as in parts of Africa, but, most notably, in the Middle East.62

Yet, at the same time, the UK sees transnational terrorism as an equally substantial threat. British policymakers have perceived a rising threat from terrorism since at least the 2005 London bombings and the subsequent wave of terrorist attacks that swept across Europe and the UK in the 2010s.63 In their eyes, “ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], Al Qa'ida, and affiliates remain committed to attacking UK and Western targets” and continue to be “the most direct and immediate threat” to the UK's “domestic security.”64 In 2015, the British government therefore decided to increase its counterterrorism spending by 30 percent, including £2 billion of new investment in the capabilities of UK special forces.65

Germany, too, considers terrorism and Russia to be threats of roughly equal significance. German policymakers view terrorist attacks as “the most immediate challenge” to their country's domestic security.66 In 2018, Germany's minister of interior stated that the security situation concerning terrorism continued to be “very threatening.”67 For Germany, transnational terrorism is tied closely to regional stability in the MENA and to the existence of failing states in which terrorist organizations can thrive.68 Accordingly, it seeks to bolster cooperation with partners in Africa and the Middle East to train their security forces so as “to create a bulwark against international terrorism.”69

At the same time, Germany sees Russia as “openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaranteed under international law, as it has done in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.”70 According to the ministry of defense, “this has far-reaching implications for security in Europe and thus for the security of Germany.”71 A comparison of Germany's 2006 White Paper and of the subsequent strategic documents (i.e., the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines and the 2016 White Paper) highlights the enhanced focus of the German armed forces on territorial defense since the Russia-Georgia war and Moscow's landgrab in Crimea.72

Interviews with current and former German officials reveal that the foreign affairs, interior, and defense ministries have different threat assessments. Whereas the first two consider terrorism to be Germany's main security challenge, the latter prioritizes Russia as the main threat.73 Across the German government, terrorism and Russia ultimately emerge as being roughly equally significant threats.

Smaller Western European powers such as the Netherlands and Belgium similarly consider Russia and other threats to be largely equivalent.74 Likewise, in Northern Europe, Danish policymakers rank terrorism and regional instability in the MENA—which can provide fertile ground for terrorists—relatively higher than do their Nordic neighbors in their threat assessments.75 At the same time, Russia is seen as posing “a significant security challenge,”76 and its military buildup and increased military exercises in the region, as well as its use of gray-zone operations, are considered “a clear challenge” to Denmark.77 The Danish government thus sees Russia, terrorism, and regional instability in the MENA as equally significant threats.

Russia is the highest threat; other threats are also significant

Several Northern and Eastern European states have displayed mounting threat perceptions of Russia—which they see as their major threat—especially since the Russo-Georgian War and, increasingly, the Ukrainian crisis (see table 1). Yet, they continue to share security concerns vis-à-vis terrorism, regional instability in the MENA, and illegal migration.

In Northern Europe, Norway and Sweden emphasize both the “long belt of instability” to the south of Europe and terrorism as significant national security concerns.78 Yet, most notably since the 2010s, Russia has returned to the top of their national security concerns. In particular, they highlight the development of Russia's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, its numerous military exercises in Northern Europe, and its activities in the Arctic as amplifying the risk of an accident or a crisis resulting in unintended escalation to war.79 The Norwegian government, for example, considers that “Russia's overall military capacity is the most significant security challenge for Norway and NATO.”80

Likewise, in Central and Eastern Europe, although the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia also emphasize other security challenges (e.g., instability in the Southern Mediterranean and terrorism), their threat assessments prioritize Russia's assertiveness.81 While refraining from officially labeling Russia a threat, the Romanian government argues that Russia's naval buildup—and the ensuing “destabilization of the security situation in the Black Sea Extended Region”—“represent the most important factor of military risk against national security.”82

Russia is the dominant threat by far

The Baltic states, Finland, and Poland exhibit the highest threat perceptions of Russia in Europe. The former Soviet-controlled states in the Baltic region (i.e., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) prioritize Russia's conventional and gray-zone military threats as their core national security concern.83 Likewise, given Finland's geographical proximity to Russia and their shared border, policymakers in Helsinki have viewed Russia as their dominant national security threat throughout the post–Cold War period.84 Finland considers that the “use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded.”85

Given its history of recurrent invasion by foreign powers, Poland has also consistently put Russia at the center of its security concerns since the end of the Cold War.86 Moscow's “aggressive policy”—through which it aims to “destabilize the internal order of other states and to question their territorial integrity”—is seen as “a threat mainly for Poland and other countries in the region.”87

### 2AC---Retrenchment Wrecks Cohesion

#### Retrenchment leads to varying threat perceptions that block European unity in the face of Russia.

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Assessing the Counterargument: Can Europeans Balance Russia?

Together, Europe's strategic cacophony and its defense capacity shortfalls feed and reinforce each other. For one thing, many of the needed steps to make up for Europe's defense capacity shortfalls will require prolonged cooperation; Europeans would thus need to overcome their entrenched strategic cacophony not just for a short time, but over a very long period. Moreover, because diverging interests hamper defense industrial cooperation among Europeans, this—coupled with major capability shortfalls—deepens their technological dependency on the United States, further reinforcing the challenges to addressing Europe's capability shortfalls.

Restraint scholars arguing for a U.S. pullout would undoubtedly respond that, even if Europe is currently split by strategic divisions and has severe defense capacity shortfalls, a U.S. withdrawal would result in heightened European threat perceptions of Russia and thereby lead Europeans to bolster their defense investments—thus prompting them to come together to balance Russia (through a balancing coalition or through the EU, or both). For restraint scholars, it is the U.S. presence in Europe that affords Europeans the luxury of low threat perceptions of Russia and thereby drives them to underinvest in defense. Below, we assess the validity and robustness of this counterargument.

european threat perceptions after a u.s. withdrawal

We now evaluate how European threat perceptions would likely evolve if the United States were to pull back, focusing first on Europe's three major powers (France, the UK, and Germany) and then on its medium and lesser powers.

Given its geographical location, colonial past, and continued engagement in Africa, France tends to look south rather than east for the defense of its core strategic interests.131 Furthermore, France's strategic outlook remains shaped partly by its Cold War, Gaullist foreign policy legacy, which was based on the willingness to carve out a “third way” between the Soviet-led and the U.S.-led blocs through some form of accommodation with Moscow while maintaining an independent nuclear force and a French area of influence in Africa.132

The UK, as an offshore seapower, has since the early Cold War concluded that the only way to deter the Soviet Union (and later Russia) is to use the United States as a counterweight.133 Accordingly, the “special relationship” with the United States, both bilaterally and through NATO, has been the center of gravity of the UK's defense policy—as illustrated by its heavy reliance on U.S. military technology.134 Indeed, NATO has been the main vehicle through which Britain has sought to entrench U.S. power in Europe and deter external threats.135

Likewise, Germany, because of its history and location in the heart of the European continent, has strategic priorities different from those of France. The defeat and subsequent occupation of Germany in World War II, including by the Soviet Union, was followed by the division of the country in two, with one side under Soviet influence—thus making Germany the geostrategic epicenter of the Cold War. After its reunification and the end of the Cold War, as well as its self-imposed stringent parliamentary constraints on the use of military force, Germany has opted for a combination of economic and political integration with the EU and military reliance on NATO, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor for its security and the stability of the continent.136

Idiosyncratic historical legacies, geography, and distinctive local security environments have thus profoundly shaped the threat assessments of the three major European powers. To be sure, these differences existed during the Cold War, too, but they were muted by the overwhelming, common Soviet threat.137 By contrast, in light of the diversification of the post–Cold War threat environment, if the United States withdrew from the continent, the threat perceptions of these major powers would be unlikely to converge around Russia.138

In such a scenario, the UK and Germany would be prone to exhibit heightened threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia. Given their historical reliance upon NATO as their ultimate security guarantee, if the United States were to remove its conventional and nuclear forces, the credibility of NATO's deterrent vis-à-vis Russia would founder in the eyes of British and German policymakers. As a result, there is every reason to expect they would raise the significance of Russia and of territorial defense in their defense planning. At the same time, they would still have to reckon with other significant threats (e.g., transnational terrorism and regional stability in the MENA).

By contrast, France's threat assessment would most likely remain unchanged if the United States withdrew. Although France might view Russia with greater concern, it would continue to prioritize terrorism and, crucially, threats on Europe's southern periphery (i.e., regional instability in the greater Mediterranean area, in general, and in Africa, in particular). As a senior current French defense official put it in an interview, “If the United States withdrew, the risk represented by Russia would ostensibly be greater but, at the same time, it would be greater only if France considered that the threat posed by Russia to the Baltic states, Poland, etc. constitutes a threat to our vital interests, which is far from sure.” This is because threats to Europe's southern periphery, such as “the destabilization of Africa or the Middle East are considered to be a much higher priority than Russia. … Our vital interests are not threatened by Russia.”139

In sum, in the case of a complete U.S. pullback from the continent, London and Berlin would likely move rightward into the second column from the right in table 1 (Russia is a higher threat, but other threats are also significant), while France would not shift from its current position. Given their differing threat prioritizations, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France would be very unlikely to reach agreement on a common position vis-à-vis Russia. Germany and the UK might lean more toward balancing and expand bilateral defense cooperation to that end. However, unlike countries that view Russia as the dominant threat by far (i.e., the Baltic states and Poland), they would face important trade-offs in their allocation of resources—between territorial defense and power projection capabilities, between Europe's eastern and southern periphery, and so on—given that they would continue to grapple with other significant threats. For its part, because France would likely continue to prioritize threats on Europe's southern periphery, it would be unlikely to provide a substantial (if any) contribution to a balancing coalition. In fact, it might opt for accommodation with Russia to develop a sphere of influence in Western/Southern Europe or, potentially, even see some strategic advantages to band-wagoning with Russia.

This predicament would be further compounded by fundamental divergences in threat perceptions among Europe's medium and small powers. Except for lesser powers in Northern and Eastern Europe (i.e., the Baltic states and Poland), which would consistently see Russia as their overriding threat, the other medium and small European states would likely display profoundly different reactions to a U.S. pullback, depending on their geographic location, history, and strategic priorities. While some countries would undoubtedly perceive a higher threat from Russia and thus revise their threat assessments (moving one column to the right in table 1), others would likely maintain their existing threat hierarchization given the equivalent or higher priority they assign to other threats or regions, or both. In fact, there is every indication that most medium and small European countries that currently perceive threats other than Russia to be more significant or dominant would be highly unlikely to revise their threat assessment. Several of these countries might even become neutral or bandwagon with Moscow. It is therefore extremely implausible that all European states would move Russia up in their ranking of threats. And even if they did, the cacophony of threat perception would remain, with only a few lesser powers in Northern and Eastern Europe perceiving Russia as their dominant threat.

Restraint scholars might reply that the above discussion is excessively pessimistic about the chances for European defense coordination because it neglects the role the EU can play in bringing Europe together in the security realm if the United States leaves.140 The EU is not an effective institutional platform for overcoming Europe's strategic divergence, however. There are many reasons for this, with the most notable being that the EU is a kaleidoscope of countries with diverging interests that operates on the basis of consensus in the field of foreign and defense policy—thus making the Common Security and Defense Policy a “structurally limited undertaking.”141 If the United States were to pull back, rather than work to overcome European divisions, the EU would be prone to inaction because of such divisions. Thus, only an effective institutional structure could probably overcome, or at least mitigate, Europe's divisions, but strategic cacophony would prevent the EU from being enabled to perform this function.

how easily can europeans balance russia's military strength?

A complete U.S. withdrawal would thus not mitigate Europe's strategic cacophony and could exacerbate it. Restraint scholars might argue, however, that, even if threat perceptions did not converge across Europe, balancing Russia would not require much effort because it is so weak. Yet, Russia is a much tougher adversary to match than restraint scholars now assess it to be—both in the conventional and the nuclear realms.

### 2AC---Transition Wars Violent

#### Hegemonic power transition is violent -- Chinese revisionism has made it more aggressive than ever

Beckley 21 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., 2-24-2020, "Conditional Convergence and the Rise of China: A Political Economy Approach to Understanding Global Power Transitions," OUP Academic, <https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/1/ogaa010/5754022?login=true>] AA

The conventional wisdom about current trends in the balance of power relies heavily on power transition theory, which assumes that economic convergence is an unconditional process in which poorer countries inevitably catch up with richer countries. Economists, however, have shown that convergence is rare and conditional on a set of geographic, institutional, and demographic factors that, so far, have not been incorporated into major theories of international change. In this article, I have discussed these factors and analyzed the growth prospects of the United States and China in light of them. The results cast doubt on China's ability to rival the United States as an economic and military superpower. The good news is that the world is unlikely to experience a full-blown hegemonic rivalry anytime soon. This is an extraordinary development for global security. In the past five hundred years alone, there have been sixteen hegemonic competitions in which a rising power challenged a ruling power for top-dog status. Twelve of them ended in catastrophic wars, and even some of the peaceful cases were brutal cold wars that inflicted tremendous harm. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the globe into rival blocs, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and brought the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. Today, by contrast, the United States does not face a peer competitor, and the world, though far from perfect, is more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. The bad news is that China may become more authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad as its economic growth slows, and this shift may undermine global security in numerous areas. History suggests that when a rising power peaks and starts to decline before its ambitions have been fulfilled, its people tend to become disgruntled, and its leaders usually respond by suppressing domestic dissent and demonizing foreign adversaries. Russia, for example, has become more hostile, revanchist, and disruptive since the collapse in world oil prices in the late 2000s gutted the Russian economy and crimped President Vladimir Putin's popularity. China seems to be going down a similar path. Over the past decade, China's economic growth rates have been cut in half, and the Chinese government has responded by massively expanding its internal security system, exporting parts of that system to other countries, waging information warfare on democratic countries, promoting “internet sovereignty,” flouting international trade rules, and ramping up its military presence on and around disputed features in the East and South China Seas in flagrant violation of international law. These actions may be just a preview of what is to come in the years ahead, as the economic, geographic, and demographic problems highlighted above grow worse. Trade disputes and territorial conflicts are only the most obvious risks posed by a stagnating and recalcitrant China. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as climate change and disease, which may fester without Chinese cooperation. Avoiding this fate requires other countries, and especially the United States, to handle China with a blend of reassurance and deterrence. Unfortunately, the widespread view that China is an emerging superpower has caused the United States to abandon engagement in favor of unbridled competition. In just the past few years, the United States has labeled China a rival, imposed steep tariffs on Chinese goods and severe restrictions on Chinese investment and immigration, inserted US forces into East Asian territorial disputes, and made plans to hit China early and hard in the event of war. This competition has not only increased the risk of US–China conflict but also threatened global security by hamstringing the World Trade Organization and effectively killing the Paris Climate Accord and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Thus, the stage has been set for tragic conflict: China is becoming more recalcitrant as it suffers slowing growth, while the United States, consumed by false prophecies of China's inexorable rise, is becoming more confrontational. The main threat to global security, therefore, is not a US-China power transition driven by economic convergence but divergence in US and Chinese perceptions about the long-term trends in the balance of power. China may not be able to stem its growth slowdown, but Americans can take note of it and recalibrate US policy accordingly.

#### Transition wars are violent -- the Britain to U.S. power shift was an exception

Schake 17 [Schake, Kori, Kori Schake is a senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)., “Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony”, Chapter 12, pg. 271-292, Harvard University Press, <https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975071>] AA

12 Lessons from a Peaceful Transition LooKiNg AcRoss A hundred years of America growing stronger and more assertive in the international order, the most striking element is how highly contingent a peaceful outcome was in the transition from British to American hegemony. This peacefulness hinged on a unique sense of political sameness, both domestically and in in- ternational practice, for the crucial years of America surpassing Britain that allowed the hegemon to diminish the importance of relative power between them. The sense of sameness dissipated soon after the transition, and America set sail on radically changing the international order to more closely reflect its domestic political compact. To the extent that the British to American transition is illustrative for future changes, it cautions deep skepticism—both that the transition can occur peacefully and that, even if it should occur peacefully, the international order that results will operate on terms the United States has set in its hegemony. This is especially true if the subsequent hegemon emerges not from within the American order but from the much more probable direction of China. 271 In stark terms, the lessons of the British to American case for future hegemonic transitions are four: (1) the prospects for a peaceful hegemonic transition are small even in the most conducive circum- stances; (2) differences in political culture and structure of government make an American to Chinese hegemonic transition much less likely to be peaceful; (3) America is making the same strategic choice with China that Great Britain did with a rising America, that it can be induced to comply with extant rules; and (4) America ought to expect that a hegemonic China will rewrite the rules to reflect its domestic political culture, just as America itself did. The Crossing of Courses TharetaGt Britain failed to maintain its dominance in the inter - national order is a simple fact; the United States grew richer, stronger, and more assertive. As a result, America demanded and received the ability to reset the rules by which states operated inter- nationally. Since the establishment of the state system, and even be- fore, hegemonic transitions have occurred by force. A rising power tests its mettle against the dominant power, succeeding or failing by force of arms. That was not the character of the transition from British to American dominance; it was uniquely peaceful. Why it was uniquely peaceful has been the subject of this book. Theories about state behavior necessarily look to explain the pre- ponderance of the data. As the only peaceful transition, the Anglo- American hegemonic transition is an outlier, so it is not surprising that prevailing theories provide imperfect explanations for its history. Yet it is an extremely important case, as the only transition achieved without cataclysmic violence. Understanding why it occurred without violence is essential to determining whether future hegemonic transitions can occur peacefully, and what the 272 nature of the international order will be once such transitions have occurred. A realpolitik explanation for what transpired between Great Britain and the United States from 1823 to 1922 would be that a rising power began probing the established hegemon, backed off when it amisnecter, easndt advanced when the hegemon was distracted or iostehuernwwilling to counter the challenge. Building on a repu- tation for twisting the lion’s tail, an upstart America cannily took credit for what Britain would need to do to prevent European colo- nization of the western hemisphere in 1823, was slapped down while attempting a steal of the Oregon Territory in 1853, managed to threaten just enough trouble for Britain in 1861–1863 to tip the scales against recognition of the Confederacy, burnished its strength win- ning the Indian Wars, and consolidated a continental economic platform. Ultimately the economic and military strength of the rising power were so compelling that, confronted with war during the 1895 Venezuelan debt crises, Great Britain instead conceded. Cooperation over Venezuela and during the Spanish-American War would illustrate a waning power buying goodwill with a new hagt eims,ojnu—mtping on the bandwagon. Being more con - cerned with a rising Germany than a fading Britain, the United States joined in the Great War on the Allied side and brokered a peace, both at Versailles and in the Washington Naval Treaties, that locked in its own superiority. All seems sensible enough in that telling. But the realpolitik story line cannot adequately account for several elements of the history, the most important elements in producing a peaceful transition: why Britain at the height of its powers offered cooperation to its rising rival in 1823; why Britain declined to press its advantage over Oregon in 1845; why Britain resisted an inexpensive opportunity to 273 deal a devastating blow before 1863 during the American Civil War; why the two countries developed such a vibrant sense of sameness during their introspective decades, unique for both countries from any other international relations; why Britain encouraged American expansion into the Pacific and enabled American success in the Smpearniciashn-WA ar; why the United States grew more liberal as it grew more powerful; and why America in the time of its hegemony used its power to try and create a diffnertekind of international order. Menatsnoy feBlermitish strategy accounted for by realpolitik as a waning power accommodating a waxing power seem instead to be characteristics of British foreign policy across the whole of its dominance of the international order; to use Silicon Valley termi- nology, they are features, not bugs. Great Britain was a peculiar kind of hegemon. It never seemed to feel its own strength, perhaps because the strategy it employed across 150 years always required partner- ships to succeed. Balancing conflicting interests and quarrelsome partners for temporary gain was Great Britain’s genius. In contrast atodAumrinergicits hegemony, Britain seemed always intensely conscious of its vulnerabilities rather than exalting in its strengths. Hlseowtoeexplain Great Britain, ascendant in 1823, seeking out common cause with an America barely able to protect its own coast- line in order to prevent further European colonization in the western hemisphere? Great Britain had a genius for piecing together mosaics of mar- ginal contributors for tactical advantage. Governments from those of Earl of Liverpool to David Lloyd George were always temporizing, finding narrow bases for ephemeral collusion to specific purpose with a fluid collection of partners. It was a cost-efficient geostrategy that succeeded spectacularly until the international order calcified 274 into standing alliances. And when that more rigid international order emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, Britain had laid the trace lines for more stable cooperation with two of the three emergent great powers, Japan and the United States. It is unfair to British statesmen to conclude, as Paul Kennedy does, that they always accommodated their challengers.1 They did not, at least, always accommodate the United States, pushing back on both American territorial demands for Oregon and the revisionist legal claims for superiority in law of democratic governments. Presi- dent James Polk probably lost more in the 1845 confrontation over Oregon than he would have gained by playing a longer hand and letting the tide of American settlers make the case for the boundary location of British Columbia. The government of Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston was sorely tempted twice before 1863 to recognize the Confederate States during the American Civil War, considering it in Britain’s interests to do so. The British inclina- tion even in 1895 was to put America in its subordinate place and deride its claims for a sphere of influence in the Americas. British governments defined their interests expansively and threatened force effectively to constrain American challenges. Confrontation was a routine part of British-American interaction for much of the nine- teenth century. The theory that democracy produced a peaceful transition is only partly borne out in the Anglo-American transition. The difference in form of government between Great Britain and America did in- crease the likelihood of hegemonic confrontation between the two countries. British statesmen were appalled at the type of government on display in America. In part this was a reflection of class privilege in Britain, but leaders’ aversion to democracy was more than just prejudice. Speaking the same language, the British had a front row 275 seat for the demagoguery, recklessness, and corruption of electoral politics on display in America after the decorum of the founding fathers gave way to Jacksonian America. Theryewnot inaccurate in anticipating that democracy would produce a bellicose state un- willing to accept the established practices of great powers. A rising Aa mwaesriacn illiberal Amer ica in very many respects. Yet even democratic British leaders did not predict that a risen America would choose to reconstruct the international order in profoundly liberal ways. British leaders before 1867 feared how American influence could permeate their national boundary, a concern uniquely posed by America. The American experiment echoed through British debates on electoral reform; it was the only model of functioning democ- racy and therefore the basis for comparison of what Britain wanted and did not want in its own democratization. Before the electoral reforms, British governments worried about infection of American attitudes in the British body politic. They had a rich appreciation for the appeal of American ideals: George Canning championed James Monroe’s announcement in 1823 because it associated Britain with America’s international appeal. Robert Peel declined to push British advantage over James Polk’s 1845 exposure in Oregon when British reformers took up America’s case. In 1863 Palmerston was cautious not to expose his government to pressure for greater dateimzaotciorn by aligning with a Southern cause unpop ular with those least represented in British politics. ThespsrofcBritish adteimzaotciorn eventually brought the po litical cultures of the two countries together and gave them a sense of distinction from other states, all of which were differently constituted. Before electoral re- form in Britain, though, the democratic divide was cause for deep distrust between Britain and America. 276 aDteizmaoticorn was not the only threat Amer ica posed to British policy, however. Choices about America had a unique resonance because of immigration. British leaders had no trepidation about domestic repercussions of policy toward other countries; with Amer- aic, British leaders had to calculate the way anti- American policies would affect attitudes in Ireland, Scotland, and even within England. No other country could play a positive role in mobilizing public sentiment, reaching into domestic politics to affect foreign policy. Palmerston saw the dimensions of that challenge in 1863 and pulled back from recognizing the Confederacy. The foreign policy gain wasn’t worth the domestic policy cost of greater diffi- culty controlling Ireland and Scotland. Franklin Delano Roosevelt threatened revolt in Britain’s colonies if Britain made a separate peace with Japan in 1936. America’s ability to reach into other countries’ domestic policies, and the comparative difficulty of other countries being able to effect a more kaleidoscopic American body politic, provided a significant bargaining advantage in American foreign policy. Democracy and immigration affected foreign policy in one other aimntpowraty for Great Britain: Americans mobilizing against their own government’s policies considered too beneficial to Britain. American nationality initially defined itself in contrast to Britain, creating a natural antipathy. But even as that generalized effect abated, the specific effect of American immigrant constituencies grew to penalize British foreign policy because of British domestic policy. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquess of Salisbury got stung in Senate consideration of the arbitration treaty by the scorpion tail of Irish American resentment of Britain’s in- sensitivity during the Great Irish Famine. President Woodrow Wilson’s fury at “hyphenated Americans” denying the League of 277 Nations shows the Irish American retribution for Irish partition and German American resentment of ascribing all war guilt and severe reparations to Germany. Another significant advantage afforded a rising America was re- course to the public. Due to the American political system’s frequent elections being tied more tightly to public attitudes, presidents could reinforce their authority in foreign policy by appealing to public sen- timent. James Monroe, James Polk, Abraham Lincoln, and Grover Cleveland all played this card to great effect during foreign policy negotiations with Britain, capitalizing on the caricature of the masses as easily whipped into an uncontrollable frenzy. Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt were acknowledged to be swim- ming against strong currents of public opposition. Canning un- derstood Monroe was grandstanding with his 1823 proclamation and declined to even acknowledge it. Peel struck a deal over Oregon before America’s victory in Mexico out of concern that the public would then push Polk to greater intransigence. Palmerston gave Lin- coln leeway during the Trent affair, considering him hemmed in by public opinion. Salisbury changed tack on Venezuela after the roar of public support for Cleveland’s unexpectedly aggressive assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895. Democracy was thus a structural advantage for a rising America as it engaged the established great power. That would not have been the case if Britain were not rdaetmizoincg; an authoritarian state would have had greater latitude in ignoring public attitudes. But theories that domestic politics are determinative of foreign policy also falter as explanation for British and American behavior in the transition. Britain did become more accommodating toward Aa monecriec both were democracies, and public sentiment did trend strongly in America’s favor. But Salisbury did not make the 278 strategic shift in response to public attitudes in 1895; if they were anllti,mthpeoSrtalisbury government would not have initially taken a strong stand on Venezuela. Salisbury made the shift because the Venezuelan crisis brought into focus a strategic problem Britain needed to solve: it was overextended and looking for power to un- derwrite British objectives. Public sentimentality about America en- abled a choice, but it did not dictate that choice. Aa mis etrhiec even more di fficult case to make for domestic pol- itics driving foreign policy. As loud and combative as the American public was, and careful as American presidents had to be in mar- shaling opinion to support of their policies, opinion factors much more in campaigning than governing. Public attitudes did not factor at all in President Monroe’s declaration. President Polk did not allow public enthusiasm for “Fiftyo-ufr forty or fight” to pre- vent compromise with Britain over the Oregon boundary. President Lincoln did not allow public outrage over the Trent affair drive a damaging choice during the Civil War. President Cleveland did not allow a restive public to force his hand on the annexation of Hawaii nor in Venezuela. President William McKinley was not stampeded to war with Spain with the sinking of the USS Maine. President The- oe dore Roos velt only expanded the Monroe Doctrine in 1902 re- sponding to the Arbitration Court’s decision, not public or business interests. Public attitudes did press on President Warren G. Harding in 1921 to find some means less destructive and costly than war for the United States to engage in the world, but perhaps that shows that hegemony gives American presidents the latitude—the margin for error—to indulge public attitudes. Aa’smvearuicnted morality, such a prominent part of its own de - scription of itself, proved limber between 1823 and 1923; it never im- pinged on the destruction of Indian tribes and their way of life. In 279 fact, an alternate morality in the form of Manifest Destiny was developed to rationalize westward expansion. The morality of colo- nialism was, to America’s credit, a major political issue from the 1870s onward as America began expanding its political control be- yond territory inhabited by Americans. But the issue was more ab- stract, as it did not affect Americans directly. As with the influence of public attitudes, America’s morality in foreign policy correlates with the increase in its power. Like public opinion, indulging mo- rality in foreign policy may be a luxury of hegemony. Something important changed in interactions between Great Britain and America in 1895—or, more accurately, the 1895 Venezu- elan debt crises revealed changes that had been long accruing. Er- nest May, who considers domestic politics and morality the driving forces of American foreign policy across this time frame, even con- cedes that “Cleveland and Olney startled England and the United States into one another’s arms.”2 The 1870s had been introspective years for both Great Britain and the United States, with Britain adapting to the changes wrought by expansion of the voting fran- chise and America consolidating its hold over a continental expanse. The result of this was an America that in many important respects had become an empire and a Britain that had become a democracy. The result of the changes was to make the currency of power less iamntpionrthe British- American relationship than it was in other state relationships. Both of these changes were essential in the peaceful transition of hegemony. Great Britain would not have trusted that America out in the world would act as Britain did had America not eschewed its republican morality with the conquest of its Indian Wars. America would not have considered Britain its natural ally if Britain had not democratized. The transformations of both societies occurring simultaneously is an historical anomaly— serendipitous, but anoma- lous. If America had not come to act like a traditional great power rather than continuing to propound its ideology in foreign policy, Great Britain might well have countered rather than encouraged Aa’smreorliec in the world. If Great Britain had not become a re- lated government, the United States might well have forced foreign policy concessions from Britain as it did from other countries. The sense of sameness that pervades Anglo-American relations in the late nineteenth century allowed the British and American governments to view each other’s power in less threatening terms. Their shifting national perceptions, their ideas of each other and the international order, are hugely important in making the hege- monic transition peaceful. Britain did not lose the will to enforce its international order—something sorrowfully evident by the three million British casualties in World War I. What explains Great Britain not contesting America’s challenge to the established inter- national order is instead that Britain and the United States came to perceive each other’s power in uniquely unthreatening terms. This perspective was the basis for peaceful resolution to the 1895 Venezuelan debt crisis, British endorsement of Hawaii’s annexation in 1898, assistance to American arms during the Spanish-American War, encouragement for Cuba and the Philippines as American col- onies, America’s 1902 willingness to enforce commercial contracts in the western hemisphere, America’s lenient attitude toward Brit- ain’s World War I blockade and even its choice to join the allied war effort on land in 1917. During the crucial passage of dominance frreoamt BGritain to the United States, the two countries viewed their interests as indistinguishable, their military power as cumu- lative. They enabled and justified each other’s foreign policy choices, a collusion championed in Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden. 281 The glittering moment of Anglo-American sameness was remarkably short-lived. ThreeGat War undoubtedly had much to do with Aa mreecroiicling from a traditional great power role. America rititslkeinagndsodel manding so much in the a ftermath of the war would remind Britain of tiresome pre-rapprochement American grandstanding. America emerged from World War I as the interna- tional order’s strongest country by far. Neither its economy nor its military suffered losses of the kind or magnitude of Europe’s great powers, and its potential far outstripped its performance. The “war to end all wars” leftaAsmtaenrdicing tallest among contenders for dominance of the international order. What America chose to do with that power is what drove an end to the special intertwining of British and American interests. First at Versailles, and then even more adamantly in the Wash- ington Naval Treaties, a hegemonic United States attempted to build an international order of great power restraint. Limiting the means of war would remove the causes of war, prejudice governments toward domestic preoccupations, and allow mutually enriching eco- nomic competition. America mistook international politics to be a macrocosm of its domestic politics. aA’smterraincsformation—or perhaps reversion is more accurate, since many of the notions pervade American thinking about inter- national relations before 1890—alarmed the British government. Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, and Arthur Balfour had built British strategy on a foundation of American might underwriting British interests; those interests were diverging from America’s. The ultimate achievement of that British strategy, American soldiers providing the winning margin of a European land war in reinforce- ment of Britain, would be the anagnorisisafotor Abrminegricabout a very diffnerteinternational order. 3 282 After World War I, republican messianism returned to American foreign policy, and a hegemonic America became ambitious to change the rules of order. As it had prohibited European coloniza- tion of the nascent nations of the western hemisphere in 1823, pro- claimed a superior right in law for representative governments in 1845, and renounced the right of states that abused their citizens in 1898, America would advance its republican principles. The reality of a hegemonic America was even more sweepingly ambitious than the Canadian representative of Britain’s empire had warned in 1921: Aa mwaesrincot satis fied being a law unto itself; it would bend the international order to make its law universal practice. The world America wanted was one in which Britain was not uniquely advantaged or influential over America, because the rest of the world made itself like America and Britain. And the United States moved quickly to try and establish that world. The schism was apparent in the 1916 American naval program that would over- take Britain’s navy, deplored by the British and American negotia- tors at Versailles, and made manifest in American proposals at the 1921 Washington Naval Conference. The resulting treaties estab- lished parity between the British and American navies and thus were importantly symbolic of America overtaking Britain as hegemon. Implementation of the treaties would further showcase the inno- vative dynamism of America and Britain’s other rising rival, Japan. It would take nineteen years of further Japanese dynamism to push Britain and the United States back into collusion, and the result of that war would redouble American belief that a state’s domestic po- lailticulture was determinative of its be havior in the interna- tional order. This cast Britain’s imperial policies after World War II in sharp and negative relief, making impossible the sustainment of Britain’s unique intertwining with the United States that had occurred during the war. It is easy to imagine different Anglo-American relationships that might have resulted if the special relationship did not cohere at the historical moment that it did. There are so many particularities to both countries and in the timing and manner of their collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as America thrust outward and Britain became concerned about the burdens of its for- eign policies. Could the cultural similarities have trumped British concern about a genuinely republican foreign policy? If America had seemed likely to advance self-determination in ways that threatened Britain’s empire, or succeeded in fostering political change in coun- tries with important economic resources, Britain might well have used its military might to prevent an expansion of American power. Instead of assisting American efforts in the Spanish-American War, Britain might have thrown its weight behind the Spanish crown, to positive effect for its relationships with continental European powers. When Britain flirted with recognizing the Confederacy, the Amer- ican minister to St. Petersburg, Cassius Marcellus Clay, publicly questioned, “Is England so secure in the future against home revolt or foreign ambition as to venture, now in our need, to plant the seeds of revenge in all our future?”4 Might America have reached more aggressively in to British domestic politics, becoming an agent provocateur instead of a model for reform? That could have reig- nited a contest over Canada, which an America steaming out of its Civil War might have taken from British control (and thus perhaps wading into a quicksand of Canadian insurgency). A Fenian Army might have mobilized for Ireland itself, with overt American sup- port (beyond throwing money into Irish flags during St Patrick’s 284 Day parades) goading Britain’s sore. Or the American government could have agitated Britain’s workingmen and urban poor, threat- ening Britain with the revolution its elites so feared. American republicanism was probably too deeply in bone and anti-British sen- timent too sturdy a factor in American politics in the nineteenth century to have given the British much confidence of turning the eAompleeriacgaaninpst their government. But the transition from British to American hegemony reads more like a romance than a realpolitik primer. There is American yearning for the stature accorded by British attention; the courtship of con- vieennce; marriage proposals o ffered several times by Britain and always formally spurned by America, even as it tried to retain the affeacvtoirosnBartietafin was performing; development of tender regard for each other’s peculiarities; a relationship maturing into sober appreciation of common interests and mutually beneficial patterns; anxiety from both as fissures emerged over what future each wanted; the heartbreak of separation; and experience with others reuniting them in gratitude. Britain remains unique in its ability to understand and negotiate the corridors of American power, and more successful than any other state in harnessing American strength to advantage of its interests. It had the structural benefit of being the first mover, along with continuing advantages accruing from linguistic and cultural similarities. But these can be easily overstated. Britain’s connection with America is less organic than cultivated, as the resurgence of a special relationship in the run up to and during World War II dem- onstrates. British governments often feel they have too little influ- ence with American governments; all others wish they had what Britain has. It was, and is, in Britain’s interest to capitalize on Amer- ican power, and Britain is smart enough to do so shrewdly and 285 with a light enough touch that Americans hardly ever notice. It is difficult to imagine America replicating that feat with any poten- tially rising powers. The Same River Twice? A hundred years after the moment when America shook off Britain and strode forward to reshape the international order in its image come other claimants for global dominance, growing in strength and testing alternatives to the American equation for dominance of the international order. China, in particular, merits examination because of the momentousness of its great leap forward since the economic reforms of 1978. Its dynamism has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, with an economic growth rate of e9r.8cepnt between 1978 and 2005. 5 Afterntaucry of humiliation, its success has fostered a swaggering nationalism. It is the world’s second largest economy, and even if it fails to maintain its galloping growth rate it may well surpass the United States. The Chinese government has a fundamentally different model of the relationship between the state and its people than does America: it is counting on prosperity preventing demands for po litical ireaoennpr, easrevtertsal of the dynamic that Amer ica asserts as the nalaoturdrer of politics. It has an increasingly combative military being primed with high-tech weaponry. And it envisions a mani- festly diffnerteregional order in Asia than does the United States. John Maynard Keynes famously quipped that “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” Many of the practical men and women running American policy toward a rising China are unwittingly enslaved to the ideas of living political scientist Francis Fukuyama. Policy makers often deride Fukuyama’s 286 The End of History and the Last Man as though he were proclaiming that events would cease to occur, rather than ruminating on Hegel’s critique of traditional liberalism and advocacy of a state with lim- ited powers based on social consent.6hYoestetsame policy makers have also consistently across more than forty years supported an ap- proach to the world based on the Fukuyaman belief that sustained success is impossible for states that are undemocratic and that there can be no successful challenger to the Western model of market economies and representative governance. It is the lesson the West took from World War II and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is en- shrined in Robert Zoellick’s solemn invocation for China to be- come a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order. It is the rationalization for American businesses to invest in and shift man- ufacturing to China. What America means by “responsible stakeholder” is, of course, a China that accepts as given the rules of the international order Aa mhaesriecstablished. Amer ica supports a powerful and pros- perous China because it is wagering there cannot be a powerful and prosperous China unless it becomes democratic, that a demo- cratic China will dovetail into the same interests as America, that hshoasreiinngtetrests it will share the burden of upholding them, and that in upholding those interests China will conduct itself as Aa mcoenrdicucts itself. It is the strategic calculation Salisbury’s government made in 1895 about the United States. Salisbury’s reorientation of British policy was essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between Great Britain and the United States. So, too, may a Fukuyaman orientation of American policy prove essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between aAmanedriCc hina should it occur. If prevention of war is the metric, Salisbury’s policy is the right choice. But it merits recollecting that 287 Salisbury’s gamble ultimately proved wrong: the United States did not fully share Britain’s interests and did not uphold the rules Britain had established. A hegemonic America established its own rules, based on its domestic ideology. G. John Ikenberry has emphasized the importance of liberality in the American-led order.7 The rules are considered by participants— not just the dominant power—to be fair and fairly applied. This cul- ture invests other powers in helping uphold the order and utilizes legitimacy to drive down the cost to the United States of sustaining the order. The American-led order thus has a great capacity to accommodate fluctuations of strength—which is to say that rising powers need not change the rules in order to become dominant in the existing order. But China clearly does want to change the rules—even as it benefits from them. China has afforded the United States glimpses at least as numerous as nineteenth-century America did for Britain that the country’s reflexes are diffnertefrom those of the reigning hegemon. It does not embrace the philosophy that people have in- herent rights and loan them in limited ways to government. It cen- tralizes power beyond the constraint of laws or institutions. It does not hold the wielders of power accountable to the public by either election or journalism. It enforces a bias in favor of national corpo- rations, both overtly through access to Chinese markets and opaquely through theft of intellectual property. It appears to view the international order as a tribute system, with weak states forced into compliance and strong states lulled into accepting small changes by threat of consequences out of all proportion to the infraction. It would thereby destroy the alliance system that is the basis for American presence in the region and provision of defense for the weak states on China’s periphery. While China’s is currently 288 a regional strategy, there is little reason to believe it would not also constitute a global strategy if the nation is in the position to assert one. This suggests that China will pose a normative challenge as well as a power challenge to the American-led order.8 Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Balfour at least had the strong bases of common political culture and public affection between the two countries when they placed their bet on a rising America aligning so closely with Great Britain that both nations’ power could be har- nessed for Britain’s interests. The United States is making the same bet on much shakier grounds with China. To be sure, America has hedged its bets with China. It maintains alliance relationships that support America’s military reach and in- tensify when China behaves threateningly. It is attempting a major trade pact that will set the rules for Asia’s economies. It is purport- edly “rebalancing” its attention to Asia. Its military forces are reen- gaged on the challenge of a great power war and the defense spending for adequate preparation. Few defense specialists believe China’s military could defeat America’s, but the Pentagon watches with anx- iety at China’s ability to develop asymmetric capabilities that might render moot America’s military advantages. Few defense specialists in 1895 would have agreed that America’s military could defeat Britain’s, and yet Salisbury fundamentally changed the course of British strategy to cede American objectives rather than persist in the rules of order Britain had set and previ- ously enforced. Might not America cede China even more rather than fight a war that could collapse American power in the Pacific? Another element of the challenge is that military power is a de- rivative index; it relies in large measure on a country’s economic base. America’s consolation thus far with China’s meteoric rise is that China’s economy is merely a cheap manufacturing base that 289 has yet to prove it can navigate the middle-income trap, whereas Aa’smwereiaclth is driven by innovation. This, too, is Fukuyama’s long shadow: belief that only free societies can foster the intellec- tual creativity to sustain dynamism. It is a complacency that Ger- many’s rise in the prewar years ought to have shattered. Freedom is not the only motivator for innovation. Authoritarian capitalism in China is proving itself as creative and unrestrained as its American counterpart. Prosperity is the main allure of the authoritarian model, espe- cially when capitalism’s champions lag.9 Nationalism, too, is a puol wfoerrcfe. Moreover, the outsize disputatiousness and risk tol - erance of Americans may itself be a national characteristic rather than a universal human attribute. Most Europeans choose forms of governance and economy less tumultuous than those of Ameri- cans; public acceptance of retrograde motion in democratizing iseosciiseto ften a function of exhaustion with the enervation of po- lailtiacnd economic change. Theopple of China could well choose a government less free but more predictable than America’s—and prosper in the choice. Aa mnaetruicrally believes such a system is unsustainable. Not only would China have to impose it by force on free societies, but it is susceptible to corrosion from within. This is often mentioned in conjunction with the fact that nearly 150,000 Chinese students study at American universities each year. In Fukuyaman terms, education offers a path to China becoming part of the American order. Amer- ican policy encourages the practice in the belief that while Chinese may not return home hoping their teenage daughters behave as American teenagers do, they surely want a government they can hold accountable. And if a government is accountable, then it will become liberal. But if the Chinese dream proves magnetic, America will have educated the political, economic, and military leaders that occasion its demise. American government during the country’s rise to prominence was not liberal. The government became liberal in conjunction with prosperity and power, and it could be argued that America’s liber- ality was practiced to a greater extent in its foreign policy than in remaining true to its creed at home. The Fukuyaman mind-set takes as causality the increased liberalism of America; it may have simply been correlation. The Lockean liberal ethos is so fully embedded in American he- gemony, though, that it is difficult to imagine the United States re- fusing admission to Chinese students. Indeed, liberalism may so far pervade American political culture that courts would deny gov- ernment the ability to proscribe university admissions on national security grounds. While conservatives bemoan the preoccupations of liberal societies, they are the defiennint gofeltehme American brand and the seemingly inescapable basis for American foreign policy in the time of its hegemony. The American order will succeed or fail along Fukuyaman lines: either the United States will prove reigeht that people and free markets are the sole basis for sustain- able prosperity and political power, and China will either fail to continue rising or become indistinguishable from other states in the American order, or China will prove resistant to the attractions of liberalism and overtake America as hegemon. If the Chinese model sustains itself, then a dominant China is likely to recast the rules in ways that extrapolate to the international order its domestic political ideology, just as America did. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics would be a very different international order from the one America has fostered in its hegemony. It would encourage and support other authoritarian governments politically, financially, and socially. It would penalize states for interfering in the internal practices of repressive governments. It would offer priv- ileged access to state-associated commercial concerns. It would prevent market forces levying penalties that make markets efficient and reliable allocators of capital. China lacks an ideology likely to appeal to America in the seductive way America’s ideology appealed within Britain and beyond. Without such an ideology, any hegemonic transition will require imposition by force.

## AT: Russia

### 2AC---No Russia Lashout

#### The idea that US power in Europe leads Russia to lash out is illogical and incompatible with realism

Gunitsky ‘22 – Professor of Political Science [Seva; Seva Gunitsky is an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto.; 1-24-22; "There’s Plenty of Blame to Go Around on Ukraine”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/24/ukraine-us-russia-stephen-walt/; Foreign Policy; accessed 7-1-2022; AH]

Focusing on U.S. idealism **ignores** Russia’s own agency. In his latest article, FP columnist Stephen Walt traces the sources of the Russia-Ukraine crisis to a single cause: American arrogance. The conflict would not have happened, he writes, “had the United States and its European allies not succumbed to hubris, wishful thinking, and liberal idealism.” By overplaying its hand, the United States has now put Russia in a position where it has no choice but to defend its interests. Realists are sometimes criticized for ignoring weaker states’ agency, but Walt takes the argument to its **absurd conclusion** by denying the agency of everyone but U.S. policymakers. It’s U.S. officials who make the choices that matter—bad ones—while the rest of the world, Russian President Vladimir Putin included, are simply enacting the eternal laws of history. This is not just an academic dispute about isms. It’s a question about how Russia and the United States got into this situation and what to do about it. During the Cold War, debates raged about who was to blame for starting the conflict between the superpowers. To simplify a complex set of arguments, answers fell into three categories: traditionalists, who blamed the Soviet Union; revisionists, who blamed the United States; and post-revisionists, who blamed not a particular side’s actions but the uncertainty and mutual suspicion created by the anarchy of international politics. Policymakers are now rehashing these debates, but instead of asking who started the Cold War, the question has become who reignited it. Walt takes the equivalent of the revisionist side—America did it, period. Doing so makes sense as a counterargument to conventional Washington wisdom—that Putin did it, period. This view—while refusing to treat the United States as anything but a force of good—has contributed to foreign-policy blunders in Afghanistan and Iraq, so it’s understandable that Walt would push against it. It would be nice to have more voices in the foreign-policy establishment doing the same. But by placing blame on one state, Walt has **robbed his argument** of the strategic context that realists themselves correctly love to emphasize. As a result, focusing on the United States doesn’t just ignore the role played by others but **contradicts** Walt’s own theory. Realists argue that regional powers always seek primacy in their neighborhood. According to this logic, a recovering Russia would seek to reestablish regional hegemony regardless of U.S. actions. Western accommodation would have only sped up the process. It’s **incoherent** for Walt to claim that liberal illusions caused the Russia crisis while also arguing that regional powers naturally seek control over their neighborhood. The rise in tensions would be expected unless **Washington abandoned all interest** in the region. This **incoherence** extends to explaining Putin’s motivations. A key realist principle is that states should not go to war unless it serves their national interests. This is why realists have admirably opposed U.S. adventurism in Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere, noting that none of these places ever posed a threat to the United States. If you want to invade, you better have a good reason. But such high standards for starting a conflict disappear when applied to other regimes. What national interest do realists think Putin is defending by escalating this crisis? What is the existential threat he faces that justifies war and tens of thousands of casualties? Even if NATO is a worry, it’s **hard to credibly portray it an as immediate danger**, especially since Russia’s concerns center on an expansion that hasn’t happened and doesn’t look likely to happen. If you argue that Putin is merely reacting to Western pressures and his reaction is understandable and expected, you are also arguing that his decision to wage war is justified on realist grounds. Which is, sorry to say, a **questionable** way to explain a war of choice, **fabricated and pursued** for reasons unknown.

#### Heg doesn’t embolden Russia

**Kagan, 2022 -** [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. May/June “The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/russia-ukraine-war-price-hegemony> [Acc 6/21/22](https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread%20Acc%206/6/22) SM]

So in what way might the United States have provoked Putin? One thing needs to be clear: it was **not by threatening** the **security** of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have **objectively enjoyed greater security** than at any time in recent memory. Russia was invaded three times over the past two centuries, once by France and twice by Germany. During the Cold War, Soviet forces were perpetually ready to battle U.S. and NATO forces in Europe. Yet since the end of the Cold War, Russia has enjoyed unprecedented security on its western flanks, **even as NATO has taken in new members** to its east. Moscow even welcomed what was in many ways the most significant addition to the alliance: a reunified Germany. When Germany was reunifying at the end of the Cold War, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev favored anchoring it in NATO. As he told U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, he believed that the best guarantee of Soviet and Russian security was a Germany "contained within European structures."

Late Soviet and early Russian leaders certainly did not act as if they feared an attack from the West. Soviet and Russian defense **spending declined sharply** in the late 1980s and through the late 1990s, including by **90 percent** between 1992 and 1996. The once formidable Red Army was cut nearly in half, leaving it weaker in relative terms than it had been for almost 400 years. Gorbachev even ordered the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and other Warsaw Pact states, chiefly as a costsaving measure. It was all part of a larger strategy to ease Cold War tensions so that Moscow might concentrate on economic reform at home. But even Gorbachev would not have sought this holiday from geopolitics had he believed that the United States and the West would take advantage of it.

### 2AC---Ukraine

#### Ukraine is not America’s fault – American hegemony in Europe has ensured stability, prevented nuclear proliferation, and provided protection.

Brands 3/15 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 3-15-22; " Putin’s Biggest Lie: Blaming NATO for His War”; https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3532081/hal-brands/putin%E2%80%99s-biggest-lie-blaming-nato-his-war; Asharq Al-Awsat; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

Now Russian officials, and even President Vladimir Putin himself, have echoed — and sometimes directly cited — American scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, who argues that the current crisis “is the West’s fault.” The “blame NATO” argument tells a story of hubris, arrogance and tragedy. It holds that there was a golden chance for lasting peace in Europe, but the US threw it all away. Rather than conciliating a defeated rival, Washington repeatedly humiliated it by expanding a vast military alliance up to Russia’s borders and even into the former Soviet Union. This pursuit of **American hegemony** in a liberal-democratic guise eventually provoked a violent rebuke. In this telling, Putin’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine are just the natural response of one great power whose vital interests are being heedlessly threatened by another. The argument isn’t wholly wrong. Putin’s wars are indeed meant, in part, to push Western influence back from Russia’s frontiers. But the idea that NATO expansion is the root of today’s problems is **morally and geopolitically bizarre**. Far from being a historic blunder, NATO expansion was one of the great American successes of the post-Cold War era. Far from being the act of a domineering superpower, it was part of a long tradition of vulnerable states begging to join America’s liberal empire. And far from posing a mortal threat to Moscow, NATO enlargement actually provided Russia with far **greater security** than it could have provided itself. NATO was founded in 1949 with 12 members in Western Europe and North America. It gradually added additional states — Turkey, Greece, West Germany, Spain — over the course of the Cold War. But the big bang of enlargement came once the superpower conflict ended. NATO incorporated the former East Germany into the alliance in 1990; it then added three Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) in 1999; then seven more, including the Baltic states, in 2004. To understand why NATO grew so rapidly, we have to remember something that nearly everyone has now forgotten: There was no guarantee that Europe would be mostly stable, peaceful and democratic after the Cold War. In fact, many of the analysts who now view NATO expansion as a catastrophe once warned that a post-Cold War Europe could become a violent hellscape. It wasn’t an outlandish scenario. A reunified Germany might once again try to dominate its neighbors; the old enmity between Moscow and Berlin could reignite. The collapse of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe could liberate those states to pursue long-suppressed territorial claims and nationalist agendas. Ethnic tensions and nuclear proliferation might explode as the Cold War order crumbled. If the US pulled back once the Soviet threat was gone, there would be no extra-European superpower to put out fires on a continent with lots of geopolitical kindling. “The prospect of major crises, **even wars**, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically,” Mearsheimer predicted in 1990. NATO enlargement was the logical answer to these fears. Expansion was a way of binding a reunified Germany to the West and surrounding it with democratic allies. Joining NATO required new members to lay aside any revanchist designs, while allowing them to pursue economic and political reforms rather than investing heavily in military capabilities to defend their newly won autonomy. NATO’s move to the east also ensured that Poland and other states that easily could have built nuclear weapons didn’t need to, because they had **America**n protection. Most important, enlargement kept the US firmly planted in Europe, by preventing the centerpiece of the transatlantic relationship from becoming obsolete. No other initiative could have accomplished these objectives. Partnership for Peace — a series of loose security cooperation agreements with former Soviet-bloc states — didn’t offer the ironclad guarantees that came with NATO membership. (If you want to understand the difference between “security partner” and “NATO ally,” just look at what is happening today to Ukraine, one of the former.) The idea of creating a pan-European security architecture (one that included Russia) had the same defect; plus, it would have given Moscow veto power over the security arrangements of the countries the Soviet Union had so recently dominated. **Only American power** and promises could provide stability in Europe, and NATO was the continent’s critical link to the US. Since 1949, Washington had tamped down rivalries between old enemies such as France and Germany, while also protecting them from external threats. After 1991, NATO expansion took this zone of peace, prosperity and cooperation that had emerged in Western Europe and moved it into Eastern Europe as well. The revolutionary nature of this achievement seemed obvious not so long ago. “Why has Europe been so peaceful since 1989?” Mearsheimer asked in 2010. The answer, he acknowledged, was because “America has continued to serve as Europe’s pacifier,” protecting the continent from dangers within and without. Today, of course, the critics don’t buy this account. They argue that NATO expansion represented crude power politics, as the US exploited the Soviet collapse to engorge its own empire. What resulted, pundits such as Thomas Friedman contend, was a sort of Weimar Russia — a country whose dignity was affronted, security imperiled and democracy undermined by a harsh, humiliating peace. There is a kernel of truth here, too. Once Russian democracy began to wobble in 1993-94, officials in the Bill Clinton administration saw NATO expansion — in part — as a way of preventing a potentially resurgent, aggressive Russia from rebuilding the Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders of all stripes griped about NATO expansion from the early 1990s onward, warning that it could jeopardize the peace of the continent. In hindsight, NATO expansion was one of several issues — including disputes over the Balkans and the collapse of the Russian economy in the late 1990s — that gradually soured Russia’s relationship with the West. Yet this story omits three vital facts. First, all policies have costs. The price of NATO expansion was a certain alienation of Russian elites — although we often forget that Clinton softened the blow by continually courting Russian President Boris Yeltsin, bringing Russia into elite Western institutions such as the Group of Seven, and making Moscow a partner in the intervention in Bosnia in 1995-96. Yet the cost of not expanding NATO might have been forfeiting much of the stability that initiative provided. Trade-offs are inevitable in foreign policy: There was no magic middle path that would have provided all the benefits with none of the costs. Second, if NATO expansion was a manifestation of American empire, it was a **remarkably benign** and consensual form of empire. When Clinton decided to pursue enlargement, he did so at the urging of the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians. The Baltic countries and others were soon banging at the door. The states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were desperate to join America’s sphere of influence, because they were desperate to leave Moscow’s. This, too, was part of an older pattern: The US has often extended its influence by “invitation” rather than imposition. The creation of NATO in 1949 was mostly a European idea: Countries that were terrified of Moscow sought protection from Washington. One reason Putin’s wars to keep countries from escaping Moscow’s empire are so abhorrent to Americans is that the US empire has trouble keeping members out. Putin may not see it that way. All that matters to him is that the mightiest peacetime alliance in history has crept closer to Russian soil. But here a third fact becomes relevant: Russia was one of the biggest beneficiaries of NATO’s move east. Open terrain has often left Russia vulnerable to invasion and instability emanating from Europe. Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany all swept through Eastern Europe to wreak havoc on Russian or Soviet territory. This is one reason why the great strategist George Kennan opposed NATO expansion — because it would surely re-activate this fear of encroachment from the west. Yet this was a red herring, because NATO posed no military threat. The alliance committed, in 1997, not to permanently station foreign troops in Eastern Europe. After the Cold War, America steadily withdrew most of its troops and all of its heavy armor from the continent. US allies engaged in a veritable race to disarm. The prospect that NATO could invade Russia, even had it wanted to, was laughable. What the alliance could do was tame the perils that might otherwise have menaced the Russian state. Germany could hardly threaten Russia: It was nestled snugly into an alliance that also served as a strategic straitjacket. NATO, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had candidly said in 1990, could “play a containing role” vis-à-vis Berlin. Moscow didn’t have to worry about a nuclear Poland — Warsaw didn’t need nukes because it had the protection of the United States. Aside from the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Eastern Europe was comparatively free of the geopolitical intrigues and military quarrels that might have made Russia jumpy. NATO expansion hadn’t just alleviated Europe’s security problems; it had protected Russia’s vital interests as well. Moscow might have lost an empire, but it had gained remarkable safety from external attack. Part of the answer is that NATO expansion wasn’t really the problem, in the sense that Russia didn’t need that pretext to seek renewed hegemony in its near-abroad. The Soviet Union, and the Russian empire before it, had traditionally sought to control countries along their frontiers and used brutal means to do it. To say that NATO expansion caused Russian belligerence is thus to make an extremely dubious assertion: that absent NATO expansion, Moscow would have been a satisfied, status quo power. And this is exactly why a bigger NATO has posed a real problem for Putin. After all, safety from external attack isn’t the only thing that states and rulers want. They want glory, greatness and the privileges of empire. For 20 years, Putin has been publicly lusting after the sphere of influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed. NATO expansion stood athwart that ambition, by giving Moscow’s former vassals the ability to resist its pressure. NATO also threatened a certain type of Russian government — an autocracy that was never secure in its own rule. A democratic Russia wouldn’t so much have minded being neighbors with Western-leaning democracies, because political liberty in those countries wouldn’t have threatened to set a subversive example for anti-Putin Russians. Yet, as Russia became more autocratic in the early 2000s, and as Putin’s popularity declined with the Russian economy after 2008, the imperative of preventing ideological spillover from a US-backed democratic community loomed large. So Putin began pushing back against NATO’s eastward march. In 2008, he invaded Georgia, a country that was moving — too slowly for its own safety — toward the West. Since 2014, he has been waging war against Ukraine, in hopes of rebuilding the Russian empire and halting Kiev’s westward drift. America’s vision of Europe has now run into Putin’s program of violent coercion. To be sure, US officials made mistakes along the way. Because Russia was prostrate, militarily and economically, during the 1990s, Washington acquired a bad habit of issuing security guarantees without really considering how it would fulfill them in a crisis. The Pentagon has thus been scrambling, since 2014, to devise a credible defense of NATO’s eastern flank. As Russia regained its strength, US officials also failed to grasp the danger of provoking Putin without adequately deterring him. When, in 2008, NATO declined to endorse membership for Georgia and Ukraine but issued a vague statement saying that they would someday join the alliance, it created the worst of all worlds — giving Putin both the pretext and the time to pre-empt future expansion by tearing those two countries apart. Yet there is a curious morality in accounts that blame the West, which sought to protect vulnerable states in Eastern Europe, for the current carnage, rather than blaming Putin, who has worked to dismember and intimidate those countries. It is sloppy thinking to tally up the costs of NATO expansion without considering the historic achievements of a policy that served American, European and even certain Russian interests remarkably well. And if nothing else, NATO expansion pushed the dividing line between Moscow and the democratic world to the east after one Cold War — a factor of great significance now that a second cold war is underway. The legacy of NATO expansion isn’t simply a matter of historical interest. Americans’ understanding of the past has always influenced their view of what policies to pursue in the future. During the 1920s and 1930s, the widespread, if inaccurate, belief that America had entered World War I to serve the interests of banks and arms manufacturers had a paralyzing effect on US policy amid the totalitarian aggression that set off World War II. Today, the US faces a long, nasty struggle to contain Putin’s imperial project and protect an **endangered world order**. Introspection is an admirable quality, but the last thing America needs is another bout of self-flagellation rooted in another misapprehension of the past.

#### Russian lashout is Putin’s fault, not America’s fault

Hamid ‘22 [Shadi; Shadi Hamid is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and an assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary.; 3-8-22; " There are many things worse than American power”; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/03/08/there-are-many-things-worse-than-american-power/; accessed 7-1-2022; AH]

Blaming America first became all **too easy**. After September 11, U.S. power was as overwhelming as it was uncontested. That it was squandered on two endless wars made it convenient to focus on America’s sins, while **underplaying Russia’s and China’s growing ambitions**. For his part, Putin understood well that the balance of power was shifting. Knowing what he knew, the Russian president wasn’t necessarily “irrational” in deciding to invade Ukraine. He had good reason to think that he could get away with it. After all, he had gotten away with quite a lot for nearly 15 years, ever since the Russian war against Georgia in 2008, when George W. Bush was still president. Then he annexed Crimea in 2014 and intervened brutally in Syria in 2015. Each time, in an understandable desire to avoid an escalatory spiral with Russia, the United States held back and tried not to do anything that might provoke Putin. Meanwhile, Europe became more and more dependent on Russian energy; Germany, for example, was importing 55% of its natural gas from Russia. Just three weeks ago, it was possible for Der Spiegel to declare that most Germans thought “peace with Russia is the only thing that matters.” The narrative of a feckless and divided West solidified for years. We, as Americans, were feeling unsure of ourselves, so it was only reasonable that Putin would feel it too. In such a context, and after four years of Donald Trump and the domestic turmoil that he wrought, it was **tempting to valorize “restraint”** and limited engagements abroad. Worried about imperial overreach, most of the American left opposed direct U.S. military action against Bashar Assad’s regime in the early 2010s, even though it was **Russian and Iranian intervention** on behalf of Syria’s dictator that bore the marks of a real imperial enterprise, not just an imagined one. Russia’s unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation, in Europe no less, has put matters back in their proper framing. The question of whether the United States is a uniquely malevolent force in global politics has been resolved. In the span of a few days, skeptics of American power have **gotten a taste of what a world where America grows weak and Russia grows strong looks like**. Of course, there are still holdouts who insist on seeing the United States as the provocateur. In its only public statement on Ukraine, the Democratic Socialists of America condemned Russia’s invasion but also called for “the U.S. to withdraw from NATO and to end the imperialist expansionism that set the stage for this conflict.” This is an odd statement considering that **Russia**, rather than the United States, has been the world’s most **unabashedly imperialist force** for the past three decades. But many on the anti-imperialist left aren’t really anti-imperialist; they just have an instinctive aversion to American power. America’s low opinion of its own capacity for good — and the resulting desire to retreat or disengage — hasn’t just been a preoccupation of the far left. The crisis of confidence has been pervasive, spreading to the halls of power and even President Barack Obama, whose memorable mantra was “Don’t do stupid sh\*t.” Instead of thinking about what we could do, or what we could do better, Obama was more interested in a self-limiting principle. For their part, European powers — content to bask under their U.S. security umbrella — could afford to believe in fantasies of perpetual peace. Europe’s gentleness and lethargy — coaxing Germany to commit even 2% of its GDP to defense seemed impossible — became something of a joke. One popular Twitter account, @ISEUConcerned, devoted itself to mocking the European Union’s propensity to express “concern,” but do little else, whenever something bad happened. Suddenly, the EU has been aroused from its slumber, and the parody account was rendered temporarily speechless. This is no longer tepid concern, but righteous fury. Member states announced that they would send anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Germany, for the first time, said that it would ramp up its military budget to 100 billion euros. On the economic front, the EU announced some of the toughest sanctions in history. My podcast co-host, Damir Marusic, an Atlantic Council senior fellow, likened it to a “holy war,” European-style. Sometimes, unusual and extreme events mark the separation between old and new ways of thinking and being. This week, the Berlin-based journalist Elizabeth Zerofsky remarked that the current moment reminded her of the memoir “The World of Yesterday,” written by the Austrian novelist Stefan Zweig as World War II loomed. In it, he recalls the twilight of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with an almost naive fondness. On the first day of the Ukraine invasion, I happened to be speaking to a group of college students who had no memory of September 11. I told them that they may be living in history. Those students, like all of us, are bearing witness to one of those rare events that recast how individuals and nations alike view the world they inhabit. The coming weeks, months, and years are likely to be as fascinating as they are terrifying. In a sense, we knew that a great confrontation was coming, even if we hadn’t quite envisioned its precise contours. At the start of his presidency, Joe Biden declared that the battle between democracies and autocracies would be the defining struggle of our time. This was grandiose rhetoric, but was it more than that? What does it actually mean to fight such a battle? In any number of ways, Russia’s aggression has underscored why Biden was right and why authoritarians — and the authoritarian idea itself — are such a threat to peace and stability. **Russia invaded Ukraine**, a democracy, **because of the recklessness and domination of one man, Vladimir Putin.** The countries that have rallied most enthusiastically behind Ukraine have almost uniformly been democracies, chief among them the United States. America is lousy, disappointing, and maddeningly hypocritical in its conduct abroad, but the notion of any moral equivalence between the United States and Putin’s Russia has been **rendered laughable**. And if there is such a thing as a better world, then **anti-imperialists may find themselves in the odd** position of hoping and praying for the health and longevity of not just the West but of Western power.

### 2AC---Thumper---Russo-Ukrainian War

#### US intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian war causes US-Russia war

Carnelos 6/3 [Carnelos, Marco, Marco Carnelos is a former Italian diplomat. He has been assigned to Somalia, Australia and the United Nations. He served in the foreign policy staff of three Italian prime ministers between 1995 and 2011. More recently he has been Middle East peace process coordinator special envoy for Syria for the Italian government and, until November 2017, Italy's ambassador to Iraq., “Russia-Ukraine war: US quest to preserve global hegemony could be its downfall”, Middle East Eye, [https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-us-quest-preserve-global-hegemony-downfall]//AA](https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-us-quest-preserve-global-hegemony-downfall%5d//AA)

When the doyen of foreign policy gurus, Henry Kissinger, is hinting that Ukraine should cede territory to Russia to help end the invasion, you know in your stomach that the West is about to make another major mistake. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kissinger also urged western countries not to seek an embarrassing defeat for Russia in Ukraine, warning it could endanger Europe’s long-term stability. He seems to be focused on Europe-Russia relations in the longer term, considering that for four centuries, Russia has been an essential part of Europe and a factor in re-establishing its balance. Just 50 years after former US President Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China, Kissinger’s ultimate concern is to avoid driving Moscow into a permanent alliance with Beijing. It is too late for that. As for the Russian economy, it is certainly suffering, but - contrary to what was confidently predicted months ago - it has not collapsed In an ideal world, Kissinger’s solemn warnings would sound alarm bells, prompting European chancelleries - which have followed a script on the Russia-Ukraine war that was hastily drafted in Washington and London - to at least review their overall strategy. They could ask themselves what “winning” looks like for Ukraine, rather than simply accepting Ukraine’s contention that all Russian forces must be pushed back to the lines of 24 February, which appears increasingly unlikely. Instead, the EU has just approved its sixth package of sanctions, agreeing to reduce Russian oil supplies in a last-minute compromise that barely conceals the cracks surfacing within European resoluteness. Nevertheless, the Nato-EU-G7 triad officially continues to believe that Ukraine’s unexpected resistance and the West’s unity in helping it, along with unprecedented sanctions against Russia, will determine Kyiv’s victory and Moscow’s economic collapse. Their “strategists” say more time is needed, and the West should hold its nerve. Italy’s prime minister has said that sanctions will really bite this summer. We’ll see. Major economic test Meanwhile, facts on the ground show that Russia, after initial serious military blunders, is slowly obtaining the upper hand in Donbas, and even media in the West are starting to admit that the situation is getting complicated. Ukrainians are losing up to 100 soldiers a day. As for the Russian economy, it is certainly suffering, but - contrary to what was confidently predicted months ago - it has not collapsed. In the words of the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, the conflict in Ukraine is subjecting the global economy to perhaps its “biggest test since the Second World War”. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, the stage was carefully set to reinforce the Ukrainian message, which essentially expels Russia from the “civilised world”. Yet, it remains unclear as to how this perspective has been welcomed by the world’s top business leaders, who have gathered for decades in the Swiss luxury resort under the motto “make money, not war”. Panelists speak at an event on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 25 May 2022 (AFP) Davos has been the temple where globalisation and interconnectedness are preached and celebrated. Should we now believe that its participants agree that the right move is to cut a global commodities powerhouse off from the rest of the world economy? Has any reliable economic simulation been conducted to assess the global impact of such a decision? Probably not. Are we thus once again watching the US-led bloc of western democracies sleepwalking towards another miscalculation of unknown proportions - similar to what we saw in western and central Asia over the last two decades? Just a month into the conflict and the collateral damage of sanctions, I wondered who would crash first: Russia or the global economy, due to the underestimated knock-on consequences. While the jury is still out on this, the economic data appear worrisome. Global trade war Supply chain disruptions, food and energy insecurity, unprecedented inflation, and a major stock market collapse: this is the menu on offer, after two dramatic years of the Covid-19 pandemic. Famine could spur new refugee flows from Africa and the Middle East, a prospect of great concern to the EU. BRICS and the so-called Global South have shown no desire to join the sanctions against Russia. Could secondary sanctions against them be adopted to force them to change their minds? Does the Nato-EU-G7 triad really want to inflict upon the whole world the bankrupt blueprint it unsuccessfully applied to Iran over the last four decades? Russia-Ukraine war: The future of the world is being decided in Beijing Is the Davos crowd keen to move from a globalised and interconnected world to conflicting trading blocs, or even a global trade war? What would happen if, after Russia, the US goes after China, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently outlined in a comprehensive speech at the Asia Society? American voters could soon be wondering why the Biden administration pushed Congress to approve, in a matter of months, $54bn in aid to Ukraine, while the US struggles to provide formula to its newborns amid soaring inflation. The Democratic Party risks being decimated in November’s midterm elections. Nobody really knows what Washington’s endgame is in Ukraine. If it is Russia’s defeat, this sounds unrealistic. If it is denying President Vladimir Putin a sound victory, this is difficult to define. If it is creating facts on the ground to improve Kyiv’s negotiating leverage - as recently leaked US National Security Council documents indicate - this is possible, but with high costs and unpredictable outcomes. Western double standards The main problem is that the Nato-EU-G7 triad, in yet another moment of cognitive dissonance, has framed the war as an apocalyptic and existential struggle between democracy and autocracy. BRICS and the Global South are not buying it, nor is the narrative fully shared among western public opinion. Contrary to the triad’s spin efforts, there is a growing feeling that the biggest threats to democracy are not China and Russia, but the western neoliberal model’s failure of governance and deep inequalities. Put simply, there have been broad inconsistencies between the words western democracies have uttered in recent decades, and the actions they have taken. They ought to ask themselves what the US represents today; on what are they still placing their hopes? Russia and China certainly represent a problem for the US-led rules-based world order. But this same order has progressively lost its credibility through endless wars and double standards, and by conveying the clear sense that such rules have always been valid for all but the US and its closest allies. The discourse about freedom and human rights sounds increasingly unconvincing when western allies violate it at will. BRICS and the Global South are reluctant to accept that it is the West’s exclusive prerogative to make the rules around which a new world order is based. Unfortunately, US President Joe Biden and his close allies truly believe that this must be the case. In March, Biden said: “Now is a time when things are shifting. We’re going to - there’s going to be a new world order out there, and we’ve got to lead it.” The bare truth is that Washington, regardless of its official rhetoric, rejects a multipolar world. It clings to its global hegemony, brazenly established by the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine in the early 1990s. But in the last 30 years, the world has changed. Expanding Nato After the Trump era, European countries breathed a sigh of relief over Biden’s slogan, “America is back”. They ought to ask themselves what the US represents today; on what are they still placing their hopes? One of the wisest American diplomats, Chas Freeman, recently noted: “[American] politics are polarised and dysfunctional, we are in a chronic fiscal deficit, our infrastructure is collapsing, our educational system is increasingly mediocre, our social fabric is fraying, our international prestige is declining, and we are more divided internally than at any time since our civil war. We appear to have achieved herd immunity to strategic reasoning.” The topic of a possible new American civil war is no longer taboo. Judging from his claimed intentions of reforming his country, Biden might be good for the US; less so for the rest of the world. The facts, unfortunately, speak for themselves. Ukrainian soldiers stand on a tank near Bakhmut on 15 May 2022 (AFP) Having ignored caution and pushed for Nato’s eastward expansion, the US, through a process that has apparently been ongoing for the last eight years, has emboldened, supplied and effectively trained Ukraine’s armed forces. The net result was the failure of the Minsk II agreement, paving the way for the wretched and bloody Russian invasion. The discomforting impression is that Washington, London and some eastern European capitals seem determined to fight for Russia’s collapse, down to the last Ukrainian soldier and European consumer. Washington has now even taken the escalatory measure of delivering long-range rockets to Ukraine, which could potentially allow it to strike Russian territory. Does this strategy really suit Europe’s interests? Power at any cost Washington also seems to be on a confrontation path with China. During a recent visit to Japan, Biden vowed to militarily defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese threat. This is a guarantee that no US president has ever issued before, and one that undermines four decades of US-Chinese discourse on this delicate topic. Blinken, in presenting the Biden administration’s strategy towards China, asserted that “even as President Putin’s war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order - and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China”. At the same time, the chances for a renewed nuclear deal with Iran appear to have almost disappeared. The US will not remove a symbolic listing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the State Department’s terrorist entities list, as requested by Tehran, even though the organisation would regardless still be sanctioned by the US Treasury. As a consequence, Iran could soon reach the nuclear threshold, with all the imaginable consequences. The US seems determined to maintain its global hegemony at any cost, and to maintain or re-establish - on its own - the rules-based world order. This ambition may ultimately deliver its coup de grace.

### 2AC---US Containment

#### The US is key to checking Russian aggression and escalation in Ukraine through a compellence strategy

Hoffman 4/28/22 [Frank G. Hoffman, Dr. Frank G. Hoffman serves on the Board of Advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and holds an appointment as a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., where he has served since 2011. Dr. Hoffman graduated from the Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1978. He holds Master’s degrees from George Mason University in Educational Leadership and the U.S. Naval War College in National Security Studies. He earned his Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College, London., 4-28-2022, "America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia," Foreign Policy Research Institute, [https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/america-needs-a-comprehensive-compellence-strategy-against-russia/]//AA](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/america-needs-a-comprehensive-compellence-strategy-against-russia/%5d//AA)

The Biden administration has formulated an unprecedented response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The coordination of transatlantic diplomacy, including the condemnation of Russia at the United Nations and the implementation of a massive sanctions package, is truly impressive. The president’s recent request for an additional $33 billion from Congress in security, economic, and humanitarian aid for Ukraine demonstrates the seriousness of America’s commitment to European security. While the White House should be applauded for its response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, this only tells part of the story. Indeed, none of these diplomatic initiatives would have been necessary had the United States and its allies successfully deterred Russia from attacking Ukraine in the first place. Deterrence failed because the United States and its allies signaled, in advance, that it was not prepared to apply direct military force in Ukraine. It did so because it was afraid of Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats. America’s risk calculus was framed by the fear of nuclear escalation and Washington’s overestimation of Russian military power. While initial efforts to deter Russia have failed, the West should now pursue a different approach. Rather than deterrence, the United States should focus on compellence. A comprehensive compellence strategy toward Russia would entail the focused integration of covert and overt military power, as well as a greater efforts to conduct information operations inside Russia to weaken Putin’s fragile political control. The goal of such a strategy could be to force Putin to stop the war, not merely help Ukraine stave off defeat. It strives to achieve this by raising costs to Moscow beyond sanctions and political isolation. The strategy would help the West coalesce around the objective of ending the war in the near term, but also forcing a negotiated conclusion to hostilities that would be more advantageous to Ukrainian and Western interests. The West’s aim should be to ensure Putin suffers an operational failure, not accede to Russia’s subjugation of Ukraine or some tortured negotiated compromise. The Need for Compellence Ukraine has, thus far, been brilliant in asymmetric tactics with creative applications of modern tools of warfare. Nevertheless, Russian forces have destroyed much of Ukraine’s infrastructure, while roughly 25 percent of the nation’s population is displaced and hungry. Without support from the United States and the West, Ukraine may still be unable to prevent Russia from achieving its new goals, which likely include seizing the entire southern coast of Ukraine, including Odessa. With the opening of the new phase of the war in Donbas and the Black Sea coastline, both sides of the conflict are now engaged in a race of strategic and operational adaptation. The coming battles will be on different terrain, and require altered tactics and weapons than the initial fighting around Kyiv. This will be a very different battlefield and the results are not preordained. Which side learns faster and altered its strategy and force employment best will determine the course of this war in the second phase. The Elements of Comprehensive Compellence One month before the war started, FPRI’s Rob Lee argued that Moscow’s compellence strategy would include the use of military force directly against Kyiv or more likely by punitive raids deep into the eastern half of Ukraine. He argued, “By inflicting heavy losses on the Ukrainian military, taking prisoners of war, and degrading Kyiv’s defense capabilities, Russia could potentially alter Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s incentive structure sufficiently to induce painful concessions.” Despite Ukraine’s successful effort to turn back Russian forces around Kyiv, Russia’s compellence strategy has not yet failed. As a result, it needs to be undercut by NATO with a more comprehensive approach. A robust U.S. counter to Moscow, what might be called comprehensive compellence, would build on the administration’s defense strategy concept of integrated deterrence to get Putin to alter his misguided effort in Ukraine. Compellence is normally a harder task historically than deterrence, but given Russia’s dysfunctional military effectiveness, the cost-benefit analysis for compellence in this case augurs for success. Deterrence and compellence share some common elements but are conceptually distinct. Deterrence seeks to persuade an adversary to not to take some action that it is capable of. On the other hand, compellence is an effort to persuade the opponent to stop some behavior or change its course due to the threat of coercive force or via incentives. Compellence is often needed in the wake of deterrence failure. While America’s efforts to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine failed, a compellence strategy would have a greater chance of success. After Russia’s inept military campaign and Ukraine’s effective resistance, the balance of power now favors the United States and its allies. Russian losses on the battlefield and degraded economic strength due to sanctions make the military components of a Western compellence strategy even more credible. A strategy of comprehensive compellence in support of Ukraine would have five elements or lines of effort. Diplomatic and political This element is already being aggressively pursued by the Biden administration in its political and economic isolation of Russia and its leaders. It has successfully made Putin a pariah in most circles, although China, India, and some other states are taking a different approach. The European Union and NATO have been energized and coordinated brilliantly. Efforts similar to the removal of Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council should be pursued, including the forthcoming G20 meeting this year. In any event, after a year or two of sanctions, Russia may be functionally dismissed from the G20 entirely depending upon the price of oil and natural gas. In terms of a new initiative, Finland and Sweden should be offered swift approval of their applications for membership in NATO. While their applications are under consideration by NATO’s 30 member states, the United Kingdom and United States should offer Finland and Sweden immediate security guarantees to protect them from Russian threats. The application process has historically taken over a year, and Russia will undoubtedly apply coercive pressure against the applicants. Additionally, former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb should be made a NATO official with a chance to become the next secretary general when Jens Stoltenberg’s term ends in 2023. The North Atlantic Council might consider Amb. (ret.) Ivo Daldler’s proposal to admit Ukraine now. However, this would be resisted by key NATO members, and should be left to the final negotiations. Informational The ongoing war has stressed the importance of strategic communications, and Zelensky has proven to be extremely effective in the battle of narratives. Moscow has employed its usual playbook of disinformation and propaganda, but to little discernable effect in Europe and North America. Russia continues to apply its concept of information confrontation against NATO and Ukraine. It persistently seeks to exploit identified vulnerabilities of democratic societies using cyber and information operations. Russia’s goal is to exacerbate existing societal, political, and military divisions. Key targets of this approach are the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government and NATO cohesion. Putin has been outdone by the determined and savvy Zelenskyy in this dimension of the conflict. However, Putin’s efforts gain more purchase in China, in democratic states like India, and parts of Africa. Efforts to pierce the fog of disinformation inside Russia should be intensified. There are few sources for independent news inside the country, but a few techniques seem to still be working. Ukraine has taken a macabre approach with facial recognition technology to identify and contact the families of fallen Russian soldiers to inform them of the fate of their loved one. They have also constructed websites for families to gain information on the status of their family members fighting against Ukraine, and at the same time receive some perspective on the scale of the war that Moscow hides from its own citizens. In Kyiv, the Information Strategies Council of Ukraine, a coalition of activists and think tanks, sent emails and social media messages directly to 15 million Russian men of draft age. It has also targeted older Russians with different tailored messages, using historical references to stimulate a questioning of Moscow-generated news reports and propaganda. NATO and the European Union need to create the capacity to design and conduct an information offensive into Russia and overwhelm Putin’s control of information. Putin seems to be afraid of “fifth columns” at home. That vulnerability should be exploited more. The U.S. Global Engagement Center has the mission to ‘‘lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government in countering foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts.” It may be a model to build upon, but it will take a collective effort from European states to establish an ability to project truth into Russia, and penetrate Putin’s dominance of his domestic information ecosystem. Russian cyber attacks against Ukraine have not been effective so far. However, Russian intelligence, particularly the GRU-supported Sandworm team, are persistently threatening Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity and its power grid. The Zelensky government is facing an ongoing surge in cyber activity at present. The West can do more to support the Ukrainians in this battlespace with both technical and intelligence support to ensure that their critical infrastructure is preserved and functional. The Ukrainians seem to be holding their own despite Russia’s presumed cyber dominance. Military The principal military stick in this strategy is supplied by the Ukrainians themselves, abetted by Western arms. This will have to be both accelerated and sustained during the next phase which is likely to involve intensive artillery and missile consumption. It will also require mass quantities of supplies, and enough drones to supplement the limited assets now flown by the Ukrainians. Recently, aid was increased by another increment. This new tranche of $800 million sounds enormous and the material is being delivered at an unprecedented timeline. Even with the recent presidential request of $33 billion in aid from Congress, it may be both inadequate and too late. More covert but direct kinetic means will be necessary as this is a war of considerable attrition. Indirect modes of conflict via proxy forces are nothing new (e.g., El Salvador, Angola, and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon). The use of proxy forces has a long history but also a growing salience in an era of strategic competition. One of the evolving modes of warfare that is suited for comprehensive compellence is “surrogate warfare.” In this mode of warfare, state’s avoid the use of their own soldiers as the primary bearer of warfare’s grave costs, and delegate it to proxy forces and the use of remotely fielded technological surrogates to better enable the state to manage the risks of modern conflict. They may also employ paramilitary forces for intelligence support for targeting critical nodes of the attacking force. For this conflict, this would mean the a greater use of allied tools for cyber warfare, greater intelligence sharing, and more unmanned precision strikes on key Russian operational centers and critical supply links inside Ukraine. Finally, NATO’s posture has been prudently enhanced with the deployment of four new NATO battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. More needs to be done to prepare for cross-border contingencies. NATO should posture one or two division-plus sized forces outside Ukraine in case peacekeeping or armed humanitarian intervention is needed. One can anticipate that human security and disaster relief operations may be needed in short order given the scale of the destruction of Ukrainian energy, medical, and water supplies. Economic America and its allies have implemented a massive sanctions package against Russia. As a result, Russian finances may soon be in default and its economy could nosedive. More attention should be paid to Russia’s energy exports. As FPRI’s Chris Miller notes “if you want to hit Russia hard, you’ve got to go after energy. Everything else is really pretty small by comparison.” Since there is little support in some capitals for more intensive sanctions, there may be value in defining their duration and the conditions for tempering them. Some have proposed that the West continue sanctions for as long as Putin remains in power. In essence, this is a call for regime change. Such a threat may not achieve much in real terms but it carries some risk since it directly challenges the Kremlin’s principal power center. It is highly unlikely to be accepted by German or French leaders. A more strategic approach would be to keep sanctions remain in place until Russian forces have departed all agreed territories and military commanders are turned in to appropriate authorities. Comprehensive compellence should also include funding for Ukraine’s restoration. The Economist estimates the reconstruction tab for Ukraine at $200–520 billion. As some scholars have recently written, rather than simply freeze Russia’s hard currency reserves in Western banks, those currency reserves should be liquidated and put to use. These assets should be collected and transferred to the International Criminal Court in escrow for reparations. The West should start proceedings to allot reparations to Kyiv from those funds. This would communicate to the Russian leadership that every day of destruction in Ukraine is simply another day of reconstruction in its future, which Moscow will pay for. Ideally, this might induce them to stop attacking and terrorizing civilians and operate within the law of armed conflict. Legal The West should purse indictments at the International Criminal Court for each division and Army commander whose area of responsibility is shown to have committed crimes against humanity and other violations of international law. Washington should also do the same for corporate and unit leaders of the Wagner Group, the mercenaries purportedly behind the Bucha massacre. Judicial proceedings may be far off, but the intent to prosecute needs to be clear now.

#### **Reimagined U.S. containment has the ability to check Russian aggression**

Daalder 3/1/22 [Daalder, Ivo H., Ivo H. Daalder is President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of World Review with Ivo Daalder. He served as the US ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013. Ambassador Daalder was educated at the universities of Kent, Oxford, and Georgetown, and received his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is married to Elisa D. Harris, and they have two sons., “The Return of Containment: How the West Can Prevail Against the Kremlin”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-01/return-containment]//AA

Russia’s unprovoked assault on Ukraine did not come as a surprise. The United States and its European allies learned last fall what Russia planned to do, and even publicized the Kremlin’s plans to the world. Even so, they failed to prevent Russia’s onslaught on its much weaker neighbor. Once they ruled out direct military assistance to Ukraine, deterring a Russia bent on controlling its neighbors and upending the post-1990 European security order was always going to be a tall order. The same threats that failed to dissuade Russia from invading before—severe sanctions, military assistance to Ukraine, and beefing up NATO—are unlikely to compel Russia from changing course now. Instead, Washington and its democratic allies need to embark on a strategy of containment that increases the cost to Russia and eventually forces internal political change that brings the brutal regime of Vladimir Putin to an end. The outlines of this playbook are familiar, first set out in the late 1940s by George F. Kennan, a senior diplomat in the Moscow embassy, and elaborated on in the pages of this magazine. Kennan argued that the Stalin regime’s paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West and called for steady, forceful counterpressure. But Kennan also believed the Soviet Union was weak and suffered from internal contradictions that would ultimately undo the regime. Containment took 40 years to succeed and involved plenty of needless mistakes by the United States—including launching the Vietnam War and backing the violent overthrow of a number of governments. But the policy ultimately unleashed forces inside the Soviet Union that led to the end of the regime. A return to a robust policy of containment is now the West’s best option. The fundamental goal will remain the same as the old policy: to counter Russian expansionism, inflict real costs on the Russian regime, and encourage internal change that leads to the ultimate collapse of Putin and Putinism. Of course, it needs to be adapted to the realities as they exist today rather than those that prevailed at the end of World War II. In particular, Russia’s close ties to a strong and newly assertive China will have to be addressed proactively. Still, Russia isn’t the Soviet Union, a military and ideological colossus nearly equal to the United States. Although it remains a nuclear power, its military is a shadow of its former Soviet self, and its economy is smaller than Canada’s, which has a quarter of Russia’s population. Meanwhile, the West has grown stronger. The United States retains unrivaled military power and has an economy 13 times larger than that of Russia. Europe, a defeated continent scarred by war and poverty after World War II, has emerged as a cohesive economic giant with a military that, although underfunded, enjoys significant modern capabilities to defend against a stretched Russian military. As a result, although a policy of containment will not deliver swift success or victory, its steady application in the months and years ahead should drive the necessary change in Russia within the next five to ten years. Three Pillars An effective twenty-first century update of containment would consist of three main pillars: maintaining U.S. military strength, decoupling Western economies from Russia, and isolating Moscow. Together, these three elements will steadily increase the cost to Russia of continuing its expansionist policies, foment internal dissent and debate, and ultimately could force a change in governance. To be clear, such change must be driven internally—although the United States seeks an end to Putinism, this will occur only when the Russian people decide the time has come. Also, a return to containment will not lead to an immediate end to the war in Ukraine. That will require additional measures, including providing Ukraine with the military means it needs to defend itself and resist occupation if Russia succeeds in taking over part or all of the country. And it will require massive economic and humanitarian assistance to help the besieged population in Ukraine and those who have been forced to flee the country. Although the United States and other NATO countries maintain significant militaries, two decades of European under-investment and U.S. military engagement in the Middle East and Afghanistan have left NATO profoundly unprepared for a return to a strong deterrent posture. The subordination of the Belarussian military to Russian command and the invasion of Ukraine mean that a new front line is being drawn from the Baltic to the Black Sea—with the eastern borders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania effectively marking NATO’s new eastern flank. As a result, NATO needs to move swiftly to defend the new front. The alliance has taken steps to bolster deterrence in the East, but these moves fall short of what the situation demands. The United States has doubled its ground presence in Poland, to 9,000 troops, and sent air and naval reinforcements to other countries. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have increased their military presence in Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic states. NATO has activated its 40,000-strong Response Force for the first time, though current plans do not include full mobilization of the entire force. While these initial steps have strengthened the forces that were deployed East in the wake of Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, they amount to little more than a tripwire that will be unable to offer a robust defense if Russia attacks NATO territory. NATO’s moves have fallen short of what the situation demands. That is why a fundamental rethinking of NATO’s forward force posture is now necessary. NATO needs to deploy tens of thousands of troops, rather than the few thousand that have so far been committed. The most immediate requirement is to deploy two to three combat brigades to eastern Poland and southern Lithuania to defend the Suwalki gap, the 60 miles that separate Russian Kaliningrad and Belarus. If Russian or Belarussian forces were to connect these territories, the Baltic states would effectively be cut off from the rest of NATO. Preparing for a long-term presence in the East will also require making significant investments in ports, rail lines, airfields, roads, fuel supply, and other critical infrastructure to improve NATO’s capacity to rapidly reinforce its troops. Moreover, given Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons, combined with the deployment of nuclear-capable and likely armed missiles in Kaliningrad and other parts of western Russia and possibly in Belarus, NATO will need to consider the adequacy of its nuclear posture. None of this is to suggest that NATO needs to prepare for war. The point is that deterrence now requires greater visibility and forward presence than was the case before Russia attacked Ukraine. Whatever Putin may be thinking about forcefully revising the post-1990 security order in Europe, NATO needs to make clear that he cannot succeed. That requires a strong deterrent presence East and a major commitment to increase spending for the long run. Germany’s decision to spend 100 billion euros now and at least two percent of GDP on defense going forward is a big step in the right direction. Beyond Military Might Although military strength is a core requirement of deterrence, it is not enough. Indeed, the forward deployment of military forces will initially reinforce the divisions in Europe—and would leave the peoples of Ukraine, the Caucuses, and indeed of Belarus and Russia, under Putin’s dominion. The West cannot allow a return of an Iron Curtain dividing Europe. That is why the new containment also needs a policy of economic decoupling and political isolation—measures that are designed to inflict ever increasing costs on Russia and force change from within. The sanctions announced by the United States and its allies are an important first step. Russia has been effectively cut off from credit and financial support, and technology export controls will severely curtail imports into Russia. Meanwhile, sanctions on Putin, his cronies, and their families will leave them isolated in their dachas in Russia, unable to gallivant on their yachts in St Tropez or their London duplexes. Though many have criticized these sanctions as too little, too late, these critiques assume that their purpose is to stop Russia’s military advance. That was never going to happen. Instead, sanctions are designed to inflict costs over months and years to force a change of behavior. The effectiveness of sanctions on Russia will depend on two factors. First, their sting requires that they be applied by as many countries as possible. The Biden administration has been right to walk in lockstep with Europe, even as it has engaged diplomatically for months to push for the maximum possible sanctions. It may make people in Washington feel good for the United States to announce a rash of sanctions, but unless others agree to follow, their impact will be limited. As the case of Iran has shown, coordinated sanctions from 2010 onwards produced a real nuclear agreement; the unilateral maximum pressure from the United States since 2018 has only led Iran to accelerate its nuclear program. Europe gets 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Second, energy is key. Former Senator John McCain once memorably described Russia as “a gas station masquerading as a country.” But it is a big gas station, especially for Europe, which still gets 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Some countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Latvia are almost completely dependent for their gas heat and electricity on imports from Russia. Although restricting Russian oil and gas imports would hit the Russian economy, which is highly dependent on fossil fuel exports, the damage such restrictions would do to European economies would be grave as well. True decoupling will thus take years, not weeks or months, as Europe finds alternative sources of gas and reduces its reliance on fossil fuels as part of its climate change commitments. Aside from military strength and economic decoupling, Russia will also need to be isolated politically. Its unprovoked attack represented a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law and runs counter to Russia’s commitment not to change borders by force—a commitment Moscow repeated numerous times in European security declarations, including the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the Charter of Paris in 1990, and the Astana OSCE Declaration in 2010. And Russia clearly violated its explicit guarantee in 1994 to respect Ukraine’s borders and territorial integrity in return for Kyiv’s commitment to give up its nuclear weapons. There can be no return to business as usual with an outlaw regime. To be sure, diplomatic channels need to remain open, as they were during the Cold War. But Russia’s normal engagement with the rest of the international community must come to an end. The International Olympic Committee’s recommendation that sporting competitions ban athletes from Russia and Belarus was the right call, as was the decision by FIFA and UEFA to ban Russian soccer teams from the World Cup and European championships. The isolation must extend well beyond sports, however. There is no place for Russia in the G20 and the diplomatic dance of European leaders heading off to Moscow that preceded Russia’s attack on Ukraine needs to cease. Aside from Russia’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from all of Ukraine—including the territory it has occupied and annexed since 2014—there is nothing to talk about. That includes suspending the strategic stability talks that were aimed at creating a predictable and stable relationship with Russia. No such relationship is possible so long as Putin is in power. "We will make sure that Putin will be a pariah on the international stage," President Biden declared. At the same time, just as during the Cold War, there needs to be a concerted effort to engage Russian civil society. Inside Russia, opposition to the war is already surprisingly widespread, as evidenced by the demonstrations that erupted in recent days in more than 50 cities. As Russian soldiers return in body bags and sanctions begin to bite, that opposition is bound to grow. Russians will need access to accurate information, which Western governments can provide through social media, the internet, and broadcasting. People-to-people exchanges should continue. The United States has opened doors to refuseniks before. It can do so again. Updating the Playbook To succeed, the new containment policy must be embraced by all Western allies—in Europe, in North America, and even in Asia. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, is keen to exploit divisions within and between democracies. It has interfered in elections for years and supported far right politics in Europe and beyond. It has used bribes and Western energy dependence to divide Europe. Putin saw the divisions within NATO sown by U.S. President Donald Trump during his four years in office, and the disagreements over Afghanistan and submarine sales to Australia that occurred since, as evidence that the West was weak and divided. Now, he likely thought, was the time to strike. Putin was wrong. The West has been remarkably unified in its response. Even before Russia’s attack, Western unity within NATO and beyond had solidified. The Biden administration, perhaps learning from its Afghanistan stumbles, did a superb job of bringing its allies together by sharing information, consulting frequently, and demonstrating tough, determined leadership. The result has been significant: strong sanctions, bolstered deterrence, and total political solidarity with Ukraine. To preserve this unity, the United States, which has once again emerged as a leader of the West, will need to carefully listen to allies and be willing to change course to keep everyone on board. There will be times when internal divisions will raise questions about the solidity of the coalition. During the Cold War, NATO seemed to be in perpetual crisis—except when it mattered most. There is no place for Russia in the G20. An important difference between the Cold War era and today is the status of China. No longer a bit player on the global scene, Beijing has emerged as the Washington’s biggest competitor and largest geopolitical challenger in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The Ukraine crisis emerged at a moment when the relationship between Russia and China has become particularly close. Their leaders have met 38 times since Xi Jinping became president of China in 2012, including most recently at the opening of the Winter Olympics. There, they issued a joint statement noting that their partnership had “no limits.” Far from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has blamed the United States and NATO for taking insufficient account of Russia’s security interests. Beijing’s pronouncements, however, contained an undercurrent of unease with Putin’s moves. The joint statement was notably silent on Ukraine, and official statements have consistently stressed China’s principled commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. China abstained on a UN Security Council Resolution condemning Russia, rather than joining Moscow in voting against. And Beijing has never recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea, suggesting it may keep an open mind on the future of Ukraine. There is scope, therefore, for quiet diplomacy to gauge whether Beijing might be persuaded to help put pressure on Russia. Even if Beijing has its doubts, however, it is hardly in its interest to help the United States against Russia. Indeed, Chinese leaders no doubt welcome the U.S.’s renewed preoccupation with security in Europe because it gives Beijing more freedom of maneuver in its own region. China is also likely to help alleviate some of the economic consequences of sanctions for Russia, though there are limits to how much it can do, especially on the financial side, where transactions largely remain the domain of western currencies from which Russia has now been banned. Containing Russia will therefore require paying attention to China. One way to increase the West’s leverage over Beijing would be to strengthen the political, economic, and military ties between the advanced democracies in Asia, Europe, and North America. An expanded G-7, for example, could include Australia and South Korea as well as the involvement of the heads of the EU and NATO. These nations and organizations will need to devise common strategies and policies not only to contain Russia but also to compete effectively with China. February 24 was a turning point in history. Democratic powers of the West are once again called upon to defend a rules-based order that has been violently uprooted. Fortunately, the Western powers possess the innate strength necessary to contain Russia and outcompete China for influence across the globe. The only real question is whether they have the will and determination to do so in unison.

### 2AC---US Heg k2 Deterrence

#### US heg is key deterring Russia and preventing nuclear war

De Witte 4/20/22 [De Witte, Melissa, Melissa De Witte is the deputy director for social science communications for the Stanford News Service. She attained an M.A. in Media, Culture, & Communication from NYU and a B.Sc. in Sociology from LSE. She was previously the digital communications manager for the Division of Social Sciences at UC Santa Cruz., “The U.S. must do what it can to prevent Russian military from crossing the nuclear threshold, Stanford scholar says”, Stanford News, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/04/20/u-s-must-can-prevent-russian-military-crossing-nuclear-threshold/]//AA

Nuclear weapons are not just a force used to deter another state from attacking – they can also be a shield behind which one can engage in aggression, says Stanford scholar Scott Sagan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reminder of Russia’s nuclear arsenal at the beginning of its recent invasion into Ukraine is a warning to the United States and other NATO members that if they get directly involved in the conflict, there could be a risk of nuclear escalation, said Sagan, the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Here, Sagan discusses Putin’s nuclear threat – it is estimated that Russia’s stockpile includes 4,477 nuclear warheads, according to a report published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists – and what could happen if Russia crosses the nuclear threshold, a line that hasn’t been crossed since 1945, when the U.S. detonated two atomic bombs in Japan. Sagan’s research examines nuclear strategy, nuclear proliferation, the ethics of war, and public opinion of combat. Back in February, Putin publicly ordered his Minister of Defense to put Russian nuclear forces into “special combat readiness.” He also warned in a televised statement that if another nation interferes in the operation, “Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Was Putin threatening a nuclear war? Putin was engaging in nuclear saber-rattling, reminding NATO leaders that he has a large nuclear arsenal and that Russian military doctrine holds open the option of using nuclear weapons first if it is losing a war and its vital interests are threatened. However, the order to go into “special combat readiness” was not part of the Russian military lexicon and U.S. officials saw no actual nuclear alert activities underway. But it’s important to understand that nuclear weapons are not just a force used to deter another state from attacking. They can also be a shield behind which one can undertake aggression. The Pakistanis moved soldiers into Indian-held Kashmir soon after Islamabad first tested nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein wanted nuclear weapons and told his senior generals that if he got them, he would order a conventional attack to take back the West Bank and Golan Heights from Israel. Similarly, Putin was brandishing his nuclear arsenal to remind the U.S. and other NATO powers that if they get directly involved in his war of aggression in Ukraine, there could be a risk of nuclear escalation. Is Putin’s nuclear threat working? Only in part. President Joe Biden did rule out direct engagement when he said the U.S. and NATO would not enforce a “no-fly zone” over the Ukraine. That policy would have meant that NATO aircraft would be shooting down Russian aircraft, which of course is an act of war, creating the risk of escalation. But Putin’s threats did not deter Washington and many NATO governments from “interfering” in Moscow’s attempt to overthrow the Zelenskyy government in many other ways, short of direct combat with the Russians. We have given the Ukrainian government millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including air defense systems and advanced anti-tank missiles, and have provided intelligence support. Without such rapid resupply of military equipment, the Ukrainians might well have lost the war already. Now they have turned back the Russian assault on Kyiv and Putin appears to have shifted his war aims from overthrowing the elected Ukrainian government to “liberating” the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine and possibly annexing it into Russia as he did with Crimea in 2014. CIA director William Burns recently said, “None of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential [Russian] resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.” Are you worried about the Russians using nuclear weapons against the Ukrainians if the war continues to go badly for Moscow? Yes. I recently argued in Foreign Affairs that Putin is the most dangerous man in the world. Putin could order the Russian military to drop a single nuclear bomb on a Ukrainian city to try to coerce the Zelenskyy government into immediately surrendering. This frightening scenario is not fanciful. It is, after all, effectively what the United States did to Japan in 1945. We can only hope that in this situation, senior Russian officers would tell Putin that such a strike would be illegal, a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and refuse to comply. Some national security officials are Putin’s cronies, like Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, but the military leadership is more independent. The United States must do what it can to reinforce any reluctance by the Russian military to cross the nuclear threshold. Washington should be prepared to take further military steps if Moscow crosses the nuclear threshold. Senior officials should not specify exactly what kind of military response would be ordered, but a clear statement that crossing the nuclear threshold would bring the gravest consequences for Russia and for Putin might help deter such action. And the U.S. should remind Russian military leaders that any nuclear use against a Ukrainian city will be treated as a war crime and that they, not just Putin, will be treated as war criminals. The Russian military may not mind targeting civilians, as it has shown in its operations in Chechnya, in Syria, and now in Ukraine. But they do care about protecting themselves. Do they really want to live in a world in which they have broken the tradition of nuclear non-use that has existed since 1945? They may think twice about agreeing to drop nuclear bombs if they know that they may one day find themselves permanently imprisoned for their actions. And if Putin gives such a reckless, dangerous order, it may just be the last straw that makes other leaders in Moscow decide that he finally has to go.

#### US threats of retaliation check Russian aggression

Alcaro 2/2/22 [Alcaro, Riccardo, Riccardo Alcaro is Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. His main area of expertise are transatlantic relations, with a special focus on US and European policies in Europe’s surrounding regions. Riccardo has been a visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution in Washington and a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies (EFSPS). He holds a summa-cum-laude PhD from the University of Tübingen., “The Return of US Leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia Crisis”, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), [https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/return-us-leadership-europe-biden-and-russia-crisis]//AA](https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/return-us-leadership-europe-biden-and-russia-crisis%5d//AA)

In dealing with Russia’s aggressive policies towards Ukraine, US President Joe Biden has put up a powerful display of competent crisis management. While it may not be enough to stop President Vladimir Putin from escalating, Biden’s policy has nonetheless re-affirmed US leadership in Europe. Communication strategy Starting last autumn, the Biden administration kept warning its European allies that Russia’s military mobilisation on the Ukrainian border was large enough to make the prospect of an invasion technically possible.[1] US officials have since publicly denounced Russia’s threatening tactics, even going as far as to accuse the Kremlin of planning false flag operations to give itself a pretext for an armed intervention.[2] President Biden himself has said that he expects Putin to move in, although he (and everybody else) remains uncertain as to what form Russia’s actions will take.[3] The Biden administration’s communication strategy is aimed at persuading European allies to close ranks while also preventing the Russian government from taking advantage of an information grey zone to spread fake news and foment confusion and divisions.[4] In spite of Russia’s insistence that it has no hostile intentions, there is little doubt that the risk of a renewed Russian intervention in Ukraine is higher than it has ever been since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Diplomatic response The Biden administration has rejected Russia’s demands for – amongst other things – a written guarantee that NATO will not expand to include other former Soviet republics and massively reduce (actually, remove) its military deployments in central and Eastern Europe (else, Moscow has threatened unspecific “technical-military” actions).[5] At the same time, Biden has agreed to open negotiations on European security, which has unfolded in three separate but related tracks: a bilateral US–Russia channel, a reactivated NATO–Russia Council, and the pan-European Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, so as to give all parties involved, starting with Ukraine, formal representation.[6] After consulting with allies, the Biden administration has presented Russia with a set of possible arrangements over arms control, missile deployments, military exercises, transparency and confidence-building measures as well as military-to-military contacts.[7] While these are secondary issues for Putin, they are still of interest to Russia. Most importantly, they substantiate a US and NATO commitment to engage in a broad negotiation over European security and start reversing the trend in the abysmal state of West-Russia relations. Diplomatic exchanges have thus far delivered no result. The US offer has disappointed the Russians, who insist that NATO’s enlargement fundamentally undermines their national security. They have nonetheless accepted to keep talking, and the two sides have engaged in a back-and-forth exchange of written proposals for compromise.[8] In the meantime, Russia’s military mobilisation has continued unabated.[9] President Biden, who has used two virtual summits to warn Putin about the terrible consequences of an intervention, has started preparing a multifaceted response.[10] Defence and deterrence Biden has ruled out the use of US troops in defence of Ukraine, to which he has nonetheless pledged full political support and continued military assistance (the US has provided Ukraine with 2.5 billion US dollars’ worth of military assets since 2014, 650 million in 2021 alone).[11] Meanwhile, the US has moved 3,000 troops from Germany to Poland and Romania and put further 8,500 soldiers on heightened alert for a possible deployment to central and eastern Europe.[12] Other NATO member states have followed suit. The United Kingdom has said it will commit more troops to the Baltic area, naval forces to the Black Sea, air patrolling of Bulgaria and Romania’s airspace, as well as rocket systems to Estonia.[13] France has offered to send troops to Romania, Denmark has deployed additional military aircraft to Lithuania and Spain has sent a frigate to the Black Sea.[14] A number of weapons systems would follow NATO and US soldiers, including air defences, artillery, armoured vehicles, warships and aircraft, thereby bolstering the few thousand troops NATO keeps in central and eastern Europe. Most likely, these deployments would lose their rotational nature and become fully permanent. Economic retaliation The policy area that has witnessed greater activism on the part of the United States has revolved around potential economic retaliation.[15] The Biden administration has worked on a wide-ranging set of measures that would cut off foreign lending, ban sales of sovereign bonds and blacklist Russia’s major financial institutions. It is reportedly also considering to ban the export to Russia of products containing US-made or US-designed semiconductors, which are the essential component of computers, smartphones and other electronic devices.[16] The US administration has agreed with the UK government to target the assets (both financial and otherwise) of some of the most prominent Russian oligarchs as well as people belonging to Putin’s inner circle.[17] Further, it has coordinated with the European Union on a set of restrictions that would strengthen the financial sanctions and ban the export of technologies for critical industry, most notably for the development of new gas projects.[18] Even though it has so far ruled out an embargo on energy imports from Russia, the Biden administration has extracted from Germany a pledge to put the activation of Nord Stream 2, the controversial Russian-German gas pipeline under the Baltic, indefinitely on hold.[19] Sustainability and effectiveness problems The Biden administration aims to raise the costs for Russia of any intervention against Ukraine, while also trying to promote a diplomatic way out of the crisis. It remains unclear whether Putin might be content with the high-level security dialogue the US is offering. It is also uncertain whether anything the US and its allies have put on the table may be enough to dissuade Putin from “moving in”, not least because the Russian president can pick amongst multiple options.[20] These span a large-scale invasion, a further militarisation and de facto integration of Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine’s eastern regions in which Russia has supported separatist movements since 2014, and a number of hybrid actions, including the intensification of the ongoing cyberattacks against Ukraine.[21] A large-scale attack would make it easier for Biden to keep the cohesion of the Atlantic front, but would create problems of sustainability.[22] Energy prices would likely spiral, thus prolonging the inflationary wave that has been mounting since last year (especially in the United States). Sanctions would wreak havoc on Russia’s economy, but would most likely inflict a heavy cost on Europe too, especially Germany and Italy (the EU’s first and third largest economies respectively), at a time of sustained but uncertain post-Covid recovery. A more limited intervention by Russia would engender an equal and opposite problem, whereby effectiveness could be sacrificed on the altar of sustainability. Western countries hold different views of what the minimum threshold is for them to be willing to absorb the economic pain that comes with the imposition of sanctions on Russia.[23] The measures they could agree upon would therefore be sustainable over time, but would hardly be as tough as the most strident critics of Putin deem necessary. Biden’s response has yet to pass the test of Russia’s intervening in Ukraine, if that indeed comes about. However, his administration has laid solid foundations for continued and intense transatlantic security dialogue. This is all the more important given that the European Union has provided no alternative to France and Germany’s attempt to have a separate dialogue with Moscow.[24] Yet the French have admitted that this diplomatic channel is complementary, rather than conflicting, with the transatlantic one.[25] \*\*\* In conclusion, the Biden administration has skillfully used or threatened to use intelligence, diplomatic, defence, deterrence and economic assets to face Russia’s challenge to Europe’s security. Most notably, it has consulted extensively with allies, showing regard for their specific sensitivities while organising a coordinated response.[26] With the spectre of interstate war looming on the continent, history has indeed come back to Europe. With the Biden administration, so has US leadership.

#### U.S. troops in Europe deter Russian aggression

Kaufman and Starr 5/20/22 [Kaufman, Ellie, Ellie Kaufman is a Producer in CNN's Washington, DC bureau covering the Defense Department and the US military as a part of CNN's National Security team. She graduated from the College of William and Mary in 2013 with a B.A. in English Literature and Hispanic Studies., Starr, Barbara, Barbara Starr is CNN's Pentagon correspondent, based in Washington, D.C. and appears regularly on The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, New Day and other shows across the network regularly breaking big news and delivering exclusive coverage on the U.S. military and political situation on a global scale. Starr graduated from California State at Northridge with a bachelor of arts degree in journalism., “US likely to keep 100,000 troops in Europe for foreseeable future in face of Russian threat, US officials say”, CNN Politics, [https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/20/politics/us-troops-in-europe/index.html]//AA](https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/20/politics/us-troops-in-europe/index.html%5d//AA)

(CNN) — The US is expected to keep 100,000 troops stationed in Europe for the foreseeable future unless Russia escalates and threatens Sweden and Finland or NATO members, according to multiple US officials. The numbers could temporarily increase if NATO carries out more military exercises in the region, and the US could add additional bases in Europe if the security environment changes, the officials added. The plans are being considered following Thursday's meeting of NATO's military chiefs in Brussels, the officials said. The military chiefs are making the recommendations to a NATO defense ministers meeting planned for June, and NATO leaders including President Joe Biden will meet in Madrid at the end of that month. The US increased its overall force posture in Europe from about 60,000 troops before Russia's invasion of Ukraine to about 100,000 now, adding troops and military assets to countries along Europe's eastern flank to support NATO and to further deter Russia. The US contributed thousands of troops to NATO's Response Force, which was activated for the first time in NATO's history earlier this spring. These recommendations are consistent with what top military leaders have been telling US lawmakers. In April, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told members of Congress he endorsed creating permanent US bases in Eastern Europe as a response to Russia's attack on Ukraine. But Milley said he believed US troops at those bases could be rotational. He said he didn't think the US needed to permanently station troops at them to create an effective deterrent. US intel skeptical Putin will be swayed by Russian public opinion over war in Ukraine NATO's military chiefs, including Gen. Tod Wolters who serves as both Commander of US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, participated in the meetings in Brussels as the war in Ukraine grinds on, nearing the three-month mark since Russia's invasion began. The US added thousands of troops in Europe on temporary rotations, deployed additional military assets to the Eastern flank to support eight new NATO battlegroups, and sent billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine, alongside NATO allies. However, the Pentagon recently announced replacement troops for those temporary rotations, signaling the increased US presence will be maintained for some time to come. The Pentagon announced that approximately 10,500 US Army personnel would be deployed to Europe in the coming weeks and months to replace forces that are already there on May 13. As well as the larger NATO meetings Gen. Milley also met military leaders from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom as well as Finland and Sweden this week, according to readouts from Joint Staff Spokesperson Col. Dave Butler. As Sweden and Finland are poised to join NATO, US officials don't believe additional forces will be needed unless Russia suddenly poses a threat to the two Nordic countries. If Russia were to move weaponry or make serious threats to move weaponry closer, the force posture might have to be further reassessed, the officials said. Sweden and Finland have expressed concerns about their security in the interim period after they submitted their applications for membership, asking certain NATO allies for additional security support while the process plays out. Certain nations have agreed to provide additional support to the two countries, Admiral Robert Bauer, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, said Thursday. Most NATO members have welcomed Finland and Sweden's application to join but Turkey has raised objections. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist at the Pentagon Wednesday, a day before the NATO military chiefs meeting in Brussels. "The secretary made it very clear that we have a comfort level with their military going back many years, and that at a staff level we'll be happy to have a discussion with them about security and capability needs that they might have to help assure them and to deter Russia should that be necessary," a senior defense official said of the meeting between Austin and Hultqvist Wednesday. The official said there would be continued staff level discussions about what the needs of Sweden's might be and how the US could help fulfill them, and that the US has also engaged Finland in similar staff level discussions. The request for additional security needs might not result in additional US troops, the official added. As an example, the US might engage in additional military exercises with Sweden or Finland, according to the official. A more permanent force posture change NATO and US leaders have been hinting at a more permanent change in European force posture in response to Russia's ongoing invasion with a possible announcement at the NATO summit in Madrid next month. It could solidify the 100,000 troop level for some time to come. In April, Austin told US lawmakers that the war in Ukraine and Putin's actions will change the US military footprint in Europe. "This unlawful and unprovoked aggression by Putin has the effect of changing the security architecture in the region for some time to come," Austin said. "We do expect that it will change our footprint. In terms of how much it changes the US contribution, that's left to be seen." Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg both hinted at an announcement about a more permanent change in NATO's military posture, specifically in Eastern Europe at the conclusion of the NATO informal foreign ministers ministerial in Berlin, Germany on May 15. "We also spent time here in Berlin laying the groundwork for next month's summit in Madrid," Blinken said during a press conference at the conclusion of the NATO informal meeting in Berlin. "NATO is going to release its new Strategic Concept laying out how the Alliance will sustain and strengthen transatlantic security in the face of President Putin's aggression as well as other emerging threats. And we'll look ahead to our continuing efforts to fortify our force posture on NATO's eastern flank." Stoltenberg said the alliance will "make important decisions to reinforce NATO's deterrence and defense to reflect the new security reality in Europe," during the summit in Madrid next month after the conclusion of the informal meeting in Berlin on May 15.

### 2AC---US Involvement Key

#### U.S. involvement is key to deter and prevent nuclear escalation

Wright 5/1/22 [Wright, Robin, Robin Wright, a contributing writer and columnist, has written for The New Yorker since 1988. Her first piece on Iran won the National Magazine Award for best reporting. A former correspondent for the Washington Post, CBS News, the Los Angeles Times, and the Sunday Times of London, she has reported from more than a hundred and forty countries. She is also a distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as at Yale, Duke, Dartmouth, and the University of California, Santa Barbara., “Ukraine Is Now America’s War, Too”, New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ukraine-is-now-americas-war-too]//AA

America has crossed a threshold in Ukraine, both in its short-term involvement and its long-term intent. The U.S. was initially cautious during the fall and winter as Russia, a nuclear country with veto power at the U.N. Security Council, amassed more than a hundred and fifty thousand troops along the Ukrainian border. It didn’t want to poke the Russian bear—or provoke Vladimir Putin personally. Two days after long convoys of Russian tanks rolled across the border, on February 24th, the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, still claimed that America’s goal—backed by hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid—was simply to stand behind the Ukrainian people. The White House sanctioned Russia—initially targeting a few banks, oligarchs, political élites, government-owned enterprises, and Putin’s own family—to pressure the Russian leader to put his troops back in their box, without resorting to military intervention. “Direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War Three, something we must strive to prevent,” President Joe Biden said, in early March. Yet in just over nine weeks, the conflict has rapidly evolved into a full proxy war with Russia, with global ramifications. U.S. officials now frame America’s role in more ambitious terms that border on aggressive. The goal—backed by tens of billions of dollars in aid—is to “weaken” Russia and insure a sovereign Ukraine outlasts Putin. “Throughout our history, we’ve learned that when dictators do not pay the price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and engage in more aggression,” the President told reporters on Thursday. “They keep moving. And the costs, the threats to America and the world, keep rising.” Having basically run out of appropriated funds, Biden has asked Congress for thirty-three billion dollars—for new military, economic, and humanitarian support—in the latest of several packages for Ukraine. “The cost of this fight is not cheap,” the President acknowledged. (As Politico noted, the new aid is about half the size of the entire Russian defense budget—and also more than half of the U.S. State Department’s annual budget. Over the next five months, U.S. aid to Ukraine will average more than two hundred million dollars a day.) The investment, Biden said, was a small price “to lessen the risk of future conflicts” with Russia. For Putin, the war in Ukraine always seemed to be, at least in part, a proxy fight with NATO and its U.S. leadership. Ahead of his invasion, he publicly expressed deep paranoia about the military alliance and its further expansion into countries once aligned with the Soviet Union. He also brokered a five-thousand-word agreement with the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, to form a de-facto alliance of authoritarian regimes. They jointly opposed NATO enlargement. Biden tried to resist that framing. At the start of the invasion, the U.S. invoked the principles of sovereignty, a democratically elected government, and territorial integrity. During the past week, however, Ukraine’s existential crisis has increasingly appeared to be America’s war, too. On April 24th, Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin took a train with blacked-out windows into Kyiv to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky and symbolically reinforce American support. The stealthy trip reflected the increasingly ambitious U.S. goal. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Austin told reporters, near the border in Poland. Blinken said, “We don’t know how the rest of this war will unfold, but we do know that a sovereign, independent Ukraine will be around a lot longer than Vladimir Putin is on the scene.” On Tuesday, Austin assembled defense leaders from more than forty countries—well beyond the NATO framework—at Ramstein, a U.S. base in southwest Germany, to coördinate support for Ukraine. Austin, a retired general involved in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, announced the formation of a new coalition of “nations of good will” that will meet monthly to “intensify” an international campaign to win “today’s fight and the struggles to come.” In appealing for more aid, Biden said, “We have to do our part as well, leading the alliance.” The shift may have been inevitable, given the barbarism of the war, which has claimed thousands of civilian lives, and Russia’s challenge to the conventions and obligations of modern statecraft. “If this is left to stand, if there is no answer to this aggression, if Russia gets away with this cost-free, then so goes the so-called international order,” General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on CNN. “And if that happens, then we’re heading into an era of seriously increased instability.” On Friday, the Pentagon press secretary John Kirby choked up at a briefing as he discussed Putin’s “depravity.” The U.S. has become more deeply engaged for at least four reasons. Diplomacy between Ukraine and Russia has stalled amid revelations of atrocities committed by Russian troops, notably the execution of civilians in Bucha. Moscow’s early participation in peace talks never seemed credible anyway; Putin is too greedy and historically ambitious. Russia has staked claims to southern Crimea, the eastern Donbas region, and the lands between them along the strategic Black Sea. Putin is not yet ready—or, perhaps, not yet under enough pressure—to negotiate seriously. The U.S. has also been emboldened by the stunning underperformance of the Russian military, the largest in Europe. U.S. intelligence had originally feared that Kyiv could fall within seventy-two hours. But Ukraine held the capital, and Russian forces retreated. Washington is no longer hesitant to poke the bear. Yet time still “is not on Ukraine’s side,” Milley reportedly told the coalition of defense leaders at Ramstein. His concern was reinforced on Thursday, when Russia struck cities across Ukraine just an hour after the U.N. Secretary-General, António Guterres, speaking at a press conference in Kyiv, described the country as the “epicenter of unbearable heartache and pain.” Guterres’s trip to Kyiv followed talks with Putin in Moscow. The U.N. leader, who toured Bucha, took a clear side in the conflict. “The war is an absurdity in the twenty-first century,” he said. “The war is evil.” The growing U.S. involvement also reflects broader fears—long held among countries on or near Russia’s borders —that Putin’s aggression will not stop with Ukraine. On April 22nd, a senior Russian military commander announced that Moscow sought “full control” over eastern and southern Ukraine in part to open the way to neighboring Moldova, a tiny, landlocked country that is supportive of the European Union but dependent on Russian energy. In congressional testimony on Thursday, Blinken cited the urgent need “to seize the strategic opportunities” and address “the risks that are presented by Russia’s overreach as countries reconsider their policies, their priorities, their relationships.” Moscow’s flagrant rhetoric about nuclear weapons has also increasingly alarmed U.S. officials. “Nobody wants to see this war escalate any more than it already has,” Kirby said, on April 27th. “Certainly nobody wants to see—or nobody should want to see—it escalate into the nuclear realm.” The Biden Administration has public support for its expanding role—for now. Despite war weariness after two decades in Afghanistan and Iraq, roughly two-thirds of Americans believe that the U.S. has a “moral responsibility” to do more to stop the killing of civilians in Ukraine, according to a Quinnipiac poll published in mid-April. In a country polarized on most other issues, a majority from both parties agreed. Three-quarters of those polled also fear that the worst is yet to come. And more than eighty per cent believe that Vladimir Putin is a war criminal. Yet the public’s moral outrage “stops at the water’s edge when it comes to committing the U.S. military to the fight,” Tim Malloy, a Quinnipiac University analyst, noted. Only nineteen per cent of Americans believe the U.S. should do more even if it risks getting into a direct war with Russia. That conviction may soon be tested. The U.S. role has evolved—from a reactive response to Russia’s unjustified war to a proactive assertion of American leadership and leverage. Perhaps in desperation, Putin’s rhetoric has become bolder. On Wednesday, he warned that he could launch a “lightning-fast” response to any nation that intervened to thwart or threaten Russia. “We have all the instruments for this, such that no one can boast of,” he said, in an apparent reference to Moscow’s nuclear and missile arsenal. “We’re going to use them if we have to.” The war could now play out in many disparate ways. Each carries its own dangers—for the U.S. as well as Ukraine.

#### **U.S. foreign involvement is key to preventing Russian attack**

Geller 5/16/22 [Geller, Patty-Jane, Patty-Jane Geller is a senior policy analyst for nuclear deterrence and missile defense in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense. She earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Government and a minor degree in physics at Georgetown University, and received a Master of Arts degree in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College., “Traditional Victory Over Russia Is Unlikely. Instead, Expect To Manage Competition for the Long Haul”, The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/traditional-victory-over-russia-unlikely-instead-expect-manage-competition-the]//AA

KEY TAKEAWAYS After many years of U.S. hegemony following the Cold War, Russia has gained—and is exercising—the capabilities to threaten the United States and its interests. In addition to modernizing and numerically increasing existing nuclear capabilities, Russia is building entirely new nuclear capabilities. Managing competition with Russia will require significant investment and effort that the American public and the current administration may be reluctant to make. After many years of U.S. hegemony following the Cold War, Russia has gained—and is exercising—the capabilities to threaten the United States and its interests abroad. Russia invests in military capabilities to confront the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other neighboring states. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea demonstrated its use of hybrid warfare to accomplish its aims and project power across the Black Sea. Moscow is propping up Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad, defending Iran at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and amassing military forces in the Arctic. It has authorized multiple cyber-attacks against the United States and continues to target vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industrial base. It uses political warfare to sow discord in the United States, from interfering in U.S. elections to spreading propaganda about the “dangers” of U.S missile defense. Perhaps most significantly, Russia invests billions of dollars into adding to its nuclear arsenal and developing new nuclear capabilities, disrupting the nuclear balance with the United States. Consequently, the current and previous administrations have framed U.S.-Russia relations as a competition, which involves two states striving for global power and opposing interests. Such a competition implies that actors in opposition to each other are pursuing a victory. But what does it look like to win in a competition with Russia? Based on the U.S. history of war and conflict, Americans typically view winning a competition as a definitive change in status quo, or strategic realignment, that works in the U.S. favor. A model American victory might look like the outcome of the Revolutionary War, which resulted in the independent American state, or Japan’s transformation to a democratic ally after it lost World War II. It once appeared that the United States was making progress toward this model of strategic realignment for Russia after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union fell. Much of U.S.-Russian policy through the 2000’s was rooted in the idea that with a little more nudging, Russia would complete the transition from unfriendly autocracy to democratic member of the rules-based international order. Such policy is evidenced by President George W. Bush’s push for a new era of improved relations with Russia, and President Barack Obama’s attempted Russian “reset.” While the Russian threat has worsened in recent years, one school of thought argues that the United States can still achieve this strategic realignment once Russia achieves full internal political change. Activists like Vladimir Kara-Murza argue such change could occur in the near term. Another camp argues that the United States can end the competition if it stops antagonizing Russia. This school of thought accepts the premise that U.S. capabilities like missile defense provoke Russia to build up its forces and asserts that unilateral concessions will convince Russia to draw back its forces as well. Others go further to argue that the Russian threat is overblown and Russia is too weak to pose a serious threat, so there is no competition to “win;” instead, the United States should redirect unneeded resources away from U.S.-Russia competition. This paper argues that Russia’s fundamental nature and interests will continue to threaten the United States for the foreseeable future and therefore a path to a traditional concept of victory is unlikely. It rejects the idea that Russia will achieve full internal change and become friendly to the United States due to its longstanding nature as an aggressive, paranoid, power-seeking, and autocratic state, no matter its leader. Based on this assessment, concessions or attempts at cooperation with Russia will fail. Indeed, history illustrates that Russia interprets these as weaknesses and exploits the opportunity to advance its position. As a result, the closest the United States can come to “winning” is successfully managing competition with Russia to mitigate the threat it poses and keep Russian aggression at bay. To manage competition, the United States must strengthen its capabilities and posture required to deter Russian mischief in all arenas of competition as well as avoid making concessions.

#### The U.S. has the capacity to deter Russian aggression

Gilliam and Van Wie 22 [Gilliam, John B., Colonel John Gilliam is a chief of staff of the Army senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. In this role, Col. Gilliam facilitates a greater appreciation for the role of land power as well as Army missions and priorities at one of the premier think thanks in the United States., Van Wie, Ryan C., Major Ryan Van Wie serves as an Instructor of International Affairs in the Department of Social Sciences. Ryan commissioned as an Infantry Officer in 2010. He received his Bachelor of Science in International Relations from West Point and a Master of Public Policy from University of Michigan’s Ford School of Public Policy., “Feasible US steps to strengthen NATO deterrence in the Baltics and Poland”, Brookings, [https://www.brookings.edu/research/feasible-us-steps-to-strengthen-nato-deterrence-in-the-baltics-and-poland/]//AA](https://www.brookings.edu/research/feasible-us-steps-to-strengthen-nato-deterrence-in-the-baltics-and-poland/%5d//AA)

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a renewed assessment of efforts by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter Russia from taking military action on NATO’s eastern flank has become particularly salient. In the coming weeks, NATO leadership will meet to discuss what longer term force posture adjustments are required to create such a deterrent.[1] This paper proposes several modest policy recommendations which will help inform the discussion and ultimately strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence posture. Contemporary academic research on conventional deterrence highlights clear gaps in the deterrence capacity of the United States and NATO, despite their concerted efforts to strengthen conventional military capability since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. For example, studies indicate that the rotational military forces established by the United States’ Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, still lack the requisite conventional capability to prevent a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, these studies lack a well-defined formula for what constitutes adequate capability and say little about what adjustments the United States and NATO must make to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltics and Poland. To help clarify capability requirements in the region, we reviewed conventional deterrence theories and models from the Cold War. Though long-standing, this research provides a clearer picture of the ideal defensive force posture and adequate force ratios needed to improve deterrence, compared to recent policy analyses. Focusing on land-based operations, we then applied these correlation of forces models to analyze the current balance of conventional ground forces in the Baltics. Through comparing the relative combat power of NATO’s forces in the Baltics with Russia’s forces in its Western Military District and Kaliningrad oblast, we confirmed that the NATO capability gaps identified in previous studies remain large. We also found that potential NATO high readiness reinforcements would be incapable of closing the gaps for at least a month in a crisis scenario. These capability shortcomings clearly hinder the United States’ and NATO’s ongoing efforts to conventionally deter Russian aggression in the Baltics or to decisively respond in a crisis. Accounting for U.S. military budget limitations, force structure constraints, and competing global requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) could make several policy adjustments to strengthen U.S. capabilities and rapidly reinforce security in the Baltics. Specifically, the U.S. military could increase U.S. armored forces in Central Europe, enhance the operational readiness of U.S. ground forces, and support upgrades to NATO mobility systems and infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. These modest recommendations, outlined in this paper, represent feasible options to strengthen NATO’s deterrence against an increasingly aggressive Russia. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine and attempts to coerce NATO members into making concessions underscore the compelling and urgent need to address critical U.S. and NATO capability deficits.

### 2AC---Russia Fill-In

#### If the US collapses, Russia fill-in is worse.

Shadi Hamid 22, contributing writer at The Atlantic, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary, 3/6/2022, "There Are Many Things Worse Than American Power," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-kremlin-imperialism-ukraine-american-power/624180/>, kav

If there was any doubt before, the answer is now clear. Vladimir Putin is showing that a world without American power—or, for that matter, Western power—is not a better world.

For the generation of Americans who came of age in the shadow of the September 11 attacks, the world America had made came with a question mark. Their formative experiences were the ones in which American power had been used for ill, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Middle East more broadly, and for much longer, the United States had built a security architecture around some of the world’s most repressive regimes. For those on the left, this was nothing new, and it was all too obvious. I spent my college years reading Noam Chomsky and other leftist critics of U.S. foreign policy, and they weren’t entirely wrong. On balance, the U.S. may have been a force for good, but in particular regions and at particular times, it had been anything but.

Blaming America first became all too easy. After September 11, U.S. power was as overwhelming as it was uncontested. That it was squandered on two endless wars made it convenient to focus on America’s sins, while underplaying Russia’s and China’s growing ambitions.

For his part, Putin understood well that the balance of power was shifting. Knowing what he knew, the Russian president wasn’t necessarily “irrational” in deciding to invade Ukraine. He had good reason to think that he could get away with it. After all, he had gotten away with quite a lot for nearly 15 years, ever since the Russian war against Georgia in 2008, when George W. Bush was still president. Then he annexed Crimea in 2014 and intervened brutally in Syria in 2015. Each time, in an understandable desire to avoid an escalatory spiral with Russia, the United States held back and tried not to do anything that might provoke Putin. Meanwhile, Europe became more and more dependent on Russian energy; Germany, for example, was importing 55 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Just three weeks ago, it was possible for Der Spiegel to declare that most Germans thought “peace with Russia is the only thing that matters.”

The narrative of a feckless and divided West solidified for years. We, as Americans, were feeling unsure of ourselves, so it was only reasonable that Putin would feel it too. In such a context, and after four years of Donald Trump and the domestic turmoil that he wrought, it was tempting to valorize “restraint” and limited engagements abroad. Worried about imperial overreach, most of the American left opposed direct U.S. military action against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in the early 2010s, even though it was Russian and Iranian intervention on behalf of Syria’s dictator that bore the marks of a real imperial enterprise, not just an imagined one.

Russia’s unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation, in Europe no less, has put matters back in their proper framing. The question of whether the United States is a uniquely malevolent force in global politics has been resolved. In the span of a few days, skeptics of American power have gotten a taste of what a world where America grows weak and Russia grows strong looks like. Of course, there are still holdouts who insist on seeing the United States as the provocateur. In its only public statement on Ukraine, the Democratic Socialists of America condemned Russia’s invasion but also called for “the U.S. to withdraw from NATO and to end the imperialist expansionism that set the stage for this conflict.” This is an odd statement considering that Russia, rather than the United States, has been the world’s most unabashedly imperialist force for the past three decades. But many on the anti-imperialist left aren’t really anti-imperialist; they just have an instinctive aversion to American power.

America’s low opinion of its own capacity for good—and the resulting desire to retreat or disengage—hasn’t just been a preoccupation of the far left. The crisis of confidence has been pervasive, spreading to the halls of power and even President Barack Obama, whose memorable mantra was “Don’t do stupid shit.” Instead of thinking about what we could do, or what we could do better, Obama was more interested in a self-limiting principle. For their part, European powers—content to bask under their U.S. security umbrella—could afford to believe in fantasies of perpetual peace. Europe’s gentleness and lethargy—coaxing Germany to commit even 2 percent of its GDP to defense seemed impossible—became something of a joke. One popular Twitter account, @ISEUConcerned, devoted itself to mocking the European Union’s propensity to express “concern,” but do little else, whenever something bad happened.

Suddenly, the EU has been aroused from its slumber, and the parody account was rendered temporarily speechless. This is no longer tepid concern, but righteous fury. Member states announced that they would send anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Germany, for the first time, said that it would ramp up its military budget to 100 billion euros. On the economic front, the EU announced some of the toughest sanctions in history. My podcast co-host, Damir Marusic, an Atlantic Council senior fellow, likened it to a “holy war,” European-style.

Sometimes, unusual and extreme events mark the separation between old and new ways of thinking and being. This week, the Berlin-based journalist Elizabeth Zerofsky remarked that the current moment reminded her of the memoir The World of Yesterday, written by the Austrian novelist Stefan Zweig as World War II loomed. In it, he recalls the twilight of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with an almost naive fondness. On the first day of the Ukraine invasion, I happened to be speaking to a group of college students who had no memory of September 11. I told them that they may be living in history. Those students, like all of us, are bearing witness to one of those rare events that recast how individuals and nations alike view the world they inhabit.

The coming weeks, months, and years are likely to be as fascinating as they are terrifying. In a sense, we knew that a great confrontation was coming, even if we hadn’t quite envisioned its precise contours. At the start of his presidency, Joe Biden declared that the battle between democracies and autocracies would be the defining struggle of our time. This was grandiose rhetoric, but was it more than that? What does it actually mean to fight such a battle?

In any number of ways, Russia’s aggression has underscored why Biden was right and why authoritarians—and the authoritarian idea itself—are such a threat to peace and stability. Russia invaded Ukraine, a democracy, because of the recklessness and domination of one man, Vladimir Putin. The countries that have rallied most enthusiastically behind Ukraine have almost uniformly been democracies, chief among them the United States. America is lousy, disappointing, and maddeningly hypocritical in its conduct abroad, but the notion of any moral equivalence between the United States and Putin’s Russia has been rendered laughable. And if there is such a thing as a better world, then anti-imperialists may find themselves in the odd position of hoping and praying for the health and longevity of not just the West but of Western power.

### AT: Retrenchment Good

#### Europe doesn’t have a nuclear deterrent to fend off Russia.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\_a\_00405, kav)

Nuclear deterrence. As a legacy of the Cold War, Russia maintains a formidable arsenal of approximately 6,400 nuclear weapons, which vastly overshadows the combined arsenals of France and the UK (290 and 195 nuclear weapons, respectively).159 In addition to Russia's numerical preponderance, it matters greatly that this force is wielded by a single actor, not a collective one. In contrast, strategic divergences and technological constraints are highly likely to hamper the emergence of a European nuclear deterrent either through the Europeanization of the French and/or British nuclear deterrents and/or through a German nuclear deterrent.

As Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe explain, Germany would have to surmount major technical, political, and security obstacles before acquiring a nuclear deterrent.160 Not only would it face the domestic and international pressures fueled by reviving fears of German hegemony, but it would have “to either repurpose its nuclear energy infrastructure for weapons production or sprint to the bomb from new military facilities,”161 a prospect made even more unlikely given that Germany plans to shut down its entire nuclear fleet by 2022.162 Accordingly, “Germany does not have the required wherewithal for even a rudimentary program.”163

In turn, the Europeanization of nuclear sharing (or Euro-deterrent) based on the nuclear capabilities of France and/or the United Kingdom independent of the United States would also “face high hurdles and immense costs that might well prove prohibitive.”164 French nuclear experts note that there is “near-zero appetite in France for transferring its nuclear assets to Europe.”165 Likewise, Barbara Kunz observes that analysts across Europe agree that the Europeanization of the French bomb, however defined, is “unlikely and hardly feasible.”166

The prospects of a Franco-British nuclear deterrent are even less likely. For one, it is highly improbable that French or British policymakers would be willing to sacrifice London or Paris for Tallinn or Riga. Second, the UK has left the EU, so France and the UK would have to overcome their previously discussed divergent strategic priorities to create an integrated Franco-British military structure for nuclear planning outside the EU. Finally, the heavy dependence of the UK's nuclear deterrent on U.S. technology and on cooperation with the United States would further complicate such an endeavor.

Ultimately, the notion forwarded by restraint scholars that European countries can easily and quickly balance Russia is ungrounded. Balancing Russia would be extremely difficult, and such a buildup would necessarily take a very long time. Our interviews with European policymakers reveal that they clearly understand this problem. A former UK ministry of defense official stresses that the “temporal factor would be quite long. … These sort of capabilities take a long time to develop.”167 Likewise, as a former German official bluntly explains, “The whole defense and capability requirements would be so extreme that the upgrade that would be needed to fill the gap if the U.S. completely withdrew is totally off limits for the foreseeable future.”168

#### Defending Europe from Russia maintains world order

**Parker** Ceri Parker is an Associate Director, Commissioning Editor of the Agenda at the World Economic Forum. **17**

( Ceri Parker 17Defend the liberal international order’ – top quotes from Joe Biden’s Davos swansong <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/defend-the-liberal-international-order-top-quotes-from-joe-bidens-davos-swansong/>, quoting Biden//KS}

We need to “fight back against the dangerous proposition that facts no longer matter. That the truth holds no inherent power in a world where propagandists, demagogues, and extremists carry sway.”

“Defending the liberal international order requires that we resist the forces of European disintegration and maintain our long-standing insistence on a Europe whole, free and at peace. That means fighting for the European Union – one of the most vibrant and consequential institutions on earth.”

In the same week that President-Elect Donald Trump suggested NATO was in need of reform, Biden said:

“The single greatest bulwark for our transatlantic partnership is the unshakable commitment of the United States to all our NATO allies. An attack on one is an attack on all. That can never be called into question.”

“History has proven that the defense of free nations in Europe has always been America’s fight – and the foundation of our security.”

# Authors

## Prodicts

### Prodict---Beckley

#### Beckley’s correct—America remains the hegemon now but tech may change LIO

**Layne et al 2020** [Christopher Layne, Emma Ashford, Mauro Gilli, Joshua Shifrinson, Michael Beckley, "Roundtable 11-11 on Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower", H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/11-11-unrivaled// KS]

Gilli also points to another unknown about the future: the possibility of a “technological revolution that changes the global source of wealth and power.” Technological change—what Gilli calls the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”—that is “unfolding in front of our eyes might make current sources of wealth and power obsolete. So if this new industrial-technological revolution does indeed materialize, much will depend on whether it reinforces America’s current economic and military advantages, or, rather, creates opportunities for a rival with a different set of capabilities and institutions more suited to benefit from this revolution.” Gilli thus cautions that although Beckley’s forecast of continuing American unipolar power may be correct, there is always the chance that discontinuous change could lead to a different outcome. In the final analysis, Gilli concludes, “to predict whether the U.S. will maintain its edge in world politics, we thus need to understand whether a technological revolution is indeed taking place, and who will gain and who will lose from it.” Shifrinson joins Ashford and Gilli in saluting Beckley’s contribution to the debates on how best to measure power in international politics, and on the grand strategic implications of China’s rise. Unrivaled, he notes, “joins a series of studies pushing back on the perception that the United States is soon to fall into the dustbin of history.” Moreover, Shifrinson comments, if Beckley is right, his attempt to construct a new framework for measuring power may force security studies scholars and diplomatic historians to re-evaluate great power politics because “much of what we think we know of the link between power and international outcomes could now be suspect.” Indeed, Shifrinson suggests, if Beckley is correct, a “reformation” of the discipline of IR/security studies would be in order. Shifrinson also identifies some flaws in Beckley’s argument, one of which is that Beckley does not provide much guidance for identifying which states qualify for great power status, and which do not.

### Prodict---Brands

#### US needs to take policy action against the rising China threat

**Dollar & Hass 21** [David Dollar and Ryan Hass, Dollar was the U.S. Treasury’s economic and financial emissary to China. Hass advised President Obama and senior White House officials on all aspects of U.S. policy toward China., 1/25/21, "Getting the China challenge right", Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/getting-the-china-challenge-right/// KS]

Rather than aiming at unrealistic targets like containment, decoupling, or regime change that are incapable of solidifying domestic U.S. support or attracting international buy-in, the United States needs to craft a strategy that can be the basis for broad and lasting support. Recent polling suggests that elements of such an approach would include strengthening American economic competitiveness, protecting the credibility of American security commitments to allies and partners, and defending U.S. values. Setting priorities along these lines would have a disciplining effect on the policy process. A coherent policy process would identify realistic objectives and form plans to achieve them. This process could involve both defensive and offensive efforts, for example, by working with allies to limit the adoption of Huawei into 5G systems around the world, as well as coordinating international pressure on China to adopt disciplines on state subsidies. It also could involve joint efforts with European allies to nudge China toward tightening pressure on Iran to return to the nuclear negotiating table, and coordination with Japan and South Korea to push China to increase the cost for North Korea of continuing to pursue its nuclear and missile programs. At its core, though, a coherent policy process would be grounded in a focus on America’s main challenges and opportunities in the world, and an awareness of how China relates to them. Great power competition would be viewed as a means to an end and not as an end in itself. There will be areas where America’s goals will be in direct tension with those of China, such as on Taiwan and the sustainment of America’s alliance network in Asia. There will also be areas where the U.S. and China will have overlapping interests, for example on promoting sustainable global economic growth and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A sober policy process would be able to discriminate between the two areas in order to manage friction while taking advantage of opportunities to enlist China’s contributions to challenges the U.S. cannot solve on its own.

### Prodict---Gohz

#### Eugene Gohz meticulously analyzes the situation – prefer the word of multiple Middle East and Foreign Policy scholars.

Responsible Statecraft (RS) 22, online magazine of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; publishes outside contributors and reporters as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news to promote a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy and critique the ideologies and interests that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure; 6-24-2021, ("Symposium: Time to bring all U.S. troops home from the Middle East," https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/06/24/symposium-time-to-bring-all-u-s-troops-home-from-the-middle-east/, kav)

Scholars weigh in on Eugene Gholz’s new paper, which argues that the countries in the region can keep their own powers and rivalries in check.

Is the United States truly ready to get its military forces out of the Middle East? Should it? Considering there are upwards of 60,000 troops in the region today, many of them stationed on bases in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, this is a question ripe for debate.

In a new paper for the Quincy Institute, University of Notre Dame scholar Eugene Gholz argues in detail that the fundamental reasons for American military involvement there — security, oil, human rights — no longer apply, and that staying there only emboldens the bad behavior of regional actors. In his Gholz’s words, “If the United States is in fact interested in a more stable Middle East, it must remove its weight from the scales and allow the region to recalibrate according to its actual multipolar balance of power.”

As such, he writes, Washington should start packing for a significant military withdrawal over the next five to 10 years.

Responsible Statecraft asked several Middle East and foreign policy scholars to comment on Gholz’s arguments, and to discuss whether this dramatic shift is feasible and necessary for U.S. and regional interests.

The 20th anniversary of 9/11 is almost upon us. In the two decades since, we have spent billions of dollars in the Middle East to contain terrorism, sold trillions of dollars worth of arms to our regional allies, and built up our own military footprint in the Gulf to protect American interests. What does the balance sheet look like as we approach this anniversary? Was the treasure well-spent? Were American interests well served?

As the curtain rises on the third decade after 9/11, the spotlight inevitably focuses on what our national interests are in the Middle East, and whether an extensive military footprint there is still necessary. Both Presidents Obama and Trump, and indeed, now Biden, in their own ways have pushed for a pivot away from the costly ventures in the Middle East and toward a new focus on southeast Asia. Yet reducing bases and troops is never easy, particularly as figuring out what American interests actually are today in the Middle East — beyond the core principle of preserving and advancing the security of the American people — is still being debated.

Focusing in-depth on two main interests, preventing the rise of a hostile regional hegemon and the interruption to the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, Eugene Gholz thoroughly debunks the need for a permanent U.S. military presence to accomplish either, with the overwhelming superiority of U.S. airpower being so definitive, and yet, so easily able to be flown in when needed.

U.S. dominance is not where the nuance of his argument against a permanent Middle East-based presence lies, however. It does not even lie in his analysis of the failures of U.S. troop action in the Middle East — in the wars to stamp out terrorism, the inability to dissuade states from acquiring a nuclear weapon, or the compromises made over the protection of human rights.

The argument’s nuance lies in its highlighting an issue that is often ignored because of what it says about American identity, but which is critical to making a success out of next steps: that the very presence of a behemoth the size and power of the U.S. military, which of course is foreign to the region and naturally favors some states against others, is actually working against core American interests.

The heaviness of our presence sucks the oxygen out of local efforts to establish working relationships between and with neighbors, such as the Gulf states and Iran, which must exist proximate to each other regardless of differences in religion or ideology. Our high troop footprint stymies a sense of responsibility and ownership by the community of Gulf and Middle East states to develop their own regional security agreements, since those that are U.S. partners consider U.S. military protection the better bet, even if it does mean internal instability and conflict with neighbors. U.S. military presence is even skewing the containment of today’s fragmented form of terrorism by making it a military rather than a policing and governance responsibility — generating blowback for an ongoing cycle of terrorism.

The irony is, none of these issues have direct bearing on U.S. national interests — these are all local issues, and Gholz rightly points out they don’t, even remotely, threaten the U.S. heartland. In other words, we have become part of the problem over there — and in the process, we are neglecting the real threats to our national interests.

The Biden administration seems serious about wanting to revisit force deployments globally. Eugene Gholz spells out many reasons why it should start by reducing the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East.

“The current U.S. force posture in the region is not necessary to guarantee U.S. interests,” he explains. “At worst, the large presence of the U.S. military undermines U.S. interests by contributing to instability, which in turn can enmesh the United States in additional conflicts.”

Consider just three aspects of a very comprehensive paper: oil, regional hegemony, and human rights.

Too many in the DC policy community still operate under assumptions informed — or, more accurately, misinformed — by the Arab oil embargoes of the 1970s, and by an energy market that has transformed many times over since then. Today, those who believe that ensuring the flow of Middle Eastern oil is a vital U.S. interest are prepared to expend considerable resources — and risk the lives of American servicemen and women — in the service of that mission, but Gholz conclusively demonstrates that fears of supply disruptions leading to serious economic harm are overblown.

A related but distinct alleged rationale for a substantial U.S. military presence is to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon. But, once again, Gholz demolishes the suggestion that Iran — or any other aspirant — is likely to prevail. Indeed, Gholz crafts an exceptionally sophisticated and thorough argument documenting the many reasons why establishing hegemony is extraordinarily difficult under any circumstance — and particularly so in today’s Middle East. This section alone is well worth the price of admission.

Gholz points to yet another reason for questioning the net benefits of a de facto permanent U.S. military presence in the Middle East — the undermining of Americans’ professed commitment to democracy and human rights. The U.S. government’s long-standing support for autocratic governments throughout the Middle East exposes Americans to charges of hypocrisy and double standards.

Advocates for a U.S. military presence often invoke the argument that these forces provide the United States with leverage, allowing Washington to shape the region’s long-term trajectory and, eventually, enable democracy to prevail. But, as Gholz wisely observes, given “that many of America’s strategic partners in the region are some of the world’s most notorious human rights violators, it is more reasonable to conclude that the U.S. military presence in the region has served to protect these regimes despite their human rights violations.” Claims that Americans care about the freedom and general well-being of average men and women are belied by the reality of the close — and often personal — connections that U.S. foreign policy elites have with the region’s privileged few.

Some realists may dismiss such concerns as ephemeral, but the high levels of anti-American sentiment in the region derive, in part, from the sense that American leaders talk out of both sides of their mouths — and this can produce grave consequences. In an earlier era, following the revolution that overthrew the tyrannical Shah of Iran, the people of Iran turned their ire toward the United States for having installed and maintained him in power for decades. One can only imagine how much anger and resentment has built up against the ruling classes in other countries in the region, and how that animosity might someday be directed against the American people.

In short, Eugene Gholz has delivered an important report informed by present realities, and well-suited to the future. Policymakers in the Biden administration determined to craft a sustainable grand strategy for the United States will find many useful insights here.

The large U.S. military footprint in the Middle East dates to the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. It ramped up further during the 1991 Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait and again after 2001 in the so-called “War on Terrorism” that featured invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

But the need for 50,000-plus troops permanently in the region is waning, especially as the United States finally withdraws combat forces from Afghanistan. With long-term bases in Germany and Italy and another convenient location to the east of the region on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, there is no reason for the United States to keep large numbers of military personnel in perpetuity in the Arab countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

The arguments made by Eugene Gholz in the paper for the Quincy Institute are sound. My only caveat is that I am not optimistic that, left to their own devices, the countries in the region will be able to create a new security architecture. Iran, despite decades of sanctions, has shown an ability to exploit the internal weaknesses of Arab countries through bankrolling local proxies and is unlikely to stop.

Meanwhile, the Arab monarchies on the Persian Gulf have failed to coordinate successfully. Smaller Arab states fear being dominated by Saudi Arabia and losing freedom of maneuver. The failure of the Gulf Cooperation Council after four decades to even coordinate missile defenses — not to mention the pointless Saudi and Emirati-led boycott of Qatar from 2017 to 2021 — is ample evidence of regional dysfunction, even without taking into account the historic rivalry between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Iran.

However, as the United States withdraws from the region, the need for de-escalation of local conflicts intensifies. It is probably best served by a continuation of bilateral talks between Iran and its neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia. Such talks have already begun in Iraq and could lead to a rapid restoration of diplomatic ties and people-to-people contact including Iranian participation in the hajj and athletic and cultural exchanges.

Normalization of Saudi-Iranian relations should also help reduce in violence in Yemen, site of the world’s largest humanitarian disaster.

The consolidation of power in Iran among conservatives after the June 18 presidential election might facilitate a decrease in regional tensions as the incoming Raisi administration needs to focus on repairing Iran’s sanctions and COVID-battered economy. While Iran will not end its alliances with non-state actors, it can be persuaded to encourage a lighter footprint and less violent interaction with Sunni Arab-backed groups.The entire region is suffering from the impact of the pandemic and is looking toward a future of greener energy, threatening the main source of hard currency, petrochemicals. It simply cannot afford new wars or a constant stream of advanced armaments.

Instead of maintaining a large and costly military presence in the region, the Biden administration should support any and all diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing tensions. It should start by returning to compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — assuming Iran does so as well — and reducing the potential for accidental clashes with Iran in and around the Persian Gulf. In the event of a true military emergency, the United States can always rapidly deploy. But a constant presence is a recipe for intervention: when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Eugene Gholz has persuasively refuted the notions that the Middle East is in danger of takeover by a regional hegemon and that oil from the region could readily be interdicted enough to cripple the global economy. That those notions are false flows not only from careful analysis, as is found in Gholz’s paper, of the relevant military capabilities and challenges. It also is a matter of interests and incentives.

### Prodict---Horowitz

#### Horowitz is right

**Weeks** Professor of Political Science and H. Douglas Weaver Chair in Diplomacy and International Relations **17**

(Jessica L. P. Weeks, In Why Leaders Fight, Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis approach a fascinating question: To what extent do leaders’ personal experiences and backgrounds influence their decisions about military conflict?, International Politics Reviews volume 5, pages 39–41)

Why Leaders Fight is a monumental contribution to this endeavor. The book introduces the LEAD dataset, a major data collection effort that records the characteristics and life experiences of leaders around the world during 1875–2004. Using these data, the authors study how leaders’ characteristics affect their likelihood of initiating an international military dispute. The book gives scholars and students not only ideas about how the attributes of leaders could matter in international relations, but provides a dataset that scholars can use to make their new own discoveries. The applications of the dataset are virtually unlimited and will allow future scholars to study how leaders’ attributes affect any number of international and domestic policies and outcomes.

Aside from these core theoretical contributions and impressive dataset, the book has many additional strengths. It anticipates and addresses a number of potential objections to the authors’ arguments that leaders matter, including whether leaders are simply conduits for policy rather than affecting policy independently. The authors take various steps to account for the fact that countries could be selecting leaders with certain attributes, which could affect the correlation between leader attributes and the initiation of conflict. The authors are also admirably clear that leaders do not determine outcomes, but are among many factors that contribute to decisions about conflict, sometimes interacting with other variables such as domestic institutions. I also find both the leader risk scores and the analysis of systemic vs. leader-based factors to be interesting and insightful, and its conclusions to be useful for policy makers. Finally, the book contains helpful and interesting narrative examples of how the backgrounds of specific leaders from around the world might have influenced their foreign policy decisions.

That said, like any book, Why Leaders Fight has some limitations. I will focus on three here, all of which open up rich new areas for future scholarship.

The first is that the book leans rather heavily toward the empirical rather than the theoretical. While this is understandable given the wealth of data the authors have to explore, their theoretical expectations about specific leader-centric variables are often somewhat equivocal. For one, it is not always evident whether the authors have a specific logical reason to expect a certain direct relationship between a leader’s characteristics and conflict initiation; the theoretical discussion is often agnostic, presenting theoretical conjectures as possibilities to be evaluated empirically rather than on logical grounds. In some cases, the authors barely discuss an anticipated theoretical relationship at all, even when the results (shown in detail in the helpful appendix) are suggestive of an empirical relationship. For example, why is having a “creative” career associated with greater conflict initiation? Why do those with experience as an interpreter initiate less conflict? Why do older leaders initiate more conflict in relatively democratic regimes, but not in autocratic ones? These are theoretical questions that deserve more attention, although the sheer number of variables admittedly makes that difficult.

A second, related issue has to do with the “why” – the causal mechanisms linking specific leader attributes to conflict initiation. Returning to the example of leader age, what evidence do we have for why age matters? The authors suggest that the answer has to do with the leader’s time horizons, but is that mechanism consistent with their empirical finding that age does not matter in autocratic regimes, and only in relatively more democratic regimes? (Figure 4.4). It seems that time horizons should be less important in democracies, where leaders face relatively short time horizons regardless of their age, due to term limits. The authors offer ideas about the mechanisms linking many leader attributes to conflict initiation, and their historical illustrations often contain clues, but future work must assess why certain leader attributes are correlated with conflict initiation.

A third concern is about what causal conclusions we can draw from the evidence in the book. The authors are careful to refute the potential objection that the results are due to selection bias, but an issue that they do not address (at least in the book or the appendix) is about specific modeling choices, particularly the decision to include so many variables in the statistical analyses of specific leader attributes. One potential problem in this vein is that many of the predictor variables in the analyses may be causally related to each other (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Rather than designing specific models to test the effects of specific attributes, the analysis often errs on the side of inclusion at the risk of bias. For example, the authors report that the findings do not support a relationship between education and conflict initiation, but the models used to reach that conclusion include measures of occupation. Education is clearly related to many of the occupations included in the analysis, such as law and medicine. The causal effects of age are also difficult to discern. Regime type probably predicts leader age (if not monotonically) because in some kinds of autocracies, very young leaders can come to power. In democracies, in contrast, there tend to be strict lower age limits. Age probably “causes” military service, combat experience, witnessing a national war, divorce, and number of total spouses. The military career and military service variables are also probably causally related, and the military service and national war participation variables may have a causal relationship as well.2 Finally, regime type appears to be highly predictive of the leader’s gender, with extremely few nondemocratic leaders having been women. Including all of these variables in the same model makes it difficult to parse out the causal effect of each one.

In sum, Why Leaders Fight is an important contribution to our understanding of the causes of military conflict. The authors bring to bear impressive amounts of data to explore the relationship between individual leader attributes and military conflict, while staying attentive to the possibility that systemic and domestic variables could matter (or condition) the importance of individuals as well. These ideas and data provide countless avenues for future scholarship on when, why, and how leaders matter for a host of questions about international and domestic politics.3

### Prodict---Ikenberry

#### Biden loves Ikenberry

Hirsh 20 – journalist, 12/5/20. (Michael, “Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable”, Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/05/liberal-internationalism-still-indispensable-fixable-john-ikenberry-book-review/>, accessed 7/7/22)//jd

Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power. One of their chief manifestos for change, as some of the incoming Bidenites have already privately conceded, will be G. John Ikenberry’s new book, A World Safe for Democracy. It is in some ways the crowning achievement of the Princeton University’s scholar’s decadeslong work explaining and defending the liberal international order. Ikenberry’s research traces the origins of the liberal internationalist project—the idea of building a community of nations based on democracy, cooperation, and the rule of law—going back 200 years. He chronicles it from its inception in the Age of Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions to its near-dissolution in the post-Cold War period under the neonationalist banner of its worst nemesis, President Donald Trump. Ikenberry, in an interview, said that his purpose was to “reframe the debate between nationalism and internationalism” and acknowledge that American policymakers are now dealing with a “liberal internationalism for wintertime rather than a Francis Fukuyama-style liberal internationalism for springtime” of two decades ago. (After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama, the Stanford political philosopher, famously suggested that the triumph of democratic liberal capitalism over communism was so complete it could constitute a kind of “end of history.” This did not turn out to be the case.) Ikenberry says that it’s long past time for Biden and the Democrats to acknowledge that rampaging American hubris after the Cold War led to some of the worst mistakes ever made by liberal internationalists of the modern era: from a Pollyannaish Reaganite belief that neoliberalism (or capitalist free markets) would solve most problems to the equally self-deluding notion that democracy would achieve the same, especially in the Arab world (hence the disastrous Iraq War). Along the way, he writes in his book, nations and especially Washington lost the “shared narrative” of being a diverse but connected international community and became more of a U.S.-manufactured “public utility” dominated by the interests of multinational corporations. And the former concept is what it must return to, he says. “The book tries to provide the deeper theory of the liberal project that Biden is going to try to renew,” Ikenberry said. “I think it’s the first book that attempts to look at a whole tradition and cull it for usable knowledge we can apply today. And to make the point that the post-1989 years [after the fall of the Berlin Wall] were very much an anomaly. Two centuries on, it’s much more of a world-weary, contested run of democracies struggling to build order.” According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team, speaking on background, the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas about readdressing the problems of the American middle class that were sacrificed to overzealous ideas of globalization.According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team, speaking on background, the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas about readdressing the problems of the American middle class that were sacrificed to overzealous ideas of globalization. He also said that reinventing liberal internationalism along the lines Ikenberry recommends will be at the forefront of their efforts. The incoming Biden team has already conceded that both they and the Republicans, pre-Trump, lost their way. They erred badly because they “came to treat international economic issues as somehow separate from everything else,” as Biden’s nominee to be national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote in the Atlantic in early 2019. Under both Democrats and Republicans, “U.S. internationalism became insufficiently attentive to the needs and aspirations of the American middle class.” In a remarkable admission, Sullivan, who served as then-Vice President Biden’s national security advisor, confessed: “During the Obama administration, when the national-security team sat around the Situation Room table, we rarely posed the question What will this mean for the middle class? Many other countries have made economic growth that expands the middle class a key organizing principle of their foreign policy.” The United States suffered a dangerous, society-splitting populist backlash because it did not address that same question, instead recklessly embracing global neoliberalism, and engaging in a confident flinging-open of all borders. The result was the loss of any sense that internationalism was also a way of protecting social and economic equity—the kind of compact that existed after World War II. Another result was a series of policies and trade deals that opened the door to the decimation of the American middle class, particularly to Chinese competition. Beyond that, successive administrations, starting with President Bill Clinton (but in which George W. Bush’s administration was particularly culpable in not punishing Chinese dumping and intellectual property theft under World Trade Organization rules) allowed China to flagrantly violate the rules of the game. The post-Cold War internationalists failed equally in thinking they could easily co-opt major illiberal states such as China and Russia fully into the global system, Ikenberry writes. They did not. The answer may be to make liberal internationalism less “offensive” and intrusive. Instead “it must define itself less as a grand vision of a global march toward an ideal society, and more as a pragmatic, reform-oriented approach to making liberal democracies safe.” China, the major rival to the United States, in particular could at least abide such an approach, Ikenberry argues, because even in its rise to global dominance it is still seeking to work within institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO. “In effect this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly to China and Russia by stepping back from the vision of a one-world liberal order,” he writes. “The emphasis instead would be on coexistence, building on the ‘defensive’ liberal principles of self-determination, tolerance, and ideological pluralism. Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.” Or, some would say, more realist. There is little doubt about the direction the Bidenites will go, because all of them know—as Ikenberry argues—that in the end there really is no alternative. As Sullivan wrote last year: Trump’s neoisolationist approach “is dangerous, but he has surfaced questions that need clear answers. Those of us who believe that the United States can and should continue to occupy a global leadership role, even if a different role than in the past, have to explain why Trump is wrong—and provide a better strategy for the future. … “This requires domestic renewal above all, with energetic responses at home to the rise of tribalism and the hollowing-out of the middle class.” Ultimately, the challenges of modernity will require a reinvented liberal internationalism because, Ikenberry argues, there really is no other system available for dealing with “the problems of interdependence” other than through international cooperation. Climate change, pandemics like COVID-19, nuclear proliferation—all can only be solved through the established global system. “The pandemic is the poster child of that problem,” he said in the interview. But even here the United States must adopt more realist approaches to liberal internationalism. “The problem of liberal internationalism is about managing interdependence, not globalizing the world,” he said. Ikenberry concludes that liberal internationalism must recreate itself as a more restrained version of President Woodrow Wilson’s original vision of making the world “safe for democracy.” But this, again, is likely to be more a defensive than offensive approach. And at home, Ikenberry says, it means finding a brand-new way of making internationalism work for average Americans, especially with labor and environmental protections. The idea of “protectionism” can no longer simply be anathema. Indeed, Trumpist populism will not disappear under Biden. He has already advocated a $700 billion-plus “Buy American” plan and conditioned his return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership he once advocated on greater worker protections. His political platform sounds a not a little Trumpian as well, declaring he will “ensure the future is ‘made in all of America’ by all of America’s workers.” Biden will also continue a campaign begun by former President Barack Obama—but turned into a strident war by Trump—pressuring European allies to pay their fair share of the Atlantic alliance and NATO. In the end, Biden’s return to liberal internationalism will be real, but more demanding of other nations, as was Trump’s. Above all, his approach will focus first at home, on the pandemic and joblessness. “Looking over 200 years,” Ikenberry said, “one of the things I found and which the Biden administration intuitively understands is that in every period where a golden era of internationalism that lifted America to greater heights existed, it was tied to a progressive agenda.” Restoring this vision means going back to the nationalist origins of internationalism, how it arose out of the wars of the 19th century, the industrial revolution, and, in hands of proto-internationalists such as the British politician Richard Cobden, how it became a means to global hegemony and economic prosperity for its first great practitioner, Britain. Cobden spoke of free trade and peace as “one and the same cause,” and at the same time new forms of social internationalism also sprung up, pushing for equanimity for all social classes. The new concept of Adam Smith-conceived free trade presaged “the dissolution of empire, the ending of territorial annexation and the abandonment of aristocratic militarism,” as the British historian Anthony Howe argues. It presaged the modern world, in other words, culminating, ultimately, in the international community institutions proposed by Wilson and imposed and perfected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. But institutions that were always meant to benefit all Americans. These changes in the international system are now so entrenched they cannot simply be undone. Yet they remain badly misdirected at present. Somewhere along the line the idea of internationalism became, rather than a means to achieve the end of national prosperity and peace, instead an end in itself. And this is where policymakers went wrong. In Washington, especially, the domestic impact of liberalization was consistently played down by both Republican and Democratic administrations. The post-Cold War globalization of free trade did indeed create, as the economists predicted, more global equality and prosperity overall. But in the past few decades far more of that equality and prosperity has accrued to developing nations than to the working classes of the champions of globalization like the United States and Europe, where growing inequality has engendered a long-term populist reaction, one that is unlikely to disappear any time soon. As a result, Ikenberry said, “I think we’re in for a kind of managed openness that allows us to protect environmental and labor standards, so as to shore up the democracies.” Even Ikenberry admits there is a long way to go in restoring faith in liberal internationalism in Washington, especially now that the problems of modernity “are like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. There are greater opportunities with technologies and innovation but also greater perils.” Cyber-misinformation, for one thing, that emerged out of the very technology that was supposed to bring us closer together: the internet. “Functioning liberal democracy requires some factual agreed-upon knowledge base,” said Ikenberry, and yet Trump showed that he could exploit the fact that there was no longer such an agreed-upon base—no direction home to broadly established economic and social truths. In the end, Ikenberry calls for a new “Wilsonian moment” but he appears to think it will be something very different from what Wilson himself conceived a century ago. In the interview Ikenberry conceded: “Some will say what we are introducing is a kind of illiberal internationalism instead.”

### Prodict---Kagan

#### **Robert Kagan is correct about the threats to the LIO. He is brilliant at** identifying and clearly explaining the chief forces driving human history,

O’Hanlon, PhD, 18

(Michael, senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy, Robert Kagan is right about the threat of the jungle growing back, 10/1/18  
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/01/robert-kagan-is-right-about-the-threat-of-the-jungle-growing-back/)

With Bob Kagan’s latest book—“The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World”—now the talk of the town (along with one or two other things!), it is time to say it: I am a Kaganite. To be sure, I have some differences with Bob, but there is no modern author who has taught me more, or changed the way I view the world more, than he has. Often, modern liberalism seems to place too much faith in institutions and in the inevitable progress of human civilization. Realism often errs in the other direction, and can be cynical and deterministic. Neo-conservatism places too much stock in American exceptionalism and tends towards overconfidence about the use of U.S. power. These three paradigms leave me wanting. To my mind, a Kaganite believes most or all of the following: The post-1945 order is indeed “the world America made” and still depends largely on **American power** to undergird it; For all its failings, and all of America’s many mistakes, that very successful world order has been an historical anomaly and it is now in significant peril; The order’s fragility is due to the facts that humans and their institutions remain deeply flawed. Left unchecked, the jungle will indeed grow back (or, as Bob writes: “The liberal world order is like a garden, ever under siege from the forces of history, the jungle whose vines and weeds constantly threaten to overwhelm it”); Americans are not necessarily smarter or more ethical than others. Indeed, over its history, America has been a “dangerous nation,” especially and at first in our own Western hemisphere. Americans come from mythical Mars in terms of their assertiveness and their willingness to use force. The narrative we often tell ourselves—that Americans would prefer isolationism and pacifism if the world would just leave us alone—is a myth; The geographic position of the United States, and the fact that it is a melting-pot nation deriving its identity and its purpose chiefly from a set of ideas and ideals, mean that it has a special ability—and thus a **special responsibility**—to **undergird the global order**, especially in terms of security and economics; Yet most Americans do not understand or accept these realities. They need to be constantly reminded and persuaded; Progress in world politics is not impossible, but it is always difficult and always fragile. It is also reversible; and Despite what is often stated as fact, America is not a status-quo power. It is a **disruptive forc**e in world politics, unapologetically promoting **democracy** and **market-based economics** as well as **human rights**. Nor should it apologize. I have my differences with Bob: His new book seems slightly too dark about the state of the world, and nuclear deterrence and memories of the world wars may help us keep the peace more than he thinks. New threats like climate change and massive urbanization around the world may deserve a more central place in his strategic framework. China may merit slightly more empathy as a rising power than he grants it (though only slightly more, I concede). But for identifying and clearly explaining the chief forces driving human history, **Bob is brilliant**. **Few rival him**, and **few write as well** either. At least at this juncture **in U.S. and world history**, please mark me down as a Kaganite!

### Prodict---Mearshimer

#### Offensive realism backed up by Chinas revisionism

**Alenezi 2020** {Danah Ali Alenezi, “US rebalance strategy to Asia and US-China rivalry in South China Sea from the perspective of the offensive realism”, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-10-2019-0132/full/html> //KS}

In fact, there are many evidences support Mearsheimer’s predictions. For instance, in terms of the shift in the balance of power. Arguably, the three decades of the growing economic development placed China as the second largest economy in the world. The economic estimations assert that China’s economy would be the number one by 2020 (Logan, 2013, p. 2). However, the most importantly, China since the 2000s, has been translating this economic power to military might and global influence. For instance, China tripled its military spending during the period from 2000 to 2011 (Mislan, 2017). In fact, this huge spending on military power means the compromise the balance of power in Asia in favor of China. On the other hand, it gives an indication that China actually seeks to be a regional hegemony. The assertiveness and strictness of China’s foreign policy, particularly in the SCS since 2008, are another important indication of the Mearsheimer’s predictions. Moreover, China’s foreign policy since 2008 has become a more stringent in many flashpoints issues with the USA such as climate change, North Korea, Taiwan and Iran ([Anderson and Cha, 2017](https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-10-2019-0132/full/html#ref002), pp. 605-606).

### Prodict---Nye

#### Soft power key to hegemony---hard power fails

**Wagner 14** [Jan-Philipp N, Jan works at the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement. "The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations", E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/// KS]

An example for the ineffectiveness of basing foreign policy making solely on hard power strategies is the U.S. invasion into Iraq in 2003. According to Steinberg, “the strategy [of the invasion of Iraq] failed to understand what elements of power were needed most to defeat the emerging threat” from terrorist groups (2008, p. 159). This misunderstanding resulted in ignoring two key elements of soft power: the Bush administration firstly forgot about the USA’s dependence on their allies’ intelligence and policy forces and on global public support; and secondly, the question of the legitimacy of the invasion was not attributed any importance (ibid., p. 160). In the short term, these mistakes led to the failure of the action. In the long term, they have caused the degradation of American soft power as “the strategy undermined the U.S. global position” (ibid., p. 160) and “global public confidence in U.S. leadership” (ibid., p. 157). The USA felt the endurance of this damage for instance when facing problems of their development aid programs in Africa (cf. Hackbarth, 2008; and see below). Due to the above mentioned factors limiting the effectiveness of hard power, it is hard to find successful foreign policies solely based on hard power resources. Many states now enact soft power rather than hard in its external relations. India’s foreign policy for instance is presently within the process of this transition. Wagner lists two main reasons for this transition: On the one hand, “India’s hard power approach of the 1970s and 1980s was not very successful” (Wagner, 2005, p. 2); and on the other hand, the economic advancement after 1991 facilitated the use of economic tools in foreign policy (ibid.). This explanation mirrors some of the above mentioned factors triggering the decline in the use of hard power.